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Abstract
In 1979, Robert Dawidoff wrote that it “was on the question of slavery that John
Randolph contributed most decisively to American history.” Randolph’s stance on slavery has
perplexed historians and biographers since his death in 1833. This dissertation examines the
paradox of slavery in the life and career of John Randolph from the American Revolution until
the Missouri Compromise. In an attempt to understand his public and private contradictions
concerning slavery and the role of intense sectionalism in his politics, I have attempted to
correlate his words with his actions. An examination of his letters reveal a man decidedly
devoted to the belief that slavery was wrong, but a closer look of his public actions expose his
commitment to preventing anyone from challenging that institution. Randolph’s cognitive
dissonance over slavery is revealed in his letters and speeches, which often display alternating
strands of brutal honesty and masterful self-deception. In his life as a member of the Virginia
gentry, he struggled with deep-seated feelings of regret and angst over holding slaves. In his
public career, Randolph’s attitudes about slavery, slaveholding, and sectionalism cultivated
countless public debates in which he participated. Randolph considered the interests of Southern
slaveholders above all else during his political career. Though in September 1815, he insisted
that he wanted to be the American counterpart to British abolitionist William Wilberforce, he
resisted any public effort to free American slaves. He devoted himself to the public defense of
slavery, while privately planning the freedom for his own slaves. He saw himself as slavery’s
severest critic while he acted as the most ardent defender of Virginia’s slave power. For
Randolph, that transformation occurred primarily in the political realm and was informed by the
declining fortunes of Virginia’s planter gentry. Examining Randolph’s contradictions on slavery
is a means of examining the transformation of antislavery principles in the South during the
Early Republic.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
In January 1824, the United States Congress prepared to pass The General Survey Act,
which would create a system of internal improvements. Secretary of War John C. Calhoun, a
staunch nationalist, had for years advocated a program to build roads and canals across the states,
conquering the space of the expanding republic. The bill would give the president and the central
government unprecedented power in planning and executing public works projects. Calhoun and
his fellow nationalists believed that the bill was necessary to strengthen the economy and the
political Union. Stronger transportation and communication systems would connect sections,
peoples, and ideas. In the House of Representatives, John Randolph of Roanoke rejected this
vision of the nation’s future and warned of the bill’s true ramifications. “I ask the attention of
every gentleman who happens to stand in the same unfortunate predicament with myself—of
every man who has the misfortune to be, and to have been born, a slaveholder,” Randolph said.
“If Congress possesses the power to do what is proposed in this bill,” he argued, “they may
emancipate every slave in the United States.”1
Though Congress passed the General Survey Act, Randolph’s warning became the
clarion call that defined the struggle of slaveholders in American politics until the Civil War.
Indeed, his 1824 internal improvements speech has been widely viewed as a pivotal statement
that defined the antebellum proslavery effort. Historian William J. Cooper has argued that
Randolph’s “doom-laden” prophecy emerged from “two decades of constitutional foreboding.”
James Oakes claimed that the 1824 statement demonstrated the “portents of disunity in the face
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of a rising antislavery threat.” Historians have correctly positioned Randolph as a pivotal figure
in the proslavery political movement that led to the Civil War.2
During the antebellum period, rabid sectionalists promoted the image of John Randolph
as the South’s first sentinel against antislavery forces. In 1860, one commentator chided fellow
Southerners for ignoring “the Cassandra voice of honest John Randolph.” Beverly Tucker cast
Randolph, his stepbrother, as the South’s original fire-eater. In Tucker’s writings, Randolph
became the archetypal Southern gentleman defending the interest of his hamlet, a precursor to
the most tragic creations of William Faulkner. A committed Southern nationalist, Tucker
romanticized his kinsman as the most committed defender of the South. In his 1836 Southern
dystopian political novel, The Partisan Leader, Tucker imagined a civil war, which drove the
Deep South out of the Union and led Virginia to defy the tyranny of a fictional President Martin
Van Buren, then in his fourth term. As the fictional Virginians finally stepped forward to defend
their rights, it seemed as “if the spirit of John Randolph had risen from the sleep of death.”
Tucker believed that Randolph had handed Southerners a charge to defend slavery from
Northerners and abolitionists.3
In August 1836, the same year that Tucker published his novel, William Lloyd Garrison’s
The Liberator portrayed a very different John Randolph. After his death in 1833, the public
learned that the arch-defender of slavery had granted freedom to his slaves and provided for their
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resettlement in free Ohio. “I give to my slaves their freedom, to which my conscience tells me
they are justly entitled,” his will declared. Furthermore, Randolph had expressed the “deepest
regret” of ever inheriting them. His closest relatives, the Tucker family, insisted that he had been
insane when he wrote the will and contested it in the Virginia courts. In coverage of the
litigation, The Liberator and many other Northern papers offered anecdotal evidence that the
South’s most ardent slavemaster had really been an antislavery man. In one colorful anecdote, a
stranger appeared at his plantation, where Randolph served him dinner. During the meal, his
guest inquired about buying one of Randolph’s favorite servants. Realizing that his guest was a
slavetrader, Randolph drew his pistols and chased the man out of his house. Following the
stranger on horseback with guns pointed, Randolph shouted—“Off my grounds, you rascal!”4
Randolph’s complicated relationship with slavery confounded contemporaries and has
mystified scholars, historians, and biographers. In 1922, William Cabell Bruce, Randolph’s most
comprehensive biographer, wrote that “there was a lack of coherence” in his public views on
slavery. Russell Kirk’s John Randolph of Roanoke has argued that Randolph served as a bridge
between the antislavery early republic and the proslavery South of the antebellum period. Kirk
viewed Randolph’s defense of slavery as an unfortunate part of his conservative philosophy’s
emphasis on preserving tradition and portrayed Randolph as hopelessly trapped by slavery.
Robert Dawidoff contends in his The Education of John Randolph that “[i]t was on the question
of slavery that John Randolph contributed most decisively to American history.” Randolph’s
political position on the issue “charted the course” for the South’s eventual secession from the
Union, Dawidoff argued. Yet, in his attempt to reconcile the proslavery and antislavery positions
of the man, Dawidoff conceded that the issue of Randolph and slavery is “at once simple and
4
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confusing.” Each of these authors placed Randolph among the generation of hopeful Southern
antislavery men from the Revolutionary era which included Thomas Jefferson, James Madison,
and Randolph’s stepfather, St. George Tucker. During the complex political era between the
American Revolution and the Missouri Compromise in 1820, Randolph held private antislavery
and public proslavery beliefs “without hypocrisy,” Dawidoff argued.5
The idea of Randolph as principled conservative intellectual has dominated writings
about him since the middle of the twentieth century. “Through his many speeches and letters and
his long political career, Randolph transformed the republicanism of the Revolutionary
generation and the anti-Federalists into a modern conservative ideology that was distinctly
southern in nature,” Adam L. Tate has argued. This portrayal of Randolph as a conservative
intellectual has its origins in Russell Kirk’s effort to make him the “American Burke.” While
Randolph read and admired the writings of British philosopher Edmund Burke, especially after
the War of 1812, the characterization of Randolph as a Burkean conservative intellectual is
largely unwarranted. Randolph never composed a treatise, articulated a concise vision of his
political ideas, or ever revealed himself to be a systematic thinker of any kind. His letters and
speeches reveal devotion to republican ideology, which in politics translated to his struggle to
weaken the central government. Beyond this, his political doctrine consisted of an unwavering,
unprincipled, and often irrational devotion to obstruction in governance. His stance on measures
5
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before Congress changed without explanation often from the basest of political reasons. For
instance, in 1808, just weeks after proposing an embargo on all imported goods, Randolph
opposed Thomas Jefferson’s nearly identical plan. His difficult and obtuse personality explains
much of his hostility toward political enemies and friends, most of whom he assumed to be
beneath him in social status, if not intelligence. While those who knew Randolph certainly
considered him learned, few of his colleagues considered him an intellectual. Instead, he was
above all else, a brawling, instinctual politician who reacted to circumstances, events, and the
wishes of his constituents. Randolph’s actions and words reveal that most of his political
decisions were made from the deepest reasons of self-interest: protection of the power of the
Virginia slaveholders and prevention of any interference with the institution of slavery. 6
This dissertation examines the paradox of slavery in the life and career of John Randolph
from the supremacy of the Virginia planter gentry until the dawn of American democracy. In an
attempt to understand his public and private contradictions concerning slavery and the role of
intense sectionalism in his politics, I have attempted to match his words with his actions.
Randolph’s cognitive dissonance over slavery is revealed in his letters and speeches, which often
display alternating strands of brutal honesty and masterful self-deception. Using any term to
describe or characterize Randolph presents problems. Although Randolph certainly labeled
himself a republican, he also described himself in numerous contradictory terms—rationalist,
Christian, Muslim, atheist, antislavery, and revolutionary. He also espoused devotion to ideas of
liberalism, egalitarianism, and aristocracy at different points in his life. His intense devotional
attachment to his beloved state was at times punctured by expressions of hatred for and
6
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disappointment in his fellow Virginians. Indeed, nothing in Randolph’s life was beyond potential
rebuke.
In his public career, Randolph’s attitudes about slavery, slaveholding, and sectionalism
informed countless public debates in which he participated. In his life as a Virginian, he
struggled with deep-seated feelings of regret and angst over holding slaves. An examination of
his letters reveal a man decidedly devoted to the belief that slavery was wrong, but a closer look
at his public actions expose’s his commitment to preventing anyone from harming that
institution. As with most humans who grapple with serious moral questions, equivocation,
reversals, tragedies, and financial hardships influenced his attitude. Therefore his rhetoric and
actions changed from year to year. In 1799, he denied being an abolitionist. In 1800, he wrote a
will freeing his slaves, which numbered approximately 120 to 140. In 1804, he wrote of his
growing love for the plantation. In 1807, he opposed abolishing the foreign slave trade. In 1810,
he wrote that he had finally reconciled himself to slavery. In September 1815, he insisted that he
wanted to be the American counterpart to British abolitionist William Wilberforce. In October
1815, he again insisted that he reconciled himself to slavery. In 1816, he insisted that his public
support for the American Colonization Society was to strengthen slavery. In 1818, in a letter to a
Philadelphia Quaker he indicated that he would consider federal intervention on the matter. In
1819, he wrote another will freeing his slaves and providing for their care in a free state. In 1820,
he offered a blistering defense of the rights of slaveholders in the Missouri debate. While he
lived this life of contradiction, the slave population at Roanoke continued to grow. When he died
in 1833, nearly 400 slaves lived at Roanoke. He saw himself as slavery’s severest critic while he
acted as the most ardent defender of Virginia’s slave power. Dawidoff’s assertion that
Randolph’s relationship to and position on slavery was at once confusing and simple appears to
6

be an understatement. Examining Randolph’s contradictions on slavery is a way to also examine
the transformation of antislavery principles in Virginia from the early Revolutionary era to the
intense sectionalism of the Missouri Compromise. For Randolph, that transformation occurred
primarily in the political realm and was informed by the declining fortunes of Virginia’s planter
gentry.
His disparate views about slavery had arisen during his childhood and stemmed from the
crisis of Virginia’s plantation system. His earliest memories were of life at Cawsons, the
plantation home of his grandfather, Theodorick Bland, Sr., in the Virginia Tidewater. Randolph’s
mother, Frances, instilled in all of her sons a devotion to the Virginia gentry, the small group of
families who had controlled Virginia’s economy, political system, and society for more than a
century. Land and slaves gave the gentry its power and means of influence and made it truly
independent. For that reason, she taught him that above all else, he must protect his property. The
planter aristocracy became the predominant organizing institution of his life, giving him social
standing and instilling in him a sense of superiority. The gentry, after all, represented the natural
leaders of Virginia, he was taught. Randolph and his brother Richard wanted nothing more than
to become Virginia planters, as their father and all of their males ancestors had been.
Specifically, for the Randolph children, the extensive debts of their father, John Randolph, Sr.,
threatened their inheritance, as creditors pursued the family for repayment.
In early national Virginia, Randolph came of age in a household devoted to the idea that
slavery was wrong and should eventually end. His stepfather, St. George Tucker, believing that
Virginia’s agricultural and social systems were in an irredeemable decline, urged Randolph to
plan for a future independent of the plantation. Tucker and Richard Randolph, John’s brother,
both took decisive action against slavery. In 1796, St. George Tucker presented a plan for
7

gradual emancipation to the Virginia General Assembly. Tucker argued that slavery betrayed the
republican commitment to natural rights and warned of severe consequences if Virginia refused
to eradicate the institution. When Richard Randolph died the same year, his last will and
testament revealed that his estate would free all of his slaves and would provide for their future.
In the document, Randolph condemned slavery in the harshest moral terms and scorned the
previous generations of the Virginia gentry who had encouraged its growth. Tucker and Richard
Randolph, both students of the eminent jurist and fervent antislavery activist George Wythe,
believed that slavery violated the natural rights of the black population and degraded the white
masters. While studying in Philadelphia during the 1790s, John Randolph also became a devotee
of the antislavery cause. Obsessed with the French Revolution, he followed closely the struggle
for liberty in Europe, paying close attention to abolition efforts in England and France. After he
inherited his plantation, Roanoke, he told several neighbors of his hope to eventually free his
slaves. When he ran for public office in 1799, his enemies attacked him as an abolitionist.
In 1789, while studying at Columbia College in New York City, John Randolph observed
the beginning of the new United States government, regularly attending sessions of the First
Congress. From the gallery, Randolph observed Thomas Tudor Tucker, a South Carolina
congressman and brother of St. George, as he passionately opposed the new financial measures
of the federal government. The expansive financial plans of Alexander Hamilton spurred
Tucker’s opposition, but he and other slaveholders from the Deep South expressed their fears
that the government would use its powers to emancipate the slaves. If the federal government
attempted such a plan, Tucker warned, the nation would risk civil war. Tucker, joined by fellow
congressman Theodorick Bland, Jr., John Randolph’s uncle, vehemently defended the states
against any federal interference with slavery. The young Randolph became devoted to Thomas
8

Tucker, who frequently allowed the boy to dine with him in the company of the most powerful
men in the government. Soon, John Randolph’s views reflected the staunch Anti-Federalist, prostates’ rights views of Thomas Tucker. When Randolph was elected to the House of
Representatives in his own right, he attacked similar petitions from Philadelphia’s antislavery
community during his first congressional speech. Like Thomas Tucker, he insisted that the
House and the federal government had no power to interfere with slavery.
This divergence of action and words defined Randolph’s private and public life. He
objected to slavery in principle and talked of freeing his slaves, yet once he became a planter, he
expanded his plantation and encouraged the reproduction of his slave population. During his first
campaign for public office in 1799, objections from his constituents forced him to deny and
effectively to disown his antislavery past. As a member of the House of Representatives, he
refused to support any antislavery effort that came before Congress, and instead proved an
indefatigable defender of the rights of Southern slaveholders and slavery. Even in matters where
Congress enjoyed clear constitutional authority, Randolph refused to defend any measures that
might harm slavery. In 1803, when South Carolina reopened its slave trade to the universal
condemnation of the nation, Randolph privately blasted the decision as foolish and dangerous,
and declared it an open invitation to import rebellious slaves. Yet, he refused to support a tax on
imported slaves in the House.
As chairman of the House of Representatives’ Committee on Ways and Means and as the
floor leader of the House Republicans, Randolph usually fought to limit the power of the federal
government. But during the first term of Thomas Jefferson’s presidency, Randolph violated his
own principles when it came to supporting measures that benefited slaveholders, such as an
expansion of the fugitive slave law and the purchase of Louisiana. He objected to the nationalist
9

course of Jefferson, deeming it a threat to republicanism and, eventually, the South. Breaking
from the Republican party, Randolph proved ardently defensive of slavery. The extent of
Randolph’s hostility toward any antislavery federal policy became evident when he opposed the
measures abolishing the foreign slave trade. Although most of the nation agreed with the
decision to abolish the trade, Randolph threatened disunion over the possibility of federal or
Northern interference with the institution.
The Napoleonic Wars threatened the stability of the Western world and the AngloAmerican relationship. Randolph saw the “age of revolutions and changes” as evil. He feared the
tyranny of Napoleon, but he also expressed dismay over democracy in America. A new class of
men, with popular support and nationalistic in outlook, seized on the perpetual crisis of AngloAmerican relations and pushed the nation to war. Randolph opposed war with Great Britain, and
insisted that a war between the two closely connected nations was tantamount to a civil war. His
republican commitment to peace, anti-militarism, and limited-war ideology, however, had roots
in his deep-seated fear of servile insurrection. He believed that getting involved in the European
conflict would lead to rebellion on the scale of the Haitian Revolution. His position, however,
placed him at odds with the rest of the South and in 1813, for the only time in his career, he was
defeated at the polls. After his defeat, he resided alone with his slaves at Roanoke, where he
meditated on the spiritual and religious questions concerning slavery, and obsessed about the
decline of the Virginia gentry. By the end of the war, Randolph believed that only white AngloSaxons inherently honored liberty, order, and tradition.7
While in political isolation during the War of 1812, Randolph returned to Christianity,
after decades as a non-believer. His religious experience led him to the most vehement
7
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antislavery period of his career. Once he returned to Congress, he pursued, for the first and only
time, an antislavery measure—the abolition of the slave trade in Washington, D.C. In 1816, his
participation in the American Colonization Society was widely viewed as a demonstration of
antislavery sentiment, but in his remarks to its convention, he made it clear that his goal was to
rid Virginia of the free black population, not the slaves. For Randolph, antislavery principles
manifested themselves in his paternalistic desire to care for his slaves. As a Christian, he saw
himself as the slaves’ protector, feeding, clothing, and providing spiritual instruction for them.
He believed that if the Northern antislavery advocates had their way, the slaves would starve and
freeze.
In 1817, Randolph decided to retire from Congress. In the following year his private
sentiments reflected a growing hatred of slavery and he even expressed the possibility that he
could support the use of federal power against slavery, especially the slave trade. A pattern thus
became clear; he expressed his sentiments for antislavery measures more strongly when he held
no power or influence. During 1818-19, suffering from depression and forecasting a gloomy
future for the nation, Randolph appeared to be on the verge of becoming a true antislavery
advocate. His disgust with slavery resulted in a second, more expansive, last will and testament
that guaranteed the freedom and care of his slaves at Roanoke.
In 1819, when economic panic hit Virginia, Randolph’s constituents asked him to return
to Congress. It was during the Missouri debates of 1820 when Randolph seemingly emerged as
the conscience of the proslavery movement. Indeed, many historians view the Missouri crisis as
the birth of Southern nationalism itself. Robert Forbes has argued, in some jest, that “the South
came into existence on Saturday, February 13, 1819,” which was the day that congressman
James Tallmadge offered his amendment restricting slavery. In Forbes’s work on the Missouri
11

Compromise, he attempts to reconcile Randolph’s violent rhetoric and apoplectic defense of
states’ rights with his “oft-cited and frequently displayed hatred of slavery.” Randolph’s lengthy,
vehement, and anti-Northern speeches represented an “effort to forestall the need for an open
defense of slavery.” Those who heard Randolph’s Missouri speeches, however, characterized
them as diatribes aimed at demonizing antislavery opponents, defending the culture of slavery,
and solidifying Southern opposition to a free Missouri. Forbes’s conclusions mirror those of the
abolitionist press after Randolph’s death. To the abolitionist, Randolph was a tortured
slaveholder, saddled with the institution, and pressed into its defense by circumstances; but in the
end, he rectified the great injustice by bestowing freedom on his slaves. Randolph himself
created this narrative. Even when he offered the strongest defense of the right to hold slaves, he
pleaded his hatred of the institution, and portrayed himself and his fellow slaveholders as its
victims. The vehemence and the solidarity of the Northern antislavery movement appalled him.
“These Yankees have almost reconciled me to negro slavery,” he insisted. The Missouri
Compromise convinced him that slavery must be defended against a federal government which
would always hunger for power.8
In his public effort to prevent the federal government from exercising power over the
institution, Randolph resorted to, and even perfected, a vision of doom for the nation. In debates
over military, economic, social, or foreign policy, he expressed his belief in the horrible
consequences of change, especially in regard to slavery. Slave rebellion was always the primary
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danger, but he also foretold disunion, moral degeneration, and the rise of capitalism as the
consequence of the failure to protect Southern society. A careless move could lead to catastrophe
for the region. Randolph saw a doomed South, with or without slavery. If scholars have seen
Randolph as the original fire-eater, a pivotal figure on the road to 1861, it can also be said that
Randolph forecast the results in Richmond in 1865. In his letters, he expressed dismay over
slavery while defending the culture that depended upon it, all the time displaying an awareness
of the ultimate consequences. Randolph, possibly more than anyone else, understood that the
South’s devotion to slavery inflicted the wound that would eventually destroy it. 9
This study of Randolph is informed by the recent literature on the place of slavery during
the early republic. Many historians have attempted to discern slavery’s effects on national
politics and understand when the nation truly started on the irreversible path to the Civil War.
Matthew Mason has argued in Slavery and Politics in the Early American Republic that the
critical period between the War of 1812 and the Missouri Compromise represented the moment
when attitudes about slavery hardened and set the course for the antebellum sectional crisis.
Forbes, of course, sees the Missouri debate as the moment when Southern antislavery leaders had
their last real chance at avoiding the course to the Civil War. George William Van Cleve
believes any chance to prevent slavery was lost before the new federal government convened in
1789, because the most critical slavery decisions had already been made during the
Constitutional Convention. John Craig Hammond and Adam Rothman both offer compelling
arguments that the issue of slavery’s future was decided in local communities in the West as
much as the national capital. An examination of John Randolph’s career before the Missouri
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debate confirms the pervasiveness of the slavery issue in national politics during the first three
decades of the national government.10
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Chapter 2: “Abilities and Exertions:” John Randolph and the Crisis of the Virginia Gentry
Throughout the War of 1812, the United States repeatedly faced defeat at the hands of the
British army. The King’s forces thrashed the inexperienced and ill-prepared American forces
near the Great Lakes and in the American West. As the British Navy raided the Atlantic coast, it
threatened an invasion of the Chesapeake Bay region—the heart of Virginia plantation country.
John Randolph of Roanoke, once the most promising young Republican in Congress, opposed
the war with Great Britain, for which he suffered. His enemies vilified him and then defeated
him at the polls. In March 1814, stung by the rejection of his constituents and friends, Randolph
set out on a journey of reflection that led him through the Virginia Tidewater region. He soon
reached Cawsons, the once magisterial plantation of the Bland family, his mother’s people. In
1773, he had been born there as his father’s generation provoked rebellion against Great Britain.
With a deep sense of nostalgia, Randolph now stared at the “grim and desolate” ruins of the
abandoned plantation overlooking the Appomattox and James Rivers. “The ancient fires of
hospitality were long since extinguished, and the hearthstone cold,” Randolph wrote. The
Tidewater region, which had given birth to Virginia’s planter elite, now seemed “muted and
deserted.”1
The following January, days after the Battle of New Orleans effectively ended the war,
Randolph visited the family of George Logan in Philadelphia. Randolph painted a portrait of the
lost Virginia culture for his antislavery Quaker hosts. Deborah Norris Logan listened intently as
he talked of Virginia “in discription [sic] so Picturesque that I shall not easily forget it.” As he
had recently traveled the “part of Virginia first settled,” the decay had saddened him. “For many
miles not a single family of respectability left, their large Brick houses and extensive
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establishments, formerly seats of elegance and Hospitality deserted and falling to ruins, and the
lands laying wasted,” he told them. He mourned the decline of the planter gentry more than any
physical dilapidation. “Better-bred men were not to be found in the British dominion,” he wrote
to Josiah Quincy. Although class conflict, slave unrest, bitter partisanship, and economic decline
plagued Virginia after the American Revolution, Randolph celebrated only the glorious past of
the planter gentry and mourned its degeneration. His missives about the great Randolph heritage
in Virginia dating back to the seventeenth century obscured a basic reality: the English presence
in Virginia had always been marked by division, violence, inequality, and oppression.2
***
In 1669, William Randolph had departed England in search of prosperity. The Randolph
family’s loyalty to the British monarchy during the recent civil war had led to the loss of the
family fortune. He traveled to Britain’s most important colony, Virginia, where he could rebuild
the family’s fortune. A half-century after the settlement of Jamestown, Virginia’s tobacco market
offered economic opportunities in the growing Atlantic trading world. By 1674, Randolph
patented land on the James River for a tobacco plantation and paid passage for 1,200 indentured
servants to Virginia. The colony’s headright system provided Randolph with acreage for every
servant. These men, many of them veterans of the recent wars, made possible the expansion of
tobacco cultivation. The presence of white indentured servants, African slaves, and the native
Indians, however, made Virginia a volatile place. White servants worked and earned their
freedom and a chance to gain their own tobacco fortunes. Virginia’s native population,
meanwhile, resisted the settlement of these freed servants on the colony’s frontiers, which often
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resulted in conflict. Newly-freed servants saw themselves as “a people press’d at our backs with
Indians.” The settlers called on Virginia’s royal governor, William Berkeley, to wage war on all
of the colony’s Indians and clear the path for settlement. The governor agreed to wage war only
on hostile tribes and continue to maintain trading agreements only with peaceful Indians. In
1676, Nathaniel Bacon, Randolph’s neighbor, led a group of settlers dissatisfied with Berkeley’s
decision in a rebellion against British authorities in Virginia. An inveterate troublemaker who
disdained manual labor, Bacon threatened to depose Governor Berkeley. In September, Bacon
and his men burned Jamestown. The violence threatened the interests of the wealthiest planters
who soon supported Berkeley’s effort to suppress the uprising. William Randolph remained
neutral until Bacon’s sudden death ended the rebellion. Berkeley hanged twenty-three of the
rebels and seized their property. Realizing the danger presented by indentured servants, the
wealthiest planters abandoned them for African slaves.3
The turmoil abated, William Randolph aggressively expanded his land holdings, slaves,
and political power. In 1680, he purchased land at Turkey Island and imported English bricks for
a plantation home, the symbol of a family’s importance. After Bacon’s rebellion, large planter
families devoted their efforts exclusively to the cultivation of tobacco. The land produced wealth
and made independence possible for the planters—but tyranny and dependence for the slaves.
Planter wealth increased as Europe became addicted to America’s cheap tobacco. Gathering
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wealth and land became Randolph’s primary goal. In 1698, he used his political connections to
purchase, for £150, Curles, the old estate of Nathaniel Bacon. At the time of his death in 1711,
Randolph owned over 10,000 acres of land in the lucrative Tidewater area, enough for a
plantation for each of his sons. His fourth son, Richard, inherited Curles, the Bacon estate, and
established his own branch of the Randolph family.4
The expansion of wealth led to the consolidation of the planters’ political power. Families
such as the Randolphs hoped to recreate in Virginia a British-style aristocracy, which required
control of the colony’s land, political system, and the lower ranks of people. Small farmers,
known as the yeomen, borrowed from the wealthiest planters to buy their own land and slaves,
while tenant farmers lived in perpetual debt to the large planters. Slaves proved essential to the
gentry’s subjugation of other classes, since they freed planters from any manual labor. Instead,
planters concentrated on solidifying their political power. The gentry contended that they were
the colony’s only independent people, an entitled class born to rule over their dependents—
slaves, servants, yeomen farmers, poor whites, free blacks, and women. And according to custom
and law, they became entitled to cultural and legal deference. The planters instituted the British
legal custom of entail by which a planter specified in his will his desire to leave his land to the
eldest son and his heirs. This practice prevented those inheriting land from selling or disposing of
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it. This bestowed the aura of inevitable and natural leadership on succeeding generations.
Entailed land was the mark of the gentry and the means of holding onto power. In a short time,
this landed gentry controlled Virginia politics. William Randolph initially served as sheriff and
justice of the peace in Henrico County. Beginning in 1684, Randolph represented the county in
the House of Burgesses, the colony’s legislature. In 1699, he served as Speaker of that body
before moving into the politically powerful clerkship of the House. His youngest son, John,
would also serve as Speaker and eventually represented the colony during trade negotiations in
London. In 1732, King George II knighted him, and he returned to Virginia as Sir John
Randolph. In a generation, the Randolph family had risen from poverty to royal recognition. The
power of the planter became self-perpetuating.5
***
Richard Randolph of Curles weathered uncertainties in the tobacco market to build a
plantation empire. As more farmers occupied the Virginia Tidewater, land became scarce and the
soil depleted. Randolph expanded his plantation operations into the Virginia Piedmont while his
family continued to live in the Tidewater. While he owned several distant plantations, Randolph
and his wife, Jane Bolling, whose ancestors included Pocahontas, established a model genteel
life in their Tidewater home. The Randolphs furnished their elaborate James River estate with
the finest material goods. Rugs, draperies, and mahogany and walnut furniture filled the house,
and the family enjoyed meals served on fine china. Richard and Jane Randolph wore the latest
English fashions, which visitors could spot in the couples’ portrait displayed in their home.
5
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Slaves and others from Virginia’s lower ranks could watch the master and mistress of Curles ride
through the Tidewater in their fine coach, pulled by well-bred horses. The Randolphs were
representative of the growing planter gentry, where the appearance of wealth became currency in
the social world of Virginia.6
Slaves were as important to the gentry as any material good. The presence of slavery
marked the real difference between British aristocracy and its blossoming replica in Virginia.
Planters had willfully chosen African slaves as their primary source of labor, which they used to
make tobacco profitable. The presence of African natives in the Anglo-Saxon colony gave pause
to some planters, however. In 1742, Virginia was home to 88,000 whites and 42,000 blacks,
most of whom were enslaved. The growth of slavery raised fears of potential insurrection and led
to the development of strategies to lessen the threat. Some of the gentry tried to slow the growth
of the slave population, but Virginia’s economic success required the expansion of the
institution. The gentry worked to turn the racial dilemma to its advantage. Enslavement of
Africans created solidarity among all whites, regardless of class. The sight of black slaves devoid
of any freedom reminded poor white men that they retained their own basic freedoms. Few
planters expressed any interest in the humanity of their slaves. Richard Randolph of Curles saw
his own slaves as little more than animals, predisposed to thievery and the satisfaction of their
sexual lust. Randolph believed that they became more productive and easier to manipulate when
spread across plantations. By the mid-eighteenth the century, the gentry firmly controlled the
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colony’s lower classes, white and black. Unlike their grandfathers, they would experience no
Bacon’s rebellion.7
The expansion of slavery and the growth of opulence, however, also caused instability in
the Virginia economy. Dependence on slavery created indolence and entitlement among planters
determined to maintain their lifestyle. Increasingly, planters mortgaged land, crops, and slaves to
British firms against profits from future crops to buy both necessary and luxury items. The
Virginia economy weakened, especially in the aftermath of the Seven Years’ War, due to the
volatile tobacco market and currency problems. The colony issued paper money to pay for the
war effort and eventually planters used the currency to pay for their private debts to British
merchants. When the war ended in 1763, the paper currency led to inflation, and British and
Scottish merchants objected to payment in diminished currency. The British Parliament passed
the Currency Act of 1764, which forced Virginia to tax the currency out of circulation and forced
repayment in specie. As Great Britain tightened control on the colonial economy, planters
mortgaged even more land and slaves to maintain their lifestyle. Debt carried serious
consequences and the wrong financial move or a disastrous tobacco yield could both ruin a
planter’s finances and damage his reputation. The Virginia economy depended on territorial
expansion, a steady supply of slaves, and British credit; each grew in tandem with one another,
and together kept the Virginia economy afloat.8
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***
When he died in 1748, Richard Randolph left over 114,000 acres of land to his children.
While the older sons inherited the family’s Tidewater land, John Randolph (1693-1737), his
youngest son, inherited a 20,000 acre plantation named Bizarre in the Virginia Piedmont. Unlike
his father, Randolph valued frivolity more than his duties as planter. He journeyed to Canada and
Philadelphia instead of moving to his plantation. Like so many third-generation members of the
gentry, Randolph lived an idle and lavish lifestyle that he could scarcely afford. In 1768, he
mortgaged seventy-eight slaves, a sign of his precarious finances. Accumulating land and
expanding his tobacco cultivation became his obsession as he struggled for solvency and to
maintain his lifestyle. He proved an inept businessman and a seemingly lazy master. One
contemporary deemed him a man “totally without application.” Unlike his father and
grandfather, Randolph held no public office. In 1769, he married his cousin, Frances Bland, a
daughter from another gentry family. His new father-in-law, Theodorick Bland, Sr., supplied the
couple with amenities and slaves but warned Randolph that only “the hand of the diligent maketh
Rich.” Randolph borrowed from family, friends, and storekeepers to maintain genteel
appearances. He became indebted to the London firm of Capel and Osgood Hansbury for
£11,000 after his brother, Ryland, defaulted on his half of a loan. In addition, the firm of Farrell
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and Jones held a note of John Randolph for £1,000. In 1773, Virginia creditors sued Randolph to
collect debts, and the Virginia General Court ruled against him.9
The Randolphs’ struggle to maintain their status as a genteel family explains their
mounting debts and their decision to reside at the Bland family’s Tidewater estate, Cawsons.
Each of Frances Randolph’s three sons entered the world at Cawsons. Richard Randolph was
born there in 1770, followed by Theodorick a year later. In June 1773, came the third son, John
Randolph, named for his father. The aura of the Tidewater remained a powerful idea in the mind
of Virginia planters. Families invested in material goods to impress other gentry families, which
few saw in the wilderness of Piedmont. Randolph purchased a 1,300 acre tract of land in
Chesterfield County and built a plantation home overlooking the James River. Matoax, taken
from Pocahontas’s original name, stood among some of the wealthiest plantations in the colony
and put John and Frances Randolph at the epicenter of Virginia gentility. To achieve the
appearance of prosperity, Randolph had mortgaged all of his land and slaves, except for a single
trusted family servant, Syphax Brown.10
Randolph struggled for solvency and profit in the midst of an imperial crisis between the
colony and Great Britain. The Currency Act had raised fears that Great Britain threatened the
economic independence of the planters. Many planters recognized that their insatiable appetite
for luxury goods created an unequal balance of trade that led to the crisis. Yet the gentry class
9
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refused to embrace austerity and prudence: to do so would admit a loss of social status.
Parliament intensified its imperial economic policy as Britain tried to pay the debts accumulated
during the recent war in America. In 1765, Parliament’s Stamp Act taxed legal documents,
newspapers, and other paper products in the colonies, which infuriated planters from all ranks. In
the Virginia House of Burgesses, Patrick Henry, a product of the middling ranks of the gentry,
led protest efforts, often in language that shocked the most genteel. Henry turned his ire on the
gentry themselves, when they tried to pass measures to relieve heavily indebted planters. The
measures would tax tobacco, which would pay for a loan of £240,000 to pay creditors and give
the most indebted planters time to repay their personal loans. The proposed tax came as the
tobacco market suffered a post-war decline. A young Thomas Jefferson watched from the
audience as Henry condemned the gentry’s “extravagance” and the “spirit of favoritism” with
which they ruled the colony. Henry’s power and thus the power of the middling planters became
evident as Parliament repealed the Stamp Act, and the Governor’s Council rejected the tobacco
tax. Henry forced the gentry to acknowledge his power. By the 1760s, it became apparent that
the ruling gentry was devoted to protecting its own interests and power. These men of
distinction now clamored to protect the interests of the least distinguished of the gentry, men
such as John Randolph of Matoax. As middling men such as Henry and George Washington
gathered wealth, land, and slaves of their own, they threatened the tightly guarded social circle of
the Virginia gentry. This emerging class of middling planters used the republican ideas of moral
regeneration to attack the power of the elite. Less frightened of disorder, they proved more
willing to oppose Great Britain’s imperial policies. In 1769, they led a nonimportation movement
to protest Britain’s economic policies. The effort allowed the gentry to curtail its extravagant
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spending without provoking the shame of its peers. In these years of upheaval, John Randolph
seemed uninterested in these public questions.11
In 1773, the Boston Tea Party triggered a showdown between Virginians and the royal
government that threatened the social order. The colony’s royal governor, Lord Dunmore,
dissolved the House of Burgesses when it petitioned the British government with its concerns.
When the reformed House voted on a resolution supporting the colonists of Massachusetts,
Dunmore again disbanded the legislature. Patrick Henry and other leaders argued that Britain
threatened the colony’s right of self-government, which would subject them to political slavery.
The British government recognized the hypocrisy of such rhetoric coming from planters who
craved more slaves for their plantations. Slavery presented a real problem for the colonists as
they faced potential war. Dunmore and the royal government threatened emancipation in the
event of rebellion, talk which slaves took seriously. In November 1774, a young James Madison
reported local unrest among slaves in Orange County as they contemplated emancipation by the
English. “If america [sic] & Britain should come to an hostile rupture I am afraid an Insurrection
among the slaves may & will be promoted,” he wrote. During the conspiracy, slaves selected a
leader who would lead them to the British during war. The slaves believed “by revolting to them
[British soldiers] they should be rewarded with their freedom.” Madison believed that planters
must keep slaves from even hearing talk of freedom. “It is prudent such attempts should be
11

T.H. Breen, Tobacco Culture: The Mentality of the Great Planters on the Eve of the
Revolution, 189-96; Edmund Morgan, American Slavery, American Freedom, 383-4; Woody
Holton, Forced Founders: Indians, Debtors, Slaves, and the Making of the American Revolution
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 1999), xix, 81-4; Bruce A. Ragsdale, A Planters’
Republic: The Search for Economic Independence (Madison: Madison House, 1996), 48-9;
Wood, Radicalism of the American Revolution, 115-16, 123; William Wirt Henry, Patrick
Henry: Life, Correspondence and Speeches (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1891) 1:76-7;
Greene, “Society, Ideology, and Politics,” 37; John E. Selby, The Revolution in Virginia, 17751783 (Williamsburg: The Colonial Williamsburg Foundation, 1988), 35-40.
25

concealed as well as suppressed,” Madison added. In April 1775, just days after the battles at
Concord and Lexington, Dunmore seized the colony’s gunpowder, declared martial law, and
eventually promised freedom to any slave who helped suppress the rebellion. Dunmore’s action
provoked John Randolph and others to finally become involved in the Revolution, when he and
Theodorick Bland, Sr., and Theodorick Bland, Jr., sold forty slaves to replenish the colony’s
ammunition. A rebellion of slaves would rob Randolph and the Blands of their fortunes and lead
to social chaos and possibly death. The Revolution might prove necessary to maintain their status
and property, and Randolph could ill afford to sit out such a conflict. In November, however,
John Randolph died unexpectedly, leaving his sons a legacy of land, slaves, and debt.12
***
John Randolph would only cast a shadow over the lives of his sons, especially his
youngest, who for decades would sign his name, “John Randolph, Jr.” Instead, their mother,
Frances Bland Randolph, became the most important person in their lives. The twenty-three-year
old-widow now faced stewardship of the vast Randolph land holdings and slaves. Her husband’s
death gave her control over her own destiny and that of her children, but the climate of war made
normal tasks daunting. She left Bizarre in the care of overseers and returned to her home at
Cawsons, where her brother, Theodorick, helped look after her sons. The antithesis of John
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Randolph, the motivated Bland had received a medical education in Scotland and returned to run
his successful plantation, Kippax. Theodorick Bland, Sr. had taken his responsibilities seriously
and secured an education for all of his children, including Frances. This, in part, explains her
skilled and strong management of plantation affairs during a time when patriarchal planter
culture demeaned the opinions and skills of women. Indeed, widowhood offered one of the rare
opportunities for women to control their own affairs. Remarriage could provide stability for her
children, but it also meant the legal loss of her property and other rights. For the moment,
however, Frances remained content to stay at Cawsons with her children as the conflict with
Britain intensified.13
In the fall of 1777, while attending a prayer service at Bruton Parish Church in
Williamsburg to commemorate the victory at the battle of Saratoga, Frances Randolph met St.
George Tucker. A young lawyer and native of Bermuda, Tucker had courted at least one woman
for her fortune, but it seems he developed true emotions for Frances Randolph. After several
months of courtship, the two married in September 1778. Tucker had emigrated from Bermuda,
where his family controlled a powerful shipping empire. The Tucker family profited from war
and commerce in the British Empire, which allowed them to create a network of important
connections in the Atlantic trading world. The patriarch, Colonel Henry Tucker, wanted to
establish a great British aristocratic family, a difficult task on the isolated island. He encouraged
his sons, Thomas and St. George, to leave Bermuda. After studying medicine in Scotland,
Thomas Tudor Tucker settled in South Carolina. St. George Tucker planned to study law in
London, but a traveler convinced him of the opportunities in Virginia. In 1771, the young
13
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Tucker traveled to Williamsburg to study and establish the family’s mercantile contacts in the
colony.14
In Williamsburg, Tucker joined the brewing intellectual revolution that fueled the
colonies’ rebellion against Great Britain. After attending the College of William and Mary, he
read law with George Wythe, the most prominent jurist in the colonies. Wythe immersed his
students in the Enlightenment literature from Europe, ancient classic texts, and readings in the
English common law, particularly William Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England.
Rational thought and republicanism became cornerstones in the intellectual development of
Wythe’s students. Furthermore, he encouraged them to take advantage of their presence in
Virginia’s capital, where they could observe the governing process and understand how the
legislature functioned. The experience convinced the students that the breach between England
and her colonies represented something greater than a skirmish over taxes or trade. Instead, Great
Britain’s policies represented the corruption, abuse of power, and tyranny prevalent under
monarchies and aristocracy. Thomas Jefferson, a former Wythe student, began to envision a
republican society free of monarchy, noblemen, and corrupted institutions. Once freed from their
control, Jefferson believed, virtuous men should rule Virginia. Frugality, self-control, and
disdain for luxury should govern Virginia’s next generation of leaders. A reinvigorated
republican Virginia would then become a more just society, where liberty would reign. For
Wythe, the existence of slavery violated these ideals as much as the actions of the British. The
son of a Quaker mother, Wythe understood the religious objections to slavery, but, as a
committed rationalist, he encouraged his students to embrace reasoned opposition to the
institution. In 1776, Wythe’s influence came to fruition when Jefferson penned the Declaration
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of Independence, a product of the Enlightenment education that convinced him that “all men are
created equal.” 15
While Tucker took Wythe’s lessons seriously, the young student also craved success and
status. Attending the General Court regularly, Tucker mastered the colony’s laws and legal
practices while cultivating relationships with Virginia’s most powerful gentry families, such as
the Nelsons and Pages. In January 1774, Thomas Nelson secured Tucker a clerkship in
Dinwiddie County. In the spring, Tucker presented himself to Attorney General John Randolph,
a cousin of the Randolphs of Matoax, for admission to the bar. The cultivation of gentry contacts
remained Tucker’s ultimate goal as he established a law practice in Petersburg serving wealthy
planters.16
While practicing law, Tucker also promoted the business interests of his family among
the powerful in Virginia. The Tucker family had used the black market to assist the war effort.
From Virginia, Tucker coordinated the smuggling of tobacco out of the colony while arranging
the shipment of sugar, salt, and military provisions to Virginia. His father, however, insisted that
Tucker return to Bermuda to help the family. In 1776, his “Golden dreams of Virginia” seemed
impossible as Tucker left the colony for home. His father relented and soon St. George Tucker
arrived back in Virginia with a load of contraband salt. His marriage to Frances Randolph finally
15
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made Tucker a member of the gentry and gave him access to its social cachet. The deep
patriarchal roots of the gentry attracted Tucker. As master at Matoax, he expected deference and
subordination from children, slaves, and servants. Decades later, Randolph recalled how quickly
life changed under Tucker’s rule. “The first blow I ever received was from the hand of this man,
and not a week after his union with my mother,” he wrote.17
In December 1778, the British military captured Savannah, Georgia, and prepared for the
invasion of the Southern colonies. In the spring of 1779, just months after his marriage, Tucker
enlisted as a private in the Virginia militia, but then used his connections to secure a commission
as a major. Avoiding the war would have invited dishonor for a republican gentleman, especially
as the enemy prepared to invade. In 1780, the American traitor and new British general Benedict
Arnold and the Redcoats invaded Virginia’s Tidewater. Planters panicked as the troops marched
toward Richmond. When the British reached Berkeley, the seat of the Harrison family, they
emancipated the plantation’s slaves. Fearing for his family and property, Tucker rushed to
Matoax where he gathered his wife, stepsons, and the couple’s week-old baby, Henry St. George.
The slaves were sent to Bizarre, hopefully out of the way of the British. Frances Tucker never
had any doubt that her obedient slaves would prove faithful to her. “My faithful Servants are
every thing I cou’d wish them, & are willing to follow my fortune,” she wrote.18
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The British emancipation inspired many slaves to free themselves, which panicked the
already frightened members of the gentry. Along the James, as British troops destroyed
plantations, eager slaves fled to them in search of their freedom. Sensing opportunity, most of the
slaves fled Cawsons. “Your father’s best tradesman went to the enemy,” John Banister wrote to
Theodorick Bland, Jr. After taking his family to Bizarre, Tucker returned to the Tidewater and
helped his father-in-law recover his slaves, most of whom were valuable skilled laborers. “You
may have heard that the old gentleman has suffered much by the absconding of his negroes,”
Tucker wrote Bland, Jr., Tucker, and Bland recovered all but two of the slaves. The British army
succeeded in terrorizing the gentry, however. Along the James River, planters lost “a
considerable [amount] of slaves,” wrote the Reverend James Madison. Many freed slaves ended
up in the ranks of the British army, which raised fears of revenge. Richard Henry Lee sent word
to Theodorick Bland, Jr., then serving in the Continental Congress, warning him about the social
havoc caused by the British invasion. “Shew [sic] this to Col. Bland & it will surely rouse him to
exert all his powers in Congress to procure us assistance & that which may be effectual—the
enemy affect to leave harmless the poor & they take everything from those they call the rich—
Tis said that 2 or 3000 negroes march in their [the British] train,” wrote Lee. Theodorick Bland,
Sr. wanted to maintain the social order of the gentry. The episode spooked the elder man so
much that he abandoned Cawsons for his safer property in Amelia County. In the midst of war,
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his slaves built a large new plantation home, Springfield, which Bland filled with expensive
furnishings.19
The Revolutionary War threatened social disorder, which upset Theodorick Bland, Sr.
Since the beginning of the war, Virginia General Assembly had paid bounties to fill the military
ranks, but as the war dragged on, enlistments declined. Seeing the “lazy fellows who lurk about
and are pests to society,” the legislature instituted a draft. The lower ranks resisted conscription,
arguing that it fell disproportionately on them. Men from the wealthiest families could avoid
service by paying a substitute, which outraged soldiers. In response, common soldiers deserted
and even rioted in Virginia’s Northern Neck. Although Theodorick Bland, Sr. supported the war,
he now feared that the legislature was waging another kind of war against the gentry. Bland
believed that those without property wanted to usurp the power of the propertied. “Such laws, I
believe, will soon reduce the most opulent fortune to a level with that of the inferior class of
people, especially if the assembly continues to put the power of taxation into the hands of the
very lowest class of the people,” Bland wrote. As the legislature shifted more of the burden
toward the wealthiest planters, Bland feared the possibility of an internal conflict. “[T]heir
proceedings in every respect have been such that, God grant it may not bring on a revolution in
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this state, which I fear is the wish of the assembly,” wrote Randolph’s grandfather Theodorick
Bland. 20
In March 1781, Tucker had returned to the front in North Carolina, where the Continental
army tried to stop the march of General Lord Cornwallis across the Carolinas. As British troops
marched on Guilford Courthouse, Tucker attempted to stop his own men from fleeing in the face
of the enemy. In an altercation, one of his subordinates stabbed Tucker in the leg. He healed
quickly and soon returned to active duty, where his old benefactor Thomas Nelson, now
Virginia’s governor and a general, rewarded him with a staff position. As the war effort moved
into Virginia, Tucker remained stationed at the headquarters of the American army and its new
French allies. By the summer, it became clear that the Americans had worn down the British
with years of warfare. At headquarters, Tucker heard privileged information and proved no
hesitation to capitalize on it for personal gain. In September 1781, as the French and American
forces laid siege to Britain at Yorktown and agents canvassed the countryside in search of
supplies, Tucker instructed his wife to withhold the family’s wheat from American agents and
sell instead to the French, who paid in specie. In October, the British surrendered. Governor
Nelson appointed Tucker to the Governor’s Council, the body which approved all executive
decisions in the state. The lower classes had accused the gentry of benefitting from the war,
which Tucker certainly had. Now he hoped his family could weather the peace as well.21
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***
The leveling tendencies that angered Bland made Tucker aware of the war’s real
ramifications. The conflict diminished the gentry’s power and now the peace threatened their
wealth. Tucker realized that families such as the Randolphs and Blands would have to rely on
their natural talents, instead of land, to preserve their status and the social order. In the final
months of the war, however, Frances Randolph Tucker complained that her sons had “grown
quite Idle and troublesome.” The boys exuded a sense of entitlement that dismissed all but
paternal authority, a common trait of the children of the gentry. During the war, Tucker urged his
wife and the Bland family to find the best tutor for the children. “Lose no opportunity of
procuring a tutor for the boys, for the exigency is greater than you can imagine,” he wrote to
Theodorick Bland, Jr. If the boys hoped to navigate the uncertain future of the post-war era,
Tucker urged his stepsons to find and foster their natural talents and pay the greatest “attention to
your improvement.”22
Tucker stressed improvement and natural talent because peace endangered the Randolph
family lands. The war interrupted the payment of planters’ debts to their British creditors, but
legislators realized that, if and when the colonies won the war, trade relations between the
nations would have to resume. Failure to repay those debts could damage efforts to reestablish
trade and put Virginians in unfavorable trading relationships. Members of the Virginia General
Assembly argued that the war canceled the debts. In late 1781, as a result of anger surrounding
the emancipation of slaves during Arnold’s raid, the legislature declared a moratorium on debt
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repayments and closed the Virginia courts to British creditors. In the peace negotiations in Paris,
the British insisted on repayment and secured a guarantee in article four of the Treaty of Paris
(1783) that state governments would remove impediments to debt collection. The United States
owed £4,000,000, with Virginians owing £2,000,000 of that. Anticipating the peace, the
legislature reopened the courts to British creditors. Virginians resisted repayment until Great
Britain compensated slaveholders for slaves freed during the conflict. Although the legislature
technically reopened the courts, the gentry agreed on an unwritten policy of obstruction. When a
debt collection lawsuit actually made it before a Virginia court, judges often refused to hear it.
After the war, Tucker returned to the practice of law, in large part because he realized that
planting could never provide him or his family with the security he desired. In his law practice,
he witnessed the troubling debt cases and realized that repayment was necessary, if Virginia
hoped for a peaceful and prosperous economy. Virginia’s debt could interfere with
reestablishment of normal trading relations between England and other colonies. A reckoning
loomed, and it appeared it would doom the future of Tucker’s stepsons. When the Hansbury firm
initiated litigation for repayment of the debts of John Randolph of Matoax, Tucker expected that
all of the Randolph land would have to be sold.23
A successful future for the Randolph children would require a life independent from the
land. Frances Tucker had taught John Randolph, Jr., to value the land above all else, since it
23
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served as the basis of his political, social, and literal survival. He later remembered riding with
her on horseback during the war, when she stopped to survey the land before her. “When you get
to be a man you must not sell your land; it is the first step to ruin for a boy to part with his
father’s home: be sure to keep it as long as you live. Keep your land and your land will keep
you,” she told him. The land remained the basis of their social superiority, but Frances Tucker
also agreed with her husband and encouraged her youngest son “to aspire to be something better
than a mere country squire.” St. George Tucker had no illusion about the boys’ future. “[O]nly
by minding their books,” Tucker advised his wife, “would their future success be assured”24
In 1781, the Tuckers sent their children to the school of Walker Maury in Orange County,
Virginia. The boys had obtained a nominal education during the war, but the invasion made
consistent study impossible, and they descended into a pattern of undisciplined habits. Maury, a
former classmate of Tucker’s, promised to “improve their morals and their understanding.” The
teacher ruled his classroom with iron discipline and a rigid structure, which seemed tyrannical to
the Randolphs. It was the youngest son’s first time away from his mother and his home, which
made the experience even more difficult. For the first time, he faced a regimen of work and
structure. For the first time, too the Randolph children were exposed to those from the lower
classes. After his years of sheltered life at Matoax and Cawsons, Randolph encountered people
from Virginia’s middling ranks, and he found the experience unpleasant. “Some four or five of
us were gentlemen’s sons and, as such, heartily envied and hated by our companions,” he wrote.
The experience evoked the sense of privilege and social superiority in John Randolph as he
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observed those beneath his social status. “I have a perfect recollection of the shock with which
the vulgar habiliments and boorish manners of my schoolmates and sordid, squalid appearance of
the whole establishment, and the economy of the place, inflicted upon me,” he wrote. From the
moment his education began, Randolph begged to remain at the plantation. Tucker forced his
stepsons to continue at Maury’s school after it moved to Williamsburg, where it became
affiliated with the College of William and Mary.25
Maury offered a solid education although Randolph later asserted otherwise. At
Williamsburg, he achieved academic success and was placed in the head class. He learned
French and Greek and excelled at classical studies. Randolph particularly enjoyed the studentstaged classical dramas. Throughout his life, Randolph demonstrated a command of the classics,
philosophy, and literature, all topics in which he excelled at Maury’s school. Yet he hated
Maury’s power over him. Randolph’s explosive temper and insistence on privilege often led to
beatings from the schoolmaster. His primary goal while at the school was his return to Matoax.
Only Randolph’s peculiar health problems rescued him from the stern school of Maury.26
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Randolph had experienced several mysterious and serious illnesses, which caused his
parents to fear for his life. Maury believed they came “only from eating too much butter,” and
typically ignored them. In 1784, Tucker sent John to his father’s estate in Bermuda “for the
reestablishment of his health.” Randolph found the excursion liberating since it allowed him to
escape “the austere rule of my stepfather and the tyranny hardly bearable of Maury.” He enjoyed
studying with a recently arrived schoolmaster, Alexander Ewing, and the large library at the
Tucker estate. Most of all, he relished his freedom. In 1785, St. George and Frances Tucker
journeyed with the entire family to Bermuda and brought Randolph home to Virginia. At home,
his parents again sent him to Maury’s school, which now met in the abandoned capitol at
Williamsburg. He surpassed other students as he excelled in his readings. “I have left off Latin
and devoted myself entirely to greek & French until the boys have finished virgil & the long
expected time will come when I shall begin Horace,” he informed his mother. Yet Randolph
resisted authority at all turns at the school. He felt no compunction about challenging other
students, teachers, or attendants, particularly if he believed them beneath his status. In one
incident, Randolph clashed with an Englishman whom Maury had appointed steward of the
children’s rooms. “We just had a violent quarrel the subject of which was whether I should burn
a candle in my room,” he wrote to his mother. He thought nothing of taking the incident to
Maury. The boy demanded the deference due to someone of the gentry and it often led him into
conflict. Soon, Tucker condemned the corrupting influence of Williamsburg and removed the
children, a decision hastened by John Randolph’s behavior.27
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Raised in privilege at Cawsons, Randolph expected the deference that his ancestors
enjoyed from the lower classes, even as that respect declined. As Theodorick Bland, Sr.
discovered during the war, the Revolution transformed the position of many middling and lower
class planters. In 1776, during the convention to create a new state constitution in Virginia,
George Mason proposed a bill of rights that attacked the colony’s social system. “All men are by
nature equally free and independent, and have certain inherent rights,” he proposed. Thomas
Jefferson attacked the gentry’s domination of the land. The customs of entail and primogeniture
had perpetuated the gentry’s power and determined the fate of Virginia’s economy. Nearly threefourths of the Tidewater land was entailed, which allowed the first generation of Virginia’s
gentry to perpetually control the state. Land in the Tidewater became unproductive, but the law
prevented its sale to those who might improve it. The abolition of entail broke this remnant of a
feudal custom. Furthermore, Jefferson hoped to diminish the power of the wealthiest planters by
advocating manhood suffrage, giving the right to vote to all men, regardless of land holding. At
the 1776 Virginia Convention, the state maintained freehold suffrage, however, which gave the
vote to men who owned more than fifty acres as long as they made the land productive and
continued to improve it. Freeholders became the sole source of political power, holding the
exclusive right to vote and hold office. Jefferson tried, unsuccessfully, to circumvent the law by
requiring the state to give land to those without any. Land ownership became the fundamental
political act in post-Revolutionary Virginia. This placed more power in the hands of Virginia’s
middling ranks while poor whites had little power and slaves none. The Declaration of Rights,
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the abolition of entail, and a voting formula that increased the number of participants in Virginia
elections all represented attacks on the power and standing of the landed elite.28
St. George Tucker’s admonitions about improvement and education emanated from his
first-hand experience in post-war Virginia. Economic depression hit the state as the tobacco
market crashed. In the Tidewater, the situation forced two potential solutions on farmers: turn to
general farming or move west. The exhausted soil, domestic debts, and low tobacco prices led to
abandoned farms in the region as members of once great families traveled westward in search of
cheaper and more productive land. Tucker once had dreams of establishing his own great planter
family, but he realized that success would prove difficult to achieve. In 1782, fearful of the cycle
of debt that affected planters, Tucker returned to his legal practice. “You complain of your being
oblig’d to turn County Court Lawyer. It is true that fall from a gentleman of ease and pleasure to
our Laborious occupation is disagreeable,” Robert Innes wrote to Tucker.29
Traveling the circuit of Virginia, Tucker witnessed the degradation of the Virginia gentry
and the chaos emerging in the state. While planters avoided payment of their British debts, they
could scarcely avoid creditors from throughout the new nation. Tucker represented numerous
planter families in debt cases and watched as their fortunes diminished or disappeared. Often he
28
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pursued planters who failed to pay his retainers. More than the loss of the gentry’s fortunes, the
post-war situation devolved into the decline of deference, the loss of manners, and the threat of
violence. In courts, he saw judges and other local officers lose authority in the public realm.
“Drunkeness, quarelling [sic], and fighting keep the pace, at least, with the Administration of
Justice,” he observed. The gentry made problems worse by failing to recognize their own part in
the state’s declining fortunes. When traveling through Virginia, French military officer Marquis
de Chastellux noted how the gentry “cherishes vanity and sloth, two vices which accord
wonderfully with the already established prejudices.” Tucker believed that the landed elite
maintained a façade of wealth and engaged in self-denial in recognizing its troubled state. The
middling and lower classes were bent on diminishing the gentry’s power, and if lower class
whites joined with slaves, true social chaos could destroy the gentry. In 1782, Edmund Randolph
reported to James Madison that local authorities thwarted a plot by poor whites and escaped
slaves to attack plantations in Clay County. By the mid-1780s, those who worried about a
brewing social revolution, such as Tucker and Madison, advocated a stronger national
government that would help preserve order.30
In 1786, in response to such concerns, several states agreed to consider amending the
Articles of Confederation, specifically to change its commerce clauses to rectify problems with
trade. Virginia selected Tucker, along with James Madison and Edmund Randolph, to represent
the state at a convention of delegates in Annapolis, Maryland. Only five states sent
30
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representatives, which prevented them from making any changes. New York delegate Alexander
Hamilton proposed another meeting the following year, this time to address more of their
concerns about economic unrest and the central government’s lack of police power. They all
agreed. Almost on cue, the delegates’ fears of disorder and unrest came true. In Massachusetts,
Daniel Shays led a band of discontented and indebted planters in a short-lived rebellion against
the state government. In western Virginia, indebted farmers in Greenbrier County led another
unsuccessful revolt against taxation by the gentry-controlled state government. If any of
Virginia’s leaders doubted the need for changes to the central authority, the threat of rebellion
from below convinced them.31
Tucker wanted to remove his stepsons from the coming chaos and the pervasive lethargy
of the gentry. In 1786, on a journey northward, which included the Annapolis meeting, St.
George and Frances Tucker met with John Witherspoon, the president of the College of New
Jersey in Princeton. The college president promised the parents that he and the college could
provide an enlightened education in a controlled environment. In early 1787, John and
Theodorick Randolph arrived at Princeton, while Richard studied under George Wythe in
Williamsburg. At the College of New Jersey’s grammar school, John Randolph became attached
to Witherspoon, who personally instructed him. The schoolmaster soon recognized the young
boy’s intelligence and advanced knowledge, a sign that Maury’s school had benefited him.
Initially, John and Theodorick were “very much pleased by the northern states.” However,
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John’s resentment of authority and natural sense of superiority again emerged. Once
Witherspoon admitted him to the college, his teachers became fools and his fellow students
became nuisances. In a letter home, he declared himself a “ten times better scholar than the
mentor.” During a public speaking contest, he remained “conscious of my superiority over my
competitors” while he “despised” those who believed they could judge him. He wanted others to
recognize and defer to his intelligence, if not his social standing. 32
His parents stressed that Randolph would need to rely on more than his intelligence to
transcend the difficulties of the planter life; he must prove diligent in his work and conduct
himself with reserve. Tucker argued that Randolph’s future success and his happiness “depends
upon the conduct you now pursue.” He believed his stepsons should look to the era’s most
distinguished republican gentlemen such as George Washington and Benjamin Franklin as
models of behavior. Particularly in Washington, they could see a reserved man who controlled
his passions and exhibited a moderate temper. “I shall study hard, not only to be the best scholar
in the class but to give you and Mama all the pleasure in my power,” Randolph assured his
parents. The hope remained that the experience at the College of New Jersey would help shape
Randolph and his brothers into the natural republican aristocracy that would rule in the next
generation. Tucker believed that these republicans needed not only brilliance or intelligence but
an ability to control their emotions, a disinterested approach to public questions, and an
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appreciation for the moral dimensions of law and liberty. Tucker wanted them to embrace these
principles of republicanism to maintain Virginia’s social order, not overthrow it.33
Slavery presented the most serious problem for the Randolph sons and Tucker knew it.
Tucker favored the outlawing of the foreign slave trade in Virginia in 1778 and generally
embraced antislavery ideals. He doubted slavery’s morality and loathed the effect it had on the
white population. The disparity between white and blacks was always evident to Tucker. Indeed,
during the siege of Yorktown when British troops faced serious deprivations, Tucker noted that
the black soldiers died first. “An Immense number of Negroes have died, in the most miserable
manner in York,” Tucker wrote. In the 1780s, however, his search for profits and security led
him to contract out fifteen slaves a year. He was never comfortable in the role of slave master,
and now he was free from the day to day problems of a planter. Frances Tucker exhibited a
certain devotion to the institution and when necessary, a forceful mastery of slaves. Unlike her
husband, she was raised in the presence of unrelenting slavemasters. Her father, brother, and late
husband all ruled their slave kingdoms with authority and decisiveness and she did the same. In
September 1787, with her husband away on the legal circuit, Frances responded to unrest at
Bizarre. Pregnant with her eighth child, she rode the long distance from Matoax and took control
of the Cumberland County plantation:
You will no doubt be surprised my dear St. George to find me absent at your return, but
the necessity is so great. I flatter myself you will think it sufficient apoligy [sic]. The
existance [sic] of everything at Bizarre probably despends [sic] upon it… I have
determined to make use of the days of your absence to see into the Anarchy at the present
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reigns at Bizarre, the extreem [sic], & repeated cruelty of the Overseer (who is not
control.d [sic]at all by Holcombe’s repeated orders to the contrary) has driven off many
of the most valuable Negroes one of which has come down to me on a horse which is an
addition to the injury done the plantation—but the poor unhappy Wretch was unable to
come to me without; I can no longer leave the miserable creatures a prey to the worst part
of mankind, without endeavoring to mitigate, as far as is my power, the pangs of their
cruel situation.
Her compassion masked her determination to maintain order and profits on her plantation, which
would help her sons keep the land. She was devoted to the gentry and wanted to maintain the
plantation system with slavery. Her husband accepted that circumstances made that less likely
with each passing year.34
Revolutionary leaders understood the contradiction between slavery and their principles
of liberty, self-government, and natural rights. During the war, Thomas Ludwell Lee scolded his
fellow planters for fighting for rights that they denied their slaves. An antislavery feeling grew
with the revolutionary rhetoric, which led in 1778 to the abolition of the slave trade. Some
considered the practice an abomination while others saw it as potentially damaging to the
Virginia economy. Either motive, however, cast doubt on the unchecked importation of slaves.
During the tumultuous Confederation period, the Virginia Quakers wanted the government to
take strong moral antislavery action and petitioned the General Assembly to abolish slavery. In
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1782, at the prodding of the Quakers, the legislature passed a new manumission law, which
allowed a slaveowner to free his slaves without the approval of the General Assembly. Although
a conservative measure with numerous restrictions, the bill seemed to point toward a gradual
emancipation of slavery in Virginia. The act encouraged antislavery Quakers to continue their
petitions to the legislature. “The body of negroes in this state have been robbed” of their natural
rights, stated one petition. The growing antislavery feeling, however, pushed many ambivalent
planters to protect slavery. In 1784 and 1785, over 1,200 proslavery petitions arrived in the
Virginia legislature. One petition condemned the Quakers as “tools of the British administration”
who wanted to “wrest from us our slaves.” If unchecked, these religious zealots would ruin the
state and unleash a class of dangerous free blacks on society, all in the name of false piety, the
petitioners continued. The economic depression, fear of uprising, and a growing awareness of
racial distinction evoked a deep suspicion of antislavery movements.35
The antislavery sentiment reflected the growing hostility toward the institution
throughout the Atlantic world. From England, Quakers led a trans-Atlantic emancipation
movement that centered on the horrors of the slave trade. When the end of the Revolutionary
War revived the Atlantic slave trade, Quakers attempted to inform the public in England and the
United States of the grim details of the practice. The group petitioned the British Parliament and
the American Confederation Congress in an effort to shame legislators to outlaw the trade.
Methodists joined the Quakers to build a religious-based antislavery movement in the United
States and Britain, which envisioned the eradication of slavery from the western world. Before
his death, Methodist founder John Wesley encouraged young British abolitionist William
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Wilberforce to persevere in their goal. “Go on, in the name of God, and in the power of His
might, till even American slavery (the vilest that ever saw the sun) shall vanish before it,” he
wrote.36
***
When the delegates gathered in Philadelphia during the summer of 1787, the apathy of
Annapolis had disappeared. The Virginia legislature passed over Tucker as a potential delegate
and instead sent James Madison, George Washington, George Mason, Edmund Randolph, and
George Wythe. With Washington presiding over the secret proceedings, the convention decided
to abandon the Articles of Confederation for a new government. The debates over the interest of
the small and large states and the power of a prospective presidency provoked tense moments,
but the issue of slavery nearly derailed the continuance of political union. In the Northern states,
a growing discomfort with the institution fueled a desire to see the foreign slave trade abolished,
a stance with which the upper South delegation agreed. Madison noted that the convention’s
basic division was “principally from the effects of their having or not having slaves.”37
The South Carolina and Georgia delegations made it clear that any attempt at Union
would fail without pledges of protection for slaveholders’ rights and for slavery itself. In
response, New York delegate Gouverneur Morris offered one of the most explicit attacks on
slavery in the entire debate. “It was a nefarious institution,” he argued, “It was the curse of
heaven upon the States where it prevailed.” In the Northern states, where abolition was under
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way, Morris noticed a happier people with more democratic institutions. In an obvious slap at the
power of the Virginia gentry, Morris contended “that Domestic slavery is the most prominent
feature in the aristocratic countenance of the proposed Constitution.” Indeed, he deemed the
South’s wealth a façade inadequate even to defend the region. While Southern “Aristocracy”
restored and consolidated its own power through the “vassalage of the poor,” the Northern states
would find themselves taxed for the security of the slave states against internal attack. At the
same time, the Southerners’ ever-present fear of insurrection made them unreliable partners in
governance. If the nation ever engaged in a foreign war, Morris asked, would slaveholders send
soldiers, leaving their plantation unguarded? Despite a contentious debate, the two sides reached
compromises on the matter of slavery, agreeing that Congress would count slaves as three-fifths
of persons in the matters of federal representation and taxation. The agreement would inflate
Southern numbers in the House of Representatives and in the electoral college. The agreement
would help offset the growing population of the Northern states. Furthermore, the delegates
agreed to establish a twenty-year delay on the abolition of the foreign slave trade, at the
insistence of Georgia and South Carolina. In return the Southern states gave the new Congress
the right to control navigation and maritime law by a simple majority in Congress, a critical
concession for the merchants of the North.38
Almost all agreed that no political union could ever exist without Virginia due to its size
and prestige. During the Virginia ratification debates in June 1788, Patrick Henry and George
Mason attacked the implicit power of the proposed Constitution. Henry argued that the new
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federal government could extrapolate its powers against Southern interests. “They might lay such
heavy taxes on slaves, as would amount to emancipation; and then the Southern States would be
the only sufferers,” Henry argued. George Mason agreed that “by laying taxes too heavily on
slaves they might totally annihilate that kind of property.” Opponents saw this primal fear behind
every potential implied power of the president or Congress. 39
For the Randolphs, the new government would endanger everything they owned. Article
VI of the proposed Constitution affirmed that the new central government would make good on
all its debts: “All Debts contracted and Engagements entered into, before the Adoption of this
Constitution, shall be as valid against the United States under this Constitution, as under the
Confederation.” Ratifying the document would end resistance to paying British creditors. The
British government would appeal to the new central government in its effort to collect the
debts.40
John Randolph and his brothers followed the proceedings with trepidation. Tucker
opposed the Constitution because of the power it could wield over Virginia, if not for the damage
it would cause his stepsons. When Virginia ratified the document in 1788, he prepared his
stepsons for the inevitable outcome for their family and encouraged them to rededicate their
attention to shaping their own futures:
You will have heard that the Constitution has been adopted in this State; that Event, my
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dear children affects your interest more nearly than that of most others the recovery of
British debts can no longer be postponed—there now seems to be a moral certainty that
your patrimony will all go to satisfy the unjust debts from your Papa to the Hansbury’s
[sic]. The consequence, my dear boys, must be obvious to you–your sole dependence
must be on your own personal Abilities and Exertions: it’s happy for you, my sons, that
the Point has been so long postponed as to give an opportunity of laying the foundation of
a good Education for you both.
In the North, Tucker insisted, they should not let their time pass “without availing yourself of
every opportunity of improvement.”41
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Chapter 3: The Inconsistent Education of John Randolph, 1789-1799
George Washington passed through the streets of Manhattan aboard an elegant coach
bound for Federal Hall, where militia companies, marching bands, and ordinary citizens awaited
him. John Adams, the new Vice-President, greeted him and then officially introduced him to the
two bodies of the new national legislature. Making his way to the second floor, Washington
emerged onto the balcony with Adams and Chancellor Robert Livingston, New York City’s
highest ranking judicial officer, behind him. From below on the street, fifteen-year-old John
Randolph watched as Livingston held a small Bible and administered the presidential oath of
office to Washington. The sight of the tall planter, dressed in a fine suit of clothes, with his hand
on the Bible, left an impression on Randolph. The distance prevented Randolph from actually
hearing the oath, but the event seemed majestic, nonetheless. However, the young Virginian was
skeptical. Like his stepfather, Randolph had opposed the Constitution and feared the power of
the new central government. Washington’s inauguration signaled “the Constitution in its
chrysalis state,” Randolph wrote. He later recalled his misgivings at that moment. “I saw what
Washington did not see; but two other men in Virginia saw it—George Mason and Patrick
Henry—the poison under its wings.”1
For Randolph, the poison that he saw that day was always the same—the potential threat
of an overpowering federal government. “You know I was an Anti-Federalist when hardly
breeched,” he later told Josiah Quincy while remembering his opposition to the new government.
In New York, during the first Congressional sessions, Randolph watched his uncle, Theodorick
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Bland, Jr. and Thomas Tudor Tucker, his stepfather’s brother, both new members of the House
of Representatives, attack the pretensions of the federal government. Tucker, or “Uncle
Thomas,” as Randolph called him, led a vociferous defense of the rights of slaveholders during
the congressional sessions at Federal Hall. It became apparent to Tucker that in the House of
Representatives, Southerners would have to defend their rights as slaveholders. St. George
Tucker continued his effort to lead his stepsons away from the plantation. After the death of
Frances Randolph Tucker in December 1787, Tucker pushed to make them independent of the
plantation, and, in turn, slavery. Yet, Randolph and his brothers resisted their education in the
North, hoping instead to continue their lives as privileged members of the Virginia gentry. In the
decade between the commencement of the new government and John Randolph’s election to
Congress, the contradictory principles of the two Tuckers influenced him. During those years,
Randolph embraced antislavery principles and envisioned himself as a radical. At the same time,
he wanted desperately to inherit his plantation and assume his place among the Virginia gentry.
As he watched the new national government rise, private and public circumstances pulled him in
opposite directions. Yet, as he entered public life, he realized that political demands forced him,
at least publicly, to declare his loyalties.2
***
Following his wife’s death, St. George Tucker insisted that his stepsons continue their
education in New Jersey. Richard joined his brothers at Princeton, which seemed to alleviate
John’s homesickness. Indeed, Richard Randolph’s efforts to carry himself like a Virginia
gentleman mesmerized John. In New Jersey, Richard purchased a new suit of clothes and sent
the bill to Tucker. His youngest brother admired how Richard Randolph always held himself
2
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“above low company of any sort.” In Virginia, Tucker received the bills for their extravagant
spending and urged them to practice frugality. In 1788, he decided to send the boys to Columbia
College in New York City, where his brother, Thomas, could supervise them. Columbia also
offered the type of education Tucker wanted for them. The college’s president, William Samuel
Johnson, gave the students republican instruction, aimed at producing virtuous men and leaders
for the new republic. As president, Johnson promoted democracy, condemned slavery, and
supported New York City’s artisans. Tucker believed that Columbia College could help the
Randolphs develop their natural talents. He expected Richard and John to prepare for legal
careers, while Theodorick would receive a medical education. They needed to approach their
studies seriously and live frugally, Tucker believed. Only then would they find success in life
independent from the plantation.3
Instead, Randolph and his brothers lived as exiled planter aristocrats in New York City.
After arriving in the city, Richard Randolph refurbished their quarters after deeming them too
shabby and Theodorick hired a servant to attend to their needs. Theodorick drank and gambled;
Richard bought fashionable new clothes. John Randolph imitated his brothers, often spurning
academic work for pleasure. Briefly, William Cochran, an Irish professor of Latin and Greek,
fired his enthusiasm, which lasted only until the professor left the school. The Randolphs
approached their education as a means of refinement to prepare them for a life of gentility. The
real education, they believed, occurred on the plantation. Randolph’s brother, Theodorick, often
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encouraged him to abandon study for the pleasures of the city. John recalled once that his brother
would “open the door of my study and [toss] the books over the floor, sometimes out the
window.” The sixteen-year-old John soon “fell into the habits and ways of life of my unfortunate
brother.” But no amount of distractions could mask John Randolph’s dissatisfaction with life in
the North. Still grieving for his mother and homesick, he begged Tucker to allow him to return to
Virginia. “I am anxious to go home, never to return,” he wrote. “You cannot conceive the
Pleasure it will give me, and the expence will be no greater than that of staying here,” he added.
Richard Randolph informed Tucker that his brother was simply lazy. Tucker denied the request
and forced young Randolph to remain in New York City.4
That the Randolphs would successfully navigate the current crisis of debt in the Old
Dominion seemed unlikely to Tucker. In the Virginia court system, he saw planters facing ruin
from their debts; and the circumstances of personal friends and family offered more sobering
evidence of the gentry’s problems. Since the end of the war, a relative, John Banister, had
struggled to recover from the economic depression and the shrinking yield of tobacco at the
family’s plantation, Battersea. “[M]y Chariot horses and several of my best Negroes are taken in
execution which will prevent my taking a Crop,” Bannister wrote to Tucker. Banister’s
reputation declined along with his financial situation, until he died in 1789. “What will become
of the Battersea Family and Estate?” John Randolph asked Tucker. Eventually, creditors
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liquidated the plantation. Most shockingly for Tucker, the Nelson family lost its fortune when his
old benefactor, Thomas Nelson, died in 1789. Young John Randolph seemed to grasp the dire
situation and expressed appreciation for Tucker’s continual guidance. “How fortunate am I, after
having lost my Parents, in having so good a Friend, as my dear Papa to take care of me until I am
able to do it myself,” Randolph wrote.5
Richard Randolph ignored the warnings and planned his return to Virginia, where he
would soon inherit Bizarre. Although he studied at William and Mary, the College of New
Jersey, and Columbia College, Richard failed to earn a degree. Instead, he planned on the planter
life and began courting his cousin, Judith Randolph. Richard’s grim financial situation led
Judith’s father, Thomas Mann Randolph, to object to their marriage. Tucker also objected and
insisted that her father would have to help the couple financially if they married. The couple
disregarded the warnings, and by the end of 1789, Richard and a pregnant Judith were married.
Although Richard inherited Bizarre, he and his new bride stayed with Tucker at Matoax. The
whole affair fueled John Randolph’s desire to return to Virginia. “I can attain great deal more
Knowledge (and at much less expense) in Wmsburg than in New York,” he argued. Despite his
homesickness, however, one activity in the city had captivated him: politics.6
***
On March 4, 1789, John Randolph skipped school and traveled downtown toward Federal
Hall, where the House of Representatives convened for the first time. More than just a curious
onlooker, Randolph attended to observe Thomas Tucker, his stepfather’s brother. He had
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represented South Carolina in the Confederation Congress, and voters had recently elected him
to the new House of Representatives. Although Tucker was not a blood relation, Randolph had
grown attached to him. Tucker was only one of thirteen congressmen present that day, but the
hall soon filled with men from all over the country. Within days, Randolph’s uncle, Theodorick
Bland, Jr., and cousin, Richard Bland Lee, arrived to represent Virginia in the House. Although
Randolph admired his Uncle Bland deeply, it was the fiery and obstinate Tucker who captivated
the boy. “Of all the Men in the World, yourself, my dear Sir, excepted, I had rather be under the
direction of Uncle Thomas. He is like a father to me,” he told St. George Tucker.7
Since the Revolution, Thomas Tucker had vehemently attacked tyranny and monarchy
while espousing a faith in democratic government. A doctor by trade, he urged South Carolinians
to see the American Revolution as a truly revolutionary and democratic event that empowered
the people. In 1784, he published Conciliatory Hints, an anonymous pamphlet that condemned
America’s continuing attachment to the British Constitution. Tucker argued that the people could
ill afford to place their trust in an uncodified and unnamed traditional form of government and
must embrace a true “democratical government” that recognized that “all authority is derived
from the people at large, held only during their pleasure, and exercised only for their benefit.” To
Tucker, only a specific written constitution that defined the powers of government would suffice.
In spite of these admonitions, he opposed the new Constitution as too loosely constructed and
with too much potential for abuse through implied powers. “The proposed Constitution seems to
me replete with Danger, & I dread it’s [sic] Consequences,” he wrote to St. George Tucker. The
fear of monarchy convinced Thomas Tucker that “the president will be a monarch whilst in
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Office.” Yet he distrusted the electoral process, convinced that popular elections to the House of
Representatives would be decided by “intrigue among the most unprincipled of the People.”
Deeply suspicious of power, Tucker took his new seat determined to thwart usurpation of the
people’s power and to fight tyranny.8
Randolph often skipped his classes at Columbia to watch Tucker and the proceedings of
the House. Tucker excoriated and ridiculed those suspected of monarchical intentions, with VicePresident Adams a particular victim of his derision. When Congress debated a number of royalsounding titles for the new President, Tucker became apoplectic. “I am out of all Patience when I
think how we suffered ourselves to be duped into Measures distructive [sic] of every Republican
Idea,” he wrote. In the early days of the new Congress, it became apparent that the old divisions
from the ratification debate had been transferred to the new national legislature. “The words
party, Tory, Anti & Federalist compose the greatest part of the Conversation of this Place,”
Randolph observed. Randolph came to echo Tucker’s uncompromising views on monarchy and
his fears of the subversion of the people’s power. Writing home to his stepfather, he described a
debate about congressional pay. “The Senate have become worse every Day. They want to have
ten Dollars a Day and the Representatives six only. They were supported in the House by
Messrs. Madison & R. B. Lee Who asserted that such a Discrimination should be made because
the Senate represented the Sovereignty of the People & they the People themselves,” he wrote.
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Like his uncle, Randolph listened for hints by those who wanted to assume unauthorized power
and privilege.9
Despite nearly universal condemnation of partisanship, President Washington sowed the
seeds of faction with his selection of men to lead the executive departments. During the first
years of the government, the Secretary of the Treasury, Alexander Hamilton, provoked hostility
in Congress with his economic plans for the national government. Great Britain’s strong,
centralized economic system inspired Hamilton’s plans, which included a national bank, the
assumption of the states’ debts, and support for manufacturers. For Anti-Federalists such as
Thomas Tucker and Theodorick Bland, these measures fulfilled their longstanding fears about
centralized power. The proposed financial system would strengthen the central government’s
powers, saddle the nation with debt, and punish planters and farmers by favoring manufacturers.
The Anti-Federalists, believing that Hamilton’s system planted the seeds of corruption and
monarchy, adopted the rhetoric of the agrarian “country” party formed in response to the British
Prime Minister Robert Walpole (1676-1745). The opposition to Hamilton led the AntiFederalists to form Democratic-Republican societies throughout the nation. The most powerful
enemy of Hamilton’s plans also served in Washington’s cabinet. After five years as minister to
France, Thomas Jefferson returned to become Washington’s Secretary of State and, although
responsible for foreign affairs, he worked with his friend James Madison in congressional
opposition to the economic plans. While some Northerners and merchants feared the power of
the central government, they endorsed Hamilton’s support of commercial enterprise. Planters
such as Jefferson, John Taylor, and Bland believed the prospect of a commercial republic
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dangerous. Despite Republican efforts, however, most of Hamilton’s economic vision became
law.10
European developments aggravated the split among the followers of Jefferson and
Hamilton and exposed deep cultural divisions between the two emerging parties. During his final
months as minister to France, Jefferson witnessed popular discontent among the lower classes
turn into full-scale revolution. In a short time, French mobs overturned the rule of the
aristocracy, abolished the remnants of feudalism, severed ties with the Catholic Church, and
called a new National Assembly. In August 1789, the Assembly issued the Declaration of the
Rights of Man and Citizen, which declared that all “men are born and remain free and equal in
their rights.” Legislators abolished all social distinctions. The French experience seemed the
natural outgrowth of the American Revolution in its struggle against monarchy and thus won the
support of most Americans. The attempt at leveling society in France, however, soon aroused
the suspicions of conservatives such as Hamilton and Adams, who had already developed
misgivings about popular government in the United States. Indeed, Adams often claimed credit
for many of the ideas in Edmund Burke’s scathing critique, Reflections on the Revolution in
France. These conservatives craved order, the antithesis of France’s revolution. In contrast, the
spirit of egalitarianism dominated discussions at the tables of Republicans such as Jefferson and
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Thomas Tucker. Jefferson reassured his supporters and President Washington that rumors of the
Revolution’s excesses came from Great Britain in an effort to derail the movement for liberty. 11
Because of his social position and relationship to Tucker and Bland, Randolph often
attended dinners where he heard congressmen and cabinet members discuss domestic political
struggles and the revolution in France. Tucker guided Randolph through the political scene in
New York, and gave him access to the development of the growing political factions surrounding
Jefferson. “I have no society except Members of Congress who have done me the Honour to take
great Notice of me,” Randolph wrote. As he dined with Thomas Jefferson, a cousin, James
Madison, and Edmund Randolph, another cousin and Washington’s Attorney General, the young
man saw the inner workings of the new government. Thomas Tucker believed the boy bright and
a serious observer of national matters. “John, I think, has more prudence, good Sense [and]
Docility than one of his years,” Tucker wrote. Yet Randolph also proved arrogant even among
distinguished company. After one dinner, his uncle admonished him for interrupting guests with
his own opinions. In a letter to his stepfather, he contended that such incidents occurred “on
account of my using in Company the privilege which you allowed us at your Table, namely that
of speaking our sentiments fully.” Thomas Tucker cared for the Randolph sons a great deal, even
taking John to the beach to recuperate from one of his many illnesses. “Uncle Tucker has
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behaved like a Father to us,” John wrote. “I shall always feel myself under the greatest
Obligations to him.” During his time in New York, he considered Tucker his true mentor.12
***
Slavery emerged as an issue when Congress initially convened in 1789. During the first
session of the House of Representatives, Virginia Congressman Josiah Parker proposed a ten
dollar tax on every slave imported into the United States, with an eye toward destroying the
foreign slave trade and ending slavery. He charged the United States with “inconsistency in our
principles.” The proposal outraged representatives from Georgia and South Carolina. Georgia
Representative James Jackson condemned Parker’s real motives. “It was the fashion of the day to
favor the liberty of slaves,” he said. Tucker pointed out that Congress held no authority to
interfere with the slave trade. “The constitution gives us no power on that point,” he added.
Tucker and Jackson wanted Congress to avoid the discussion, insisting that the House had no
right to interfere with slavery and therefore no reason to discuss it. James Madison, who
supported the tax, believed that Congress not only had the right but the responsibility to debate
the issue. “The dictates of humanity, the principles of the people, the national safety and
happiness, and prudent policy require it of us,” he argued. “I conceive the constitution, in this
particular, was formed in order that the Government, whilst it was restrained from laying a total
prohibition, might be able to give some testimony of the sense of America with respect to the
African trade,” he added. Madison believed that Congress had a moral and logical responsibility
to discourage slavery, especially the slave trade. Madison said, “It is certain a majority of the
States are opposed to this practice.” The resistance of the Deep South baffled Madison since
12
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decreasing importation only benefited them. “I should venture to say that it is as much the
interest of Georgia and South Carolina as of any in the Union. Every addition they receive to
their number of slaves, tends to weaken and render them less capable of self-defence,” he argued.
Theodorick Bland agreed that “if it was impossible to cure the evil” he would support “measures
that prevent it extending further.” The Georgia and South Carolina delegations delayed the
matter until it finally disappeared.13
Madison’s sentiments reflected the antislavery feeling that existed in Virginia. Most of
the Virginia delegation also believed that Congress should nudge the nation toward eventual
eradication of slavery. In Virginia, St. George Tucker promoted the idea to his students at
William and Mary. He wrote Virginia congressman John Page, urging Congress to promote a
plan of gradual emancipation, “recommending to the States to take up the subject.” More than
simple advocacy, Tucker believed a “plan for extirpating an Evil so abhorrent to the principles of
our Government” could work. “I am induced to think, if the Finances of the united states
[sic]would admit, that a few thousand Dollars per annum might be appropriated to the purpose of
promoting such a Society [for Abolition of Slavery] in the several States,” Tucker argued. If the
states could move toward emancipating slaves, the federal government could then relocate them
to the western territories. Madison also hoped that the spirit of republicanism, such as Tucker
displayed, was “secretly undermining the institution.”14
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Congress, however, moved in an opposite direction. Whether the nation would retain the
current mode of organization of western territories fell to Congress. The Confederation Congress
had adopted the Northwest Ordinance, an organization of the territories that banned slavery north
of the Ohio River. In 1789, the new Congress renewed the Northwest Ordinance but refused to
extend the ban on slavery to the Southwest Territory. The public land system would encourage
settlement to raise revenue, not practice moral suasion. Some argued that the constitutional
compromise over slavery discouraged any more interference with the institution. In renewing the
Northwest Ordinance, Congress respected both the historical precedent of the act as well as the
natural barriers to slavery’s expansion. With both pieces of legislation, however, Congress made
the Ohio River the great dividing line between slavery and freedom.15
The hardening of sectional attitudes about slavery became even more evident in early
1790. In the North, the Quakers ceaselessly advocated for abolition and recognition of the rights
of slaves throughout the nation, issuing petitions and pamphlets about the institution’s evils. In
Philadelphia, Benjamin Franklin aided the religious sect in its effort against slavery. In early
1790, he crafted a petition that attacked the morality of the institution and sent it to Congress
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under his own signature. The petition urged Congress “to countenance the Restoration of liberty
to these unhappy men, who alone, in this land of Freedom, are degraded into perpetual bondage.”
Arriving during the tense debate over the assumption of states’ debts, the petition angered the
South Carolina and Georgia delegations. Thomas Tucker opposed even reading the petition on
the House floor and blamed the “mischievous attempt” on Franklin, “a man who ought to have
known better.” Tucker and the South Carolina and Georgia delegations, already agitated over
Parker’s proposed tax on slave imports, accused Northerners of destroying the Constitutional
agreement. Ratification of the Constitution required North and South to accept “each other with
our mutual bad habits and respective evils,” Federalist Congressman William Loughton Smith
argued. “The best informed part of the citizens of the Northern States knew that slavery was so
ingrafted into the policy of the Southern states, that it could not be eradicated without tearing up
by the roots their happiness, tranquility, and prosperity,” he added. For Smith, the effort
represented an insidious plot to destroy the South. Quakers cowered in the face of the enemy, but
they interfered in the affairs of others, Smith argued; now they were “doing every thing in their
power to excite the slaves in the Southern states to insurrection.” Tucker agreed that the petition
masked malicious motives and warned of the consequences of an attempt at abolition by the
federal government. “Do these men expect a general emancipation by law? This would never be
submitted to by the Southern States without a civil war,” Tucker insisted. 16
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Tucker led an effort to refuse even accepting the petitions, and hoped to stop the House
from ever discussing the issue again. The petitions had made a “great uproar in these Southern
States,” wrote an anonymous South Carolinian. Some Northerners tired of the issue, since nearly
everyone agreed that the federal government had no power over slavery. Madison remained
adamant that the Quakers had the right to petition their government, although he feared that
discussing slavery on the House floor would enflame tempers and sap the republican spirit that
he believed would lead to emancipation. In the end, Madison arranged for the petitions to go to a
special committee, which confirmed that the House could not act on slavery. The debate made
Southerners suspicious that the Northern states were trying to dominate the slaveholding states.
“I had rather myself submit to all the hazards of war & risk the poverty loss of every thing dear
to me in life, than to live under the rule of a fixed insolent northern majority,” Henry Lee wrote
to Madison.17
The plans of Hamilton and the growing power of the central government frightened
Theodorick Bland, Jr., who saw in them the means to damage Southern interests. “I already
perceive that the workings of it are Statical [sic], and I fear much that whoever plays the Music,
the Southern States will pay the Piper,” Bland wrote to St. George Tucker. The new federal
government “could have no competitor.” As the full scope of Hamilton’s financial plans
unfolded, Bland compared the nation to a ship pulled in different directions. “One half of her
crew hoisting sail for the land of energy, and the other looking with a longing aspect on the shore
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of liberty,” he said. In the conflict over the nation’s financial future, Bland saw the sacrifice of
the slave South’s rights. “[T]he agricultural interest is the permanent interest of this country, and
therefore, ought not to be sacrificed to any other,” he insisted. The passage of Hamilton’s plans
only confirmed Bland’s misgivings. “The sacrifice of states’ rights has in my opinion been
offered up,” Bland wrote. The Quaker petitions raised the question of whether Congress had any
power in taking up the question out of “mere morality.” St. George Tucker and James Madison
believed that although the Constitution restricted regulation of and prevented intervention with
slavery, Congress could act as a moral agent promoting antislavery sentiment among the states
and the people. While Madison hoped that America leaned toward freedom, Thomas Tucker and
the Deep South wanted otherwise. They insisted on congressional neutrality but also cast slavery
as morally defensible.18
***
While Randolph often spent his days in Congress, he increasingly spent his nights
drinking with his older brother Theodorick. With Richard back in Virginia, Theodorick proved
an irresistible influence. In New York, the second Randolph son spent his time in revelry and his
money on alcohol. Indeed, his family in Virginia remained concerned about Theodorick’s
behavior. “You will recall to mind my frequent admonitions to avoid Taverns, [and] other places
where you maybe led into the practice of such an abominable vice,” St. George Tucker wrote to
him. While Thomas Tucker tried to watch over the boys, his congressional duties proved too
18
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distracting and they continually accumulated debts that their stepfather was forced to pay. “Col.
Bland seems to be apprehensive that they are wasting Time [and] Money here,” Thomas Tucker
wrote to his brother. Their frustrated stepfather tired of admonishing them and planned a change.
In the spring of 1790, he sold tobacco from the Randolph lands to send Theodorick to Europe,
where he would study medicine, while John would remain in the United States to study law.19
Tucker arranged for John Randolph to study law with Attorney General Edmund
Randolph when the federal government moved to Philadelphia. Jefferson and Hamilton had
recently struck a deal to locate the permanent capital on the Potomac River, but agreed that the
national government should reside in Philadelphia in the interim. The young Randolph hated the
idea. “I could do as well in the Wilds of Kentucky as in the Desart [sic] of Philadelphia for such
it is to me.” Despite the excitement of living again at the center of national politics, Randolph
begged to return to Virginia.20
A proponent of the Constitution during the ratification debate, Attorney General
Randolph now led the effort to define the parameters of the federal judiciary, attend to the
president’s private legal matters, and serve as advisor to Washington. The position was both illdefined and low-paying, forcing him to take law students and continue his private practice. As an
instructor, he supervised John Randolph’s reading, stressing David Hume’s A Treatise of Human
Nature followed by Shakespeare, classical history, and works on natural rights. Randolph studied
alongside the president’s nephew, Lawrence Washington, and Joseph Bryan of Georgia.
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Although never close to Washington, Randolph began a lifelong friendship with Bryan. Indeed,
he and Bryan spent more time carousing than studying. Randolph considered the Attorney
General a poor teacher, and complained that public duties prevented him from devoting
sufficient time to students.21
Life in Philadelphia evoked John Randolph’s sense of entitlement and superiority. With
rent high in the city, he was forced to find Spartan quarters which he hated. “[L]ow and ill bred
people” surrounded him at his lodgings. “[I]n the Conversation and Company of ignorant and
awkward fellows,” he became even more aware that he had “been brought up to associate with
Gentlemen and Men of Sense.” Increasingly, he seemed to reflect Thomas Tucker’s own difficult
personality and disdain for those around him. As the Hamiltonian plan passed through Congress,
William Loughton Smith commented on the difficulty dealing with their colleague. “Tucker
seems sunk in an indifference proceeding from ill-humor—he was dissatisfied with every thing
(as he generally is)—he hated the Assumption, but he was obliged to vote for it—he didn’t like
the residence bill much better; he disliked the government itself, & was not therefore sorry to see
it become contemptible—he accordingly took no part, but allowed things to take their own
course,” Smith wrote. Frustrated and condescending toward his colleagues, the cynical Tucker
convinced his nephew that life in Philadelphia was “incompatible with study.” With Thomas
Tucker’s encouragement, Randolph pressured his stepfather to allow him to return to Virginia
and become a planter.22
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The lingering British debts made the future of Virginia planters uncertain. Great Britain
pressed the debt problem with the new American government. The situation embarrassed
Secretary of State Jefferson during negotiations with the British. Virginians still insisted on
reimbursement for lost slaves as a precondition for repayment. The British creditors refused to
relent and continued to press the issue through diplomacy and the courts. The Hansbury and
Osgood firm’s lawsuit against the Randolphs proceeded. “It may not be amiss to inform you that
a Court of Law is to determine whether I shall be a man of small or opulent Fortune. As there is
an equal chance for my giving up or retaining my present property,” Randolph wrote. To put
himself “above the reach of poverty,” he would continue his legal studies. “If I am ever
necessitated to pursue the practice of the Law, I shall give it over as soon as I shall have acquired
a sufficiency to support me genteelly in my native Country,” he added. Randolph wanted a life in
“refined Society.” Despite Randolph’s assurances that he would finish his legal studies, his time
with the Attorney General seemed a failure. In early 1792, Tucker allowed him to return to
Virginia.23
Their stepfather feared that the Randolph children had misspent their opportunities and
planned to rely on their social status as gentry. Despite a brief improvement in the tobacco
markets, Tucker reevaluated his own participation in the slave-driven economy. He believed the
new market economy positioned bankers, doctors, and lawyers to become the next generation of
leaders. By the early 1790s he doubted whether any natural leadership still remained among
Virginia’s planters. The gentry still lived in excess as their fortunes and society collapsed—and
no better example of this lax new generation could be found than in Tucker’s stepsons, who
23
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shunned both hard academic work and frugality. Tucker himself abandoned any hope in
Virginia’s plantation system. He sold his own plantations, left Matoax, which belonged to the
Randolph family, and moved to Williamsburg, where he became a professor of law at the
College of William and Mary. Although he maintained a tangential interest in slaves, bank stocks
became his primary form of investment. In Williamsburg, he would educate “my Children at the
College without parting with them from under mine own Eye.” The wayward Randolph sons had
disabused him of his faith in a distant education. Tucker wanted to break the powerful hold that
the gentry had on the imagination of his children. His stepsons had proven irrationally devoted to
the idea of the gentry. With great irritation, he watched Richard and Judith Randolph try to run
Bizarre from a distance because they refused to leave Matoax or the rarefied air of the Tidewater.
Tucker reminded the Randolph children that the decision to plant came with harsh realities. “The
Harvest is small, but the Labourers [sic] are abundant,” he wrote. He urged Richard and Judith to
move “to Bizarre in the fall.” The ill-fated decisions of the Randolphs made Tucker determined
that his own children would never depend on the cultural power of the gentry.24
The only Randolph son who prepared for a serious education had problems of his own.
Tuberculosis and alcoholism ended hopes of a European medical education for Theodorick
Randolph. In 1791, he returned to Virginia, where his family hoped for his recovery. Despite his
poor health, he fell in love with his cousin Nancy Randolph, sister to Judith, his brother
Richard’s wife. The courtship angered her father, who disapproved of another daughter’s
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marriage into the severely indebted branch of the Randolph family. In February 1792, however,
Theodorick Randolph died, leaving behind a grief-stricken Nancy.25
In June 1792, illness struck John Randolph while he stayed at a Richmond tavern. “I was
taken with scarlet fever and brought to the brink of the grave,” Randolph later recalled. For days,
he lingered near death. Virginia Governor Henry Lee tended to the boy and reported his progress
to Tucker. Although Randolph recovered, historians have speculated that the illness arrested his
masculine development, rendering him sterile and impotent. As he grew older, people described
his strange appearance. His voice remained high pitched, similar to the tone of a child or female.
At the Virginia Constitutional Convention of 1829-30, George Wythe Mumford described the
fifty-six-year-old Randolph: “his features were rather delicate and feminine…his voice was
peculiarly feminine and shrill.” No hair ever seemed to grow on his face. His narrow shoulders,
long arms and legs, and rail-thin torso gave him a distinctly feminine appearance. His appearance
led to whispers, smears, and innuendo throughout his life, and many believed the illness at
Richmond was responsible. The details, however, point to a rare genetic disease. He was
nineteen when he suffered the scarlet fever illness, but he had already failed to experience some
of the basic signs of puberty. After Randolph’s death in 1833, doctors examined his body and
found half-formed testicles and lack of pubic hair. The symptoms seem to imply Klinefelter’s
syndrome, a rare chromosome disorder. Instead of the normal XX chromosome combination,
males who suffer from this disease have an extra female chromosome, or XXY combination.
Throughout Randolph’s life, his feminine appearance and his continual ill health, both
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characteristics of the disease, plagued him. Possibly the most serious consequence was his
sterility. Although he displayed a romantic interest in women, most notably Maria Ward, he
remained reticent to begin any serious relationship. In Southern culture, where manhood
mattered immensely, Randolph failed to achieve the basic function of a man: fatherhood. The
illness meant that he could produce no progeny for the great Randolph family.26
Tucker was making a new life for his family in Williamsburg and brought Randolph there
to recuperate. Randolph found that his family had changed a great deal. Recently, the widower
Tucker had married Lelia Skipwith Carter, a wealthy widow from another powerful gentry
family. The union demonstrated Tucker’s own unwillingness to break completely from the
planter aristocracy that he often criticized. While he hated many of the traditions of the planter
elite, he remained very much committed to the social order of the gentry. Randolph hated the
new situation and blamed Tucker’s new wife. “I shall never forget the chilling coldness of my
reception,” he commented about Lelia, whom he labeled a “shrew” and “vixen.” After several
years in the North, he returned to find Tucker and his children in far better financial condition
than the Randolphs. The stepfather had carved out a reputation as one of the state’s finest legal
minds and worked to assure that his own children would enjoy a prosperous and successful
future. Now he had married into another wealthy family. As Randolph faced the probable
liquidation of his own property, the well-being of others may have been, in its own way,
devastating. He left the Tucker home. “I set out for Bizarre, and was once more restored to the
26

Dawidoff, Education of John Randolph, 98-99; Stokes, “John Randolph,” 92-3; JR to Tudor
Randolph, December 13, 1813, Randolph Papers, UVA; George Wythe Mumford, The Two
Parsons: Cupid’s Sports; The Dream; The Jewels of Virginia (Richmond, J.D.K. Sleight, 1884),
568; Garland, John Randolph, 1:21; “Dr. Francis West’s Reminiscences of the last moments of
the Hon. John Randolph of Roanoke, May 1833, “Randolph Papers, UVA; Harry F. Klinefelter,
“Klinefelter’s Syndrome: Historical Background and Development.” Southern Medical Journal,
79 (September 1986), 1089-1093.
72

society of the fondest of brothers,” he later remembered. At Bizarre, John and Richard Randolph
hoped to save their ancestral lands and their family’s reputation. As they prepared for Randolph
to inherit Roanoke on his twenty-first birthday, they hoped to use parts of their late brother’s
inheritance to satisfy their creditors.27
***
As autumn arrived in Southside Virginia, the Randolphs of Bizarre set out to visit their
close friends Randolph and Mary Harrison at their plantation, Glentivar. On Monday, October 1,
1792, Richard, Judith, Nancy, and John Randolph traveled across Cumberland County to the
plantation. With space limited in the Harrison home, John Randolph found lodgings at a local
tavern. That night at Glentivar, Nancy’s screams startled Mary Harrison, who rushed to check on
the girl. Finding the door to Nancy’s room bolted, she knocked. Richard Randolph opened the
door to reveal a teenage slave tending to a very ill Nancy. Richard told Harrison that he had
administered laudanum and alcohol to the girl to relieve her hysterics. Harrison watched for a
while before returning to bed. Later, the Harrisons heard Richard Randolph leave the house and
return and assumed that he left to summon a doctor. For three days, the stricken Nancy remained
in her chambers. Later that week, the Harrison’s slaves discovered a fetus on a pile of old
shingles on the plantation grounds. The master refused to believe the slaves, but they soon spread
rumors that someone had murdered a baby at Glentivar. According to the gossip, Nancy
Randolph gave birth to a child that night—and Richard murdered the baby. The child’s paternity
became the focus of the rumors. Many assumed that Theodorick had fathered the child before his
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death in February, but those closest to Nancy knew she was not at full term when she visited
Glentivar in October. Rumors among the gentry settled on a more troubling suspect: Richard.28
John Randolph first heard of the dramatic night a few days later when he traveled to
Williamsburg. “[Jack Banister] gives me the first intelligence of what was alleged to have
happened at Glenlyver,” he wrote in his diary. Throughout the winter of 1792-93, the planter
gentry whispered that Richard Randolph impregnated his sister-in-law Nancy and then traveled
to Glentivar, where he performed an abortion. Through the years, Richard had earned a
reputation as a vacuous planter’s son, concerned only with satisfying his passions for
indiscriminate spending and illicit sex. “I have been unfortunate in having passions which I had
never resolution to govern or resist,” he once wrote. Nancy later admitted that Richard once
came to her bedchamber to seduce her while he complained of Judith’s cold and unloving
behavior. His questionable reputation gave the rumors special credence as they spread across the
Virginia countryside. By spring 1793, Richard faced a daunting swell of hatred toward him as his
peers privately condemned him. “I have been informed of the late horrid and malicious lie,
which has been for some time too freely circulated,” he informed his stepfather. Such
accusations normally would lead to the dueling ground, but the accusers remained faceless and
left him with no one to challenge.29
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As the scandal brewed, John Randolph returned to Williamsburg and the College of
William and Mary. Nancy remained at Bizarre with Richard and Judith, which made life
uncomfortable. Randolph had long resisted Tucker’s plans for education, but the scandal
encouraged him to find refuge at the college. As the rumors spread, Richard considered leaving
Virginia until the controversy passed. When Nancy’s brothers, William Randolph and Thomas
Mann Randolph, Jr., openly accused him of seducing her and fathering the child, Richard
struggled to end the growing public spectacle. The very charges of Richard’s behavior had made
him unworthy of an affair of honor with William Randolph. For many in Cumberland County,
Richard Randolph now stood beneath contempt. Tucker advised openness, which led Randolph
to issue a public statement announcing that he would present himself at the next court day at the
Cumberland County courthouse. “[A] public enquiry into it is now more than ever necessary,”
Randolph believed. He promised to “answer in due course of law, any charge or crime which any
person or persons whatsoever shall then and there think proper to alledge [sic] against me.”
Those unwilling to face him could submit their charges and evidence to a newspaper. Hopefully
the public airing of charges would clear his name and lift the cloud over his reputation.30
On April 29, 1793, Richard Randolph handed himself over to the Cumberland County
court. Although this legal procedure was not a trial, it would determine whether the county
would charge him with a crime. Randolph took no chances and spent a hefty sum for legal
defense. Two of Virginia’s most distinguished lawyers, Patrick Henry and John Marshall,
represented him at court. Nearly all of the family members present that night at Glentivar
testified during the proceedings. Randolph Harrison admitted that he suspected an improper
30
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relationship between Richard and Nancy while Mary Harrison and Martha Jefferson Randolph
suggested that an abortion occurred. When John Randolph testified on his brother’s behalf, he
pleaded ignorance of any impropriety. He insisted that he lounged on a bed with Judith and
Nancy not long before that night but “never suspected her [Nancy] of being pregnant.” He
agreed, however, with witnesses about a strange smell that lingered in Nancy’s room the day
after the supposed event. No one in the family testified to seeing a fetus. The Glentivar slaves
saw the body, but Virginia law prevented these incriminating witnesses from testifying.31
During the legal proceeding, a portrait emerged of a degraded and even demented gentry.
John Marshall’s defense of Richard made the affair seem all the more perverse. While denying
that Randolph took advantage of his sister-in-law, Marshall portrayed Nancy as an indulgent and
spoiled daughter whose parents never denied her desires. “She had been nursed in the lap of ease
and indulgence; she had been accustomed only to wish, and to find her wishes complied with,”
Marshall said. The entire affair revealed the gentry’s self-indulgence and unwillingness to deny
their basest desires. Without the slaves’ testimony, accusers could prove nothing, however. The
restrictions of the legal system in a slave society spared Randolph further charges. The court took
no action, and in a single day, Richard Randolph ended his legal problems.32
The scandal, though, lived beyond the courthouse as the public believed the accounts of
the slaves. In the eyes of his peers, Richard remained guilty. In a letter to the public, St. George
Tucker reminded the planters that the court cleared Randolph of the charges, but acknowledged
that “the public mind is not always convinced by the decisions of a court of law.” Tucker tried to
convince others of the family’s happiness, but John Randolph’s diary entry in the aftermath of
31
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the hearing revealed otherwise: “The trial. Return. Quarrels of the women.” Try as he might,
Tucker failed to convince many people of his stepson’s innocence. Inside the family, some
absolved Nancy Randolph and blamed Richard for the indiscretion. “I am in hopes there that
neither of you feel any uneasiness but for the pitiable victim [Nancy], whether it be of error or of
slander,” wrote Thomas Jefferson. Following details of the scandal while in Philadelphia,
Jefferson reached his own conclusion. “I see guilt but in one person, and not in her,” he added.
The court proceedings convinced Martha Jefferson Randolph that Richard Randolph had seduced
Nancy, impregnated her, and effectively destroyed her life. “As for the poor deluded victim I
believe all feel much more for her than she does for herself. The villain having been no less
successful in corrupting her mind than he has in destroying her reputation,” she wrote to her
father. Martha Randolph’s feelings revealed the damage done to Richard and Nancy Randolph’s
reputations.33
John Randolph found himself confronting the consequences of his brother’s scandal.
Their decision to take their places among the gentry meant that Richard and John Randolph must
live by the code of the honor-driven culture. Unlike in New York, the loss of reputation and
one’s good name meant losing critical social standing among family, friends, and neighbors.
Disgrace resulted for those who failed to defend their name. At William and Mary, John
Randolph clashed with Robert Barraud Taylor, a young Federalist, during a political debate. A
duel followed. They met on the field of honor, where Randolph shot his opponent in the hip,
although Taylor survived. Some argued that the issue between the two may have been as trivial
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as the proper pronunciation of a word. Randolph’s reaction to Taylor’s affront, however,
suggests a remark over the recent scandal. In the court of honor, Randolph felt responsible for
the broader reputation of his family. Randolph quit the school before his inevitable expulsion.
The incident ended his hope of staying in Virginia. In late spring 1793, other developments
added to Randolph’s problems and made the prospect of continuing to live in Virginia
problematic.34
***
In May, George Wythe, now a judge of the state’s chancery court, handed down a
devastating decision for Virginia planters. In the case of Jones v. Walker, the court found the
new U.S. Constitution rendered Article IV of the Treaty of Paris (1783) binding. The decision
“abrogated the acts of every state in the union; tending to obstruct the recovery of british [sic]
debts from the citizens of those States.” Furthermore, Wythe admonished attorney Patrick Henry
for his legal attempt to absolve planters from their responsibilities to creditors. In his decision,
Wythe confirmed that the agreements between creditors and debtors were contracts. He
dismissed the arguments about compensation for slaves as a matter of politics unrelated to the
legal case, and a responsibility of the federal government. Wythe’s standing gave the decision
gravity, but outraged many planter families. Indeed, many never forgave him for the decision.
Although many families continued to fight creditors, the decision reinforced Tucker’s long-held
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belief in the inevitability of repayment. The recent court decision indicated that John Randolph
would likely lose Roanoke. “That event I think seems, every day more inevitable,” he wrote.35
Debt and scandal precipitated plans for Randolph to resume his legal studies with
Attorney General Randolph in Philadelphia. He wanted anything but to return to Philadelphia,
however, and in the spring, circumstances seemed to offer him an alternative. In April 1793,
France’s new minister to the United States landed in Charleston, South Carolina. Edmond Genét
traveled from South Carolina to Philadelphia soliciting American support for France’s recentlydeclared war against England and its monarchy. Since his first stay in Philadelphia, Randolph
had devoted himself to the ideas of the French Revolution, following its development and
believing that it would save mankind. Genét’s call for American support fired Randolph’s
imagination. Seeing no future in Virginia, Randolph wanted to play a role in France’s great
struggle against the British monarchy. He asked Tucker to “permit me to go, immediately to
France to enter into the army of the Republic.” Promising that the endeavor would cost no more
than a year in Philadelphia, Randolph tried to convince Tucker of the cause’s righteousness.
Without his plantation, Randolph dreaded a life as “a miserable attorney” dealing with “a
thousand petty villainies in order to secure the sum of fifteen shillings.” He added, “Sir, I have
not one spark of lawyer in me.” Tucker surely saw the futility of the legal profession even if he
refused to support a venture into the European war. He rejected the scheme and Randolph
returned to Philadelphia.36
Randolph committed himself to the ideas of the French Revolution in Philadelphia even
as many Americans condemned the increasingly violent turn taken by the revolutionaries. France
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believed England’s monarchy one of Europe’s greatest threats to the world’s liberty and tried to
foment rebellion in Ireland. Federalists feared that the radical turn in France could destabilize the
social order in the United States. On the other hand, Jefferson and his Republican supporters
argued that the French Revolution offered the best hope for mankind to escape from tyranny and
ignorance. In January 1793, the execution of the deposed King Louis XVI sparked a streak of
political violence by the Jacobins against their enemies. Regardless, Randolph and many
Republicans maintained their support of the French Revolution.37
Edmond Genét encountered overwhelming support for the Revolution as he traveled to
Philadelphia that spring. Met by large crowds and thousands of supporters, he attempted to
recruit troops and arm privateers for the war effort against Britain. Reaching Philadelphia, he
hoped that Secretary of State Jefferson, his well-known supporter, could help secure aid for the
war. The raising of privateers outraged President Washington, who issued a policy of neutrality
just days after meeting Genét. The French minister ignored Washington’s statement of neutrality
and began recruiting new privateers. The French diplomat hoped to incite rebellion in Canada
and encouraged Americans to overthrow Spanish rule in the west. When Genét threatened to
appeal directly to the American people against Washington’s proclamation of neutrality, he
turned even Jefferson against him. A furious President Washington insisted on Genét’s recall.
Randolph sided with Genét and believed Washington a tool of the British. “I think the minister
has been treated very cooly [sic] by our court, for that is appellation with which the executive is
known by the high flyers of this metropolis,” Randolph wrote.38
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Randolph saw himself as a part of a great trans-Atlantic revolution. As with so many
planters, he saw the struggle between the planters of the South and commercial interests of the
North as a struggle parallel to France’s rejection of monarchy. He embraced the moral,
intellectual, and political ideas of the revolution. The ideas of the revolution usurped some of his
long-held planter beliefs. For instance, his mother encouraged her sons to embrace the Anglican
faith of their ancestors, but Randolph rejected it for the “rational religion” of deism that St.
George Tucker had long professed.39
In his intellectual journey in Philadelphia, Randolph also embraced the antislavery
principles that his stepfather had long advocated. The inherent violence of slavery bothered
Randolph. On one visit to Matoax in 1788, he watched John Coalter, a tutor for the Tucker
children, viciously beat a family slave. When a slave “treated him ill,” Coalter “knocked him
down and stamped him under his feet and kick[ed] him most inhumanely.” The violence of the
moment shocked young Randolph. “Mr. C. kick[ed] him in the Breast and stomach until I
thought it would have killed him,” he said. Coalter continued the beating even as Theodorick
Randolph attempted to stop it. Theodorick insisted “that he [would] not see your [Tucker’s]
property trampled on in such a manner,” John informed his stepfather. “[S]weating with rage
and vexation,” Coalter stopped as he realized the consequences of damaging Tucker’s property.
Unsatisfied, Coalter insisted that Theodorick have another slave, Essex Brown, deliver a
whipping to the insolent slave. John Randolph begged for mercy for the servant since the
arrogant and brutal Coalter’s behavior had been “inexcusable even to a Slave.” 40
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Witnessing such brutality explains, in part, why a radical Randolph embraced the transAtlantic movement for emancipation. In particular, he became attached to Thomas Clarkson’s
pamphlet, An Essay on the Impolicy of the Slave Trade, which focused on the damage that the
slave trade caused to the economic and political systems of the modern world. The arguments fed
Randolph’s moral dislike of slavery. “From my early childhood, all my feelings and instincts
were in opposition to slavery in every shape; to subjugation of one man’s will to that of another;
and from the time I read Clarkson’s celebrated pamphlet, I was I am afraid, as mad—as Clarkson
himself,” Randolph later remembered. He expressed his support of the anti-slavery Quakers and
the developing French Société of des Amîs des Noirs (Society of the Friends of Blacks). Formed
in Paris by elites before the outbreak of Revolution, the organization went beyond the antislavery
movement in Britain. Clarkson and Wilberforce focused their efforts on outlawing the slave
trade, but the Ami De Noirs attacked slavery itself. The arrival of Genét, an avid member of the
society, encouraged abolitionists in Philadelphia. The convergence of Philadelphia Quakers,
British antislavery ideas, and the Societe of de Amis des Noirs, created a dynamic moment of
hostility toward slavery that appealed to Randolph. He later mused that he had been “brought up
among Quakers,” which helped make him “an ardent ami des noirs.”41
Events in the Caribbean, however, tempered revolutionary enthusiasm in the Southern
states. The fight for liberty in Paris inspired slaves on the French island of St. Domingue to assert
their own rights. Officials in the United States government worried about tales of unrest coming
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out of the island, a leading source of the nation’s sugar and molasses. In June 1790, Secretary of
State Jefferson tried to appoint a consul to St. Domingue to protect American trading interests.
The concern proved warranted. In July 1791, a band of slaves seized cane-cutting tools and
marched on the plantations. In an orgy of violence, slaves killed masters and their families,
destroyed plantations, and burned crops. Several hundred slaves planned the rebellion in
conspiracy, but within a month nearly 10,000 bondsmen joined in the violence. Within weeks,
rebels destroyed nearly two hundred plantations. White militia units responded with vengeance,
and the island exploded in a harsh and frightening violence. Race war had arrived in the Western
hemisphere.42
President Washington assisted the embattled white planters of the island, investing
$726,000 and arms to help them maintain power. A skilled manumitted slave, Toussaint
Louverture, stepped forward to lead the slaves and brought order to a violent and disorganized
rebellion. He proved effective in his diplomatic skills as he played the European powers against
one another. To quell the unrest, France’s republican government sent Léger-Félicité Sonthonax
to the island as a de facto ruler of the island’s governing commissioners. His goal was to defeat
the rebellion, establish order, and protect the slaves who had already been freed. His rival,
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General Francois-Thomas Galbaud, a planter and military governor, solicited British support to
defend the planters and their economic interests, exploiting England’s fear that the rebellion
would spread to Jamaica. Eventually the forces of Galbaud and Sonthonax clashed. Randolph
condemned Galbaud’s effort against the republican forces once he heard the news. “I believe he
is an aristocrat, as the St. Domingo people praise him for his assistance against the
commissioners,” he wrote. Those commissioners realized that Louverture’s forces would prove
victorious and preemptively freed the slaves in an effort to win support of island inhabitants. The
measure won the conditional support of Louverture. Forces soon drove Galbaud off the island.
Despite efforts by the United States government, white rule in Haiti had effectively ended.43
Most of Randolph’s fellow Virginians failed to share his enthusiasm for the impending
liberation of Haiti. Although many Virginia planters supported the French Revolution, they now
feared its ideology of liberty would infect their slaves. Rumors of slave conspiracies spread. In
July, John Randolph, a cousin, swore a deposition about uncovering a potential plot inspired by
the St. Domingue rebellion. Awakened by noisy slaves, Randolph had opened his window and
heard two of his slaves talking. “The one spoke to the other telling him that the blacks were to
kill the white people soon in this place,” he deposed. The “chief speaker” used the example of
St. Domingue to encourage the other slave: “you see how the blacks has [sic] killed the whites in
the French Island and took it.” With the nation’s largest slave population, Virginia feared its
chaos. “It is high time we should foresee the bloody scenes which our children certainly, and
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possibly ourselves (South of Potomac) have to wade through, and try to avert them,” Jefferson
wrote to James Monroe.44
In February 1794, the French Convention abolished slavery in France and all its
territories, a decision that led many American planters to end even nominal support of the French
Revolution. In contrast, New England merchants supported the St. Domingo rebels, especially as
their trade to the island increased. The region’s support of Haiti fueled Southern suspicions that
the Federalists planned to use the federal power assumed under Hamilton’s economic plans to
emancipate the slaves. In 1793, Jefferson and Madison asked John Taylor to produce a pamphlet
attacking the power assumed under Hamilton’s economic system. Taylor’s initial draft digressed
into Southern fears about slavery, much to Jefferson’s annoyance. Working through Madison,
Jefferson instructed Taylor “to strike out the passage relating to slaves, which however in itself
would be a signal for raising the cry of Virginianism agst. [sic] the publication.” Northern
Federalists had come to hate that slavery dominated the political decisions of many Southerners.
The following year, after Taylor delivered a highly sectional speech on British debts in the
Senate, two Northern Senators, Rufus King and Oliver Ellsworth, asked Taylor to cooperate in a
secret plan for the peaceful dissolution of the Union since “the eastern states would never submit
to their [Southern states] politicks.” Taylor resisted, but believed secession a possibility. Many
industrious New Englanders saw Southern planters as hypocrites devoted to the perpetuation of a
debased and lazy lifestyle. Connecticut Federalist Chauncey Goodrich condemned the struggle
against the central government as a part of this effort. “Southern people will oppose [the
44
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Government] till it accommodates itself to a state of Negrohood, debt, luxury, and gambling,” he
wrote.45
In this environment, the political interests of Virginia and the South became of paramount
importance to Randolph. In January 1794, James Madison offered resolutions to the House of
Representatives designed to restrict commercial interactions with Great Britain. Since that nation
had failed to honor several parts of the Treaty of Paris, the Republicans hoped to use commercial
policy to assert the United States’ economic independence. The war between France and Great
Britain caused trouble for U. S. trade and Madison wanted the nation to assert its rights.
Randolph attended the session as Madison tried to build support for his resolutions. The absence
of congressmen John Page and John Francis Mercer during the debate outraged Randolph. “Mr.
Madison’s resolutions respecting the restrictions of commerce,” Randolph wrote, “will be, I am
afraid, thrown out, from the circumstance of our southern men being absent.” He deemed
Southerners who failed to fill their basic duties as elected officials “unpardonable.” The
“indolence” of the region’s own men and the “villainy” of others endangered “the interests of the
southern states.” Randolph saw no contradiction between his support of revolutionary republican
ideals and defense of the South.46
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The national and international political developments fascinated Randolph in a way that
reading law never would. By the end of 1793, he wanted desperately to leave the study of
Attorney General Randolph. In December, Tucker asked Thomas Jefferson for help. “[M]ight I
presume so far on your Attachment to those of your native country, who wish to improve
themselves, as to sollicit [sic] your friendship and advice to him?” In his request, Tucker
admitted that the relationship between his stepson and the Attorney General was a failure. This
effort to win Randolph another opportunity came from “my Anxiety for the advancement of my
son,” Tucker wrote. Jefferson advised Randolph “to devote the winter to Coke Littleton,” but
informed Tucker that he had resigned from the cabinet and would soon return to Monticello. In a
last ditch effort to educate Randolph as a lawyer, Tucker asked him to return to Williamsburg
and complete his education at William and Mary. Randolph reluctantly agreed to return to do so:
I will now, my dear, sir, touch upon that part of your letter dated New Year’s day, which
relates to my studying in Williamsburg. I have found my conduct and character, during
my residence in that place canvassed in so ungenerous and malicious a manner, that were
it not for the residence of yourself, and your beloved family, I never would set foot in it
again, but if you wish me to return, I will conquer my aversion to the place.
Randolph’s hatred for the legal profession, his distaste for William and Mary, and his desire to
inherit Roanoke dashed Tucker’s hopes for his stepson. In June 1794, Randolph finally inherited
his plantation and returned to Virginia to assume control over his indebted lands.47
***
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Since leaving for Princeton seven years earlier, Randolph had stayed at any of his
plantations only on an intermittent basis. After years of dreaming about the planter life, he now
found himself “overwhelmed with overseers and blacksmiths and sheriff’s claims of several
years standing.” Debts still encumbered Randolph lands, and creditors continued to press their
claims with the government and the courts. Tucker encouraged the brothers to sell Matoax to
settle part of the debts, but they resisted. The plantation remained the family’s connection to its
Tidewater roots. The sale of their family seat would violate Frances Tucker’s admonition to keep
hold of their ancestral lands at all costs. The brothers refused to sell their Tidewater land.48
After his return to Virginia, Randolph again decided to live at Bizarre with his brother’s
family. There, he and Richard could try to dig out of the financial mess. The mood at Bizarre
remained melancholic as Richard, Judith, and Nancy lived there in isolation. Many continued to
shun Richard Randolph, who alternated between sadness and extravagance. Richard and Judith
filled their lives with luxuries that only increased their debts. In contrast, John Randolph had
remained solvent and frugal during his most recent stay in Philadelphia, but now Richard faced
numerous personal debts in addition to his family’s debt. A year after the court proceeding,
Patrick Henry sued Richard for his legal fees. Adding to the financial stress, Richard still
struggled to clear his name, all the while remaining uncomfortably close to Nancy. His efforts
only exacerbated his damaged reputation and drove a wedge between himself and Judith, who
begged him to leave the scandal alone. Judith grew close to John, the only member of her
household untainted by the scandal.49

48

Stokes, “John Randolph,” 123-4; JR to Tudor Randolph, December 13, 1813, Randolph
Papers, UVA.
49
Kierner, Scandal at Bizarre, 87-8.
88

Whenever possible, John Randolph escaped the tense environment of Bizarre and
traveled throughout Virginia, staying with friends and family, as he indulged his growing love of
horse-racing, the favored sport of the gentry. Indeed, he seemed far more interested in the
lifestyle of the planter than actually running his own plantation. During most of 1795, he
wandered aimlessly, avoiding some of the more complicated questions that Richard Randolph
and St. George Tucker were confronting. “You inquire after my plans,” he wrote to his friend
Rutledge, “I have none, my dear Henry. I exist in an obscurity, from which I shall never
emerge.” Randolph’s life fulfilled the Northern stereotype of the idle planter, born of privilege,
who lived from the labors of others. In the same year, a Virginia expatriate condemned the
“Lords of the Soil who are taught from their infancy to consider the industrious Poor even of
their own colour as little above the Africans who in the Minds of many are on a level with the
Brutes.”50
Richard Randolph arrived at similar sentiments about the planter gentry and slavery. The
guilt of slavery and the shame of excess weighed on him as he suffered in disrepute. The planter
elite was consumed with self-interest and harbored lazy and entitled people, he believed. He
looked to himself for the best example of planter degeneration. For a brief time, he studied with
George Wythe, who strengthened the young man’s antislavery feelings. Afterward, Randolph
became devoted to the ideas of the French Revolution, but during his self-reflection, he realized
the hollowness of those sentiments. He perpetuated the injustice of bondage on his slaves at
Bizarre while he lived in excess. Increasingly ill and depressed, Richard Randolph turned his
self-loathing into a constructive plan. In early 1796, he composed a will that freed his slaves
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upon his death. The document’s language went far beyond mere manumission. Randolph
indicted slavery, the gentry, and his own ancestors for “lawless and monstrous tyranny.” While
he “humbly” begged the forgiveness of his slaves, he also wanted his two sons to understand the
“horror” of a “crime so enormous & indelible.” John Randolph, Sr. remained responsible for the
current condition of the slaves, his son insisted. The institution had been “forced on me by my
father” who had “mortgaged all his slaves to british Harpies, for money to gratify pride &
pamper sensuality.” Although he planned to free his slaves as soon as possible, Randolph
instructed Judith and his executors to free them once his debts were paid. He wanted a part of his
estate given to the slaves to establish a free community and urged Judith “to lend every
assistance to the said Slaves thro’ life.” 51
While Richard Randolph contemplated a private plan for his slaves’ freedom, St. George
Tucker researched and composed a public proposal to rid Virginia of slavery. His ideas
concerning gradual emancipation had evolved from his lectures at William and Mary after the St.
Domingue rebellion. The island revolution gave Tucker’s emancipationist ideas urgency.
Jefferson’s thoughts for emancipation in Notes on the State of Virginia also inspired Tucker, but
he looked beyond the South for viewpoints on emancipation. Tucker corresponded with Dr.
Jeremy Belknap in Boston, who sent him the various plans used by Northern state legislatures to
abolish slavery. Taking into consideration slaves, free black Virginians, “the deep-rooted
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prejudices of whites,” and his devotion to Lockean ideas of property rights, Tucker devised a
plan to “remove the same evil from among ourselves.” 52
His hopeful yet tentative “Dissertation on Slavery” offered a plan for gradual
emancipation that also addressed the white fears of a free black population. Tucker ruled out
immediate emancipation since it equaled a sentence of “lingering death by famine, by disease
and other accumulated miseries.” Freedom should unfold over generations, which would respect
all the slaveholders’ property rights and prevent the sudden appearance of a large free black
population. The plan would free all females born under slavery, but they would remain in
servitude until they were twenty-eight, a form of compensation for masters. All men during the
first generation would remain slaves. The second generation would be free but would serve as
apprentices until they turned twenty-one. Unlike other Virginia antislavery men, Tucker refused
to express a belief in the inferiority of slaves. His fear of a free black population rested in the
belief that an uneducated, unskilled, and unprepared black population would seek retribution
from white Virginians. He opposed the forced removal of liberated slaves from Virginia, but he
did not want the state “to encourage their future residence among us.” Free blacks would enjoy
few rights and would be banned from office-holding, voting, serving as jurors or witnesses, or
owning guns. If free blacks remained in Virginia, the white population would control them.
Tucker hoped that these deep-seated prejudices would eventually decline, however. The plan
seemed to fulfill Madison’s expectation that Virginians would promote Lockean antislavery
ideas from within. Indeed, Madison assured his colleagues during another debate over slavery in
1795 that Virginia would continue to implement laws aimed at “gradually reducing the number
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of slaves.” In 1796, Tucker submitted his plan to the Virginia General Assembly for
consideration. The antislavery feeling, in which Madison and Tucker placed so much hope,
however, had waned considerably. The legislature tabled the plan without really considering it.
Tucker himself found it impossible to fully escape the dilemma of slavery. Just days after
submitting his plan, he arranged the sale of a slave that he had long rented out, an action
rendered acceptable by his belief in property rights.53
During most of the time that Tucker and Richard Randolph spent contemplating public
and personal resolutions regarding slavery, John Randolph traveled through South Carolina and
Georgia in the company of his proslavery friends such as Joseph Bryan. While his brother
struggled, John Randolph reveled in the life of a planter—betting on horses and drinking. On his
return trip home, he fell ill at Petersburg. Richard traveled to his brother’s bedside and
apparently urged him to return to Bizarre. After being assured that his brother would recover,
Richard Randolph returned to his plantation, where he unexpectedly fell ill. British architect
Benjamin Latrobe visited Bizarre in early June, and he reported that his host suffered from an
“inflammatory fever.” On June 17, 1796, the doctor arrived to treat Richard, but “his opinion
was against the probability of Mr. Randolph’s recovery,” Latrobe reported. A messenger met
John Randolph as he made his way to Bizarre with the news of his brother’s death. A sense of
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doom had followed Richard Randolph since the scandal, and his brother always suspected that,
in the end, it destroyed him.54
***
With the death of his brother, the twenty-three year old Randolph became the patriarch of
his family. He abandoned any thought of moving to Roanoke and settled instead at Bizarre to
assist Judith in managing the plantation, caring for her children, and carrying out his brother’s
will. “I am sensible to the deranged state of your brother’s affairs and rely entirely on your
assistance and advice,” Judith wrote to him. In turn, Randolph became attached to Judith and her
two sons, John St. George and Tudor. “I dread leaving her alone,” he wrote before one trip. He
was determined to save the plantation for his nephews. “I have long ago assured her that I
considered myself pledged by the most sacred ties to advance their mutual interests and
Happiness,” he wrote to Tucker. Richard Randolph had insisted that his sons be raised and
educated as enlightened republican citizens, and their uncle took a personal role in that mission.
Protecting their land concerned him most, however. Randolph brought sixty-four of his own
slaves to assist in clearing new lands for cultivation and experimented with new agricultural
practices to conserve the soil.55
Remaining creditors inched through the legal process to collect the Randolph family’s
outstanding debts. Tucker advised John to sell land since the creditors would get it anyway.
Adding to the hardships, Richard’s private debts came due, and Judith faced the manumission of
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the slaves at Bizarre. John Randolph understood that if he failed to satisfy the numerous
demands, the family faced the humiliation of losing Bizarre and Roanoke. Soon after Richard’s
death, a federal court decided the debt case in favor of Hansbury and Osgood. Randolph found
himself overwhelmed as he negotiated with the creditors. Staring at the dire financial situation,
John Randolph finally sold Matoax for three thousand pounds, which erased a substantial portion
of the Randolphs’ outstanding obligations and kept other creditors at bay. He had violated his
mother’s admonition and parted with the family’s most important piece of land. The sale of
Matoax ended the family’s presence in the Virginia Tidewater. “I have been deprived by a
sentence of the family court of more than half my fortune,” Randolph wrote. “I am highly
chagrined at being robbed in so villainous manner,” he added. He remained determined to make
the family solvent and keep the remaining plantations. Honor forced him and Judith to try to
carry out Richard’s emancipation plans, even though it would destroy Bizarre’s labor source and
its wealth. But the remaining debts of Richard and the family prevented immediate
emancipation. Indeed, Randolph sold several slaves to cover part of his late brother’s debts. As
pieces of Bizarre fell into disuse, Randolph rented the land to tenants or moved his own slaves
from Roanoke to work it. At Roanoke, Randolph truly became the master and Judith found his
decisions and power hard to resist.56
His responsibilities taxed him emotionally, and his fragile emotional state began to show.
“I go to bed but can not sleep,” Randolph wrote, “I turn and toss about, and altho’ it is now late
at night, I do assure you that I have not been even in a doze since the night before last.” He paced
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the floor, muttering to himself lines from Macbeth. Some nights found him patrolling the
grounds of Bizarre, pistols in hand, protecting his land from unseen enemies. “I have nobody to
unburden myself to,” he wrote to Tucker. The struggle to pay the debts consumed his attention
for several years. Even after the Hansbury decision, Randolph contested the amount owed,
accusing the financial firm of overcharging. Like his brother, he found it “impossible for me to
investigate so confused a parent as that of my late father.”57
***
After Randolph left Philadelphia, he followed national politics closely, and he remained
committed to republican and revolutionary principles. The ongoing war between France and
Great Britain threatened to pull in United States. Randolph and fellow Francophiles believed that
the Washington administration’s neutrality policy functioned as a means of passive support for
Great Britain. The war only aggravated already tense relations between the United States and
England. Despite the Treaty of Paris (1783), Britain maintained forts in the Northwest, refused
to offer any compensation for emancipated slaves, and kept many British ports in the West Indies
closed to American merchants. To make matters worse, the British navy routinely seized
American ships suspected of carrying provisions to France. Jefferson and Madison believed that
a peaceful but strong commercial policy could break Britain’s hold on the Atlantic and force that
nation to respect American maritime rights. In 1794, President Washington appointed Chief
Justice John Jay to a special mission to negotiate a treaty with Great Britain. The appointment
outraged Republicans, who wanted the House of Representatives, the direct representatives of
the people, to decide on a commercial policy with Great Britain. Madison and Jefferson believed
57
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Jay’s mission represented an effort to use executive power to circumvent popular will. In 1795,
Jay returned with a treaty that incensed Republicans. In the agreement, England agreed to
abandon its forts, compensate American ship owners for losses, and establish a trading
relationship that amounted to most favored nation status with Great Britain. British negotiators
refused to consider the planters’ demands for compensation for freed slaves, and the antislavery
Jay refused to press the issue. Furthermore, the treaty granted American Indians far-reaching
rights in the West, an impediment to unchecked westward expense. The treaty reinforced
Republican suspicions that Federalists wanted to subordinate American interests to Great Britain
and force a breach in the U.S. relationship with France. Republican mobs burned Jay in effigy
and, after Washington signed the treaty, condemned him as a tool of the British. While in South
Carolina, Randolph joined in the condemnation of the treaty, expressing his hatred of
Washington. “In order to concentrate in his own person all the powers of the Government, the
president has riveted the chains of his Country,” he wrote. The president rallied men of “British
principles” and used Jay’s Treaty as a means to suppress the Republican opposition, especially
Southerners. As the Anti-Federalists had once warned, the executive used his popularity “to
force people” to accept a policy “inimical to Their interest and freedom,” Randolph continued.
Washington, Randolph believed, led the nation into “tyranny.” The financial chaos in the
aftermath of Richard’s death prevented Randolph from participating in the 1796 election, but he
supported the pro-French platform of the Republicans and the presidential campaign of Thomas
Jefferson against the Federalist nominee, John Adams.58
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In the campaign, Federalists attacked Republicans as both dangerous Jacobins who
threatened social disorder and slaveholding aristocrats determined to protect their interests at any
costs. Both charges, of course, were based in fact. The Northern supporters of Jefferson consisted
of artisans, small farmers, and a host of middling or lower class people. Influenced by the French
Revolution, these people subscribed to democracy and believed in its leveling effects. In the
South, planters used the language of democracy, but devoted themselves to maintaining the
status quo and slavery. Even while Richard and John Randolph tried to rescue their plantations
and maintain their family status, they adopted the garnishments of revolutionary language,
signing letters “citizen” and adopting the revolutionary Thermidor calendar. In Virginia, signs of
gentry decline became evident in the loss of deference, but its power had been replaced by men
who had recently found their fortunes and stubbornly kept lower-class whites out of politics.
Jefferson and Madison knew that Northerners and Southerners must unite to build a national
movement that could defeat Federalists. The North saw Jefferson as an antislavery man, but
Southerners knew he would never embrace abolition or other emancipation measures. The
Federalist press noticed and accused Jefferson of “gross hypocrisy, since at one moment he is
anxious to emancipate the blacks, to vindicate the liberty of human race—at another, he
discovers that the blacks are a different race from the human race.” The 1796 election was
decided along sectional lines with Adams winning little Southern support.59
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The temperamental John Adams hoped to govern independent of party influence, a goal
derived as much from his dislike of Alexander Hamilton as from his principles. After the signing
of Jay’s Treaty, France began to seize American ships on the Atlantic, which created a tense
diplomatic problem for the new administration. In his first days in office, Adams consulted with
Jefferson about sending James Madison to France to repair relations damaged by Jay’s Treaty.
The Hamilton-controlled cabinet objected to the plan, although Jefferson’s acquiescence in a
potential political and diplomatic coup for Adams seemed unlikely. President Adams realized
that Federalists would be the obstacle to a peaceful agreement with France. “I will resign the
office and let Jefferson lead them to peace, wealth and power if he will,” Adams threatened.
Instead, he selected Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, John Marshall, and Elbridge Gerry for the
French mission. French officials insulted and bullied the American envoys and demanded
humiliating concessions from the United States. French minister Charles-Maurice de TalleyrandPerigold insisted that Adams apologize for an earlier aggressive speech made about France and
that the United States government assume France’s debts to American suppliers. Most
appallingly, Talleyrand insisted on a £50,000 bribe for himself and the French Directorate even
to begin negotiations. In other words, France demanded money for peace. When the envoys
returned with news of the failed mission, President Adams refused to release its full details but
asked Congress to arm merchant vessels. Jefferson and his supporters accused Federalists of
manufacturing a war panic and demanded the release of dispatches from the mission. The details
shocked the nation when Adams finally released them. In addition to the bribery scandal, French
officials indicated that they counted on French supporters within the United States as key allies.
The assertion left Jefferson red-faced and Republicans on the defensive. An outraged public
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clamored for war. The Federalist press condemned France and its domestic Republican
sympathizers.60
The crisis allowed Federalists to regain the public support lost in the aftermath of Jay’s
Treaty and gave President Adams considerable leeway in his response to the crisis. The
development intensified Southern Republican fears. The situation presented Alexander Hamilton
with the opportunity to implement his militarist vision of the republic, which meant that the
United States would build support for a permanent military that the nation would use to
implement its foreign policy. Adams imposed an embargo on trade with France and abrogated
treaties, which he expected would increase attacks on the sea. As tensions between the two
nations mounted, Adams asked Congress to build a navy. Amid the anti-France fervor, Hamilton
instructed his supporters in the government to expand the nation’s army. Rumors of a French
invasion fed public support for the proposal. In 1798, President Adams reluctantly asked for
twelve regiments while also creating a “provisional army” of 10,000 additional men. Tyrants,
Republicans believed, used state-controlled standing armies, consolidated power, crushed
dissent, stifled reason, and created a perpetual state of war. Indeed, many Americans believed
armies exacerbated other evils that ruined republican governments. In 1795, James Madison
explained the republican hatred of war. “Of all the enemies to public liberty war is, perhaps, the
most to be dreaded, because it comprises and develops the germ of every other. War is the parent
of armies; from these proceed debts and taxes, and armies, and debts, and taxes are the known
instruments for bringing the many under the domination of the few,” he wrote. Nations should
resort to war only under direct attack, Republicans believed, and the people should ideally
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defend themselves through militias. When war proved inevitable, republics should strive for
limited war. A limited conflict would involve the fewest soldiers possible, have immediate
objectives, and leave the citizenry untouched. In a true republic, the people relied on commerce
to forge peaceful relations between nations. Jefferson stressed his opposition to “a standing army
in time of peace which may overawe the public sentiment.” The nation’s security should rest in
the hands of the state militias “till actual invasion.” News that Alexander Hamilton angled for
control of the new army only fulfilled Republican fears and even gave President Adams pause.61
The entanglement in European affairs complicated the United States policies toward St.
Domingue, now Haiti, which also escalated Republican fears. Louverture maintained loyalty to
the French after that nation’s abolition of slavery in 1794. No nation recognized the inevitability
of home rule on the island, which explains why the United States ignored Great Britain’s
invasion of Haiti in an effort to restore order. Supplied by the French, Toussaint Louverture and
his armies fought for four years before wearing down the British army. Before evacuating the
island, Britain agreed not to invade the island again while Louverture promised to attack neither
Jamaica nor the United States. Haiti remained nominally under French rule and Louverture used
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the prospect of his nation’s independence to exert influence. Because of Haiti’s status as a
French colony, the United States stopped its lucrative trade to the island when it instituted the
embargo. Secretary of State Timothy Pickering, an arch-Federalist, believed the United States
should urge the independence and recognition of the nation as a weapon against France.
Louverture sent an envoy to the United States to seek support of the Adams administration. The
President believed that no power would ever reestablish control over the island and wanted to
reach an arrangement with Louverture. Great Britain’s opposition to Haitian independence,
however, prevented any real agreement. Pickering came to see the Haitian general as
“respectable.” Informally, Louverture agreed to protect American interests near the island. In
return, Adams urged Congress to add a section to an existing bill that gave the President power
to open trade with Haiti when he believed it in the interest of the United States. Jefferson
complained that Adams wanted to surrender Haiti to the “Cannibals of the terrible republic.”62
The Adams administration’s confidence in Toussaint Louverture angered Southerners,
who feared the consequences of American recognition of the rebellion or of Haitian
independence. If the United States bestowed its blessings on the rebellion, their own slaves
would believe that an uprising could end in recognition and reward. White refugees from the
island carried horror stories of the violence against masters, while Southerners feared that black
Haitians who made it into the United States threatened to spread rebellion. Rumors about the
island created deep suspicion and led to panic such as the November 1797 rumors that French
62
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black refugees plotted rebellion in Charleston. James Simons of South Carolina informed
Secretary of Treasury Oliver Wolcott, Jr. that slaves circulated stories among themselves. “The
report will undoubtedly spread that the French are expected here and that when they come they
are to make all the Negroes free,” he wrote. “If they [the slaves] get possession of Savannah or
Charleston, they might do immense mischief before they could be dislodged,” South Carolina
Congressman Robert Goodloe Harper argued. Secretary of State Pickering fed the Southern
anxiety when he informed Harper, who headed the House Committee of Ways and Means, that
five thousand Haitian soldiers planned to invade within a week. In Virginia, St. George Tucker
feared that “an Army of Negroes from St. D[omingue]” commanded by black officers would
land in the South and provoke “a general Insurrection of Slaves.” If such occurred, Virginian
David Meade argued, it would “prove fatal to the Union [and] must bring evils upon the three or
four Southern States, more terrific than Volcano’s [or] Earthquakes.” 63
Southern fears actually led Southern Federalists to embrace the standing army as the
means of suppressing rebellion. Indeed, President Adams and other Federalists sold the military
buildup as a means to offer internal security to the South. In an early draft of the special message
requesting the army, President Adams contended that the government would use the force “in
case of Insurrection of Domestics or others.” Secretary of the Treasury Oliver Wolcott, Jr.
informed George Washington that the administration looked toward “the enrollment of a force
with a view principally to the Blacks in the most Southern States.” Washington advised the
administration to select South Carolina’s Charles Cotesworth Pinckney for a military post since
63
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he would best prepare for an invasion from Haiti or an insurrection. Adams and the Federalist
party offered security and used fear to sell the army to the public, Republicans argued. Many in
South Carolina, including John Rutledge, switched loyalties from the Republicans because
Federalists offered the best chance to quash any slave unrest. The Federalist party found itself
about to build a national movement by promises to protect slavery. The choice was hardly to be
celebrated and many believed the remedy would be worse than the disease. St. George Tucker
believed the military buildup would only hasten “a separation of the [United] States and perhaps
in the Subjugation of the Southern part of the Union.”64
Republicans used the expanding newspaper market to condemn Federalist policies and
vilify their enemies. A group of editors and politicians including Benjamin Franklin Bache,
William Duane, Matthew Lyon, and James Callender printed sensational critiques of their
opponents, often in vulgar and popular terms, which signaled the growing democratic base of
their newspapers’ readership. In July 1798 the United States Congress passed the Sedition Act,
which made it a crime to publish or state false, malicious, or scandalous things about the United
States government. The law would silence the remaining Jacobins, Federalists hoped. Secretary
Pickering led a zealous effort to prosecute the most virulent critics of the administration and its
policies. For instance, Federal authorities charged, jailed, and fined Republican Congressman
Mathew Lyon for his particularly nasty attacks on the President. Along with the Sedition Act,
Congress passed the Alien Act to curb the influence of immigrants, a large Republican
constituency. In Virginia, citizens gathered in county meetings and expressed fear that a
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monarchy was rising before their eyes. Assemblies throughout the states continually petitioned
the government for the repeal of the acts while reasserting their rights of speech and assembly.65
In a climate that repressed political opposition, Vice-President Jefferson and James
Madison declared their opposition to the Federalist abuse of power in the Virginia and Kentucky
Resolutions. Discontent in Virginia drove the leaders to precisely define what their struggle
represented. In their resolutions, Jefferson and Madison offered narrow goals—the repeal of the
Alien and Sedition Acts—but also crafted definitions to define the question of ultimate
sovereignty when the federal government’s interests clashed with the states. In resolutions
passed by the Kentucky legislature Jefferson argued that “the States retain as complete authority
as possible over their own citizens.” Citizens, through their state governments, could render
unjust and unconstitutional laws void by nullifying them. The union between the states and the
federal government did not mean “unlimited submission to their general government.”
Furthermore, sovereign states could decide their means of redressing abuses. The idea of
nullification emanated as much from the people as from Jefferson himself. In August 1798, an
Amelia County petition argued that “[a]ny ‘Act’ violating the Constitution, is, we conceive, a
nullity.” While Jefferson’s Kentucky Resolutions and Madison’s accompanying Virginia
Resolutions expressed a theory of states’ rights, they also helped the Republicans’ effort to create
a national movement. While the Republicans expressed support for natural rights, they believed
that the states were responsible for protecting them. Acting on behalf of the people, state
governments held the responsibility to resist the overreach of the central government through
65
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nullification, and, if necessary, secession. In his introduction of the Virginia Resolutions, John
Taylor argued that the recent actions of the federal government represented the oppression of the
few by the many. “[T]hat oppression was the road to civil war,” Taylor insisted. While Northern
democrats rejected the implicit defense of slavery in the Resolutions, they also saw them as AntiFederalist theory crafted into a theory of constitutional dissent. If they could be used to defend
slavery, they could also be used to protect liberty in the North. The Resolutions’ constitutional
defense of states’ rights became the “principles of ’98.”66
The supposed abuses of John Adams and the Federalists spurred John Randolph from his
grief at Bizarre. “The friends of Freedom [and] Mankind are alarmed at the lengths to which this
administration of this country have gone,” Randolph wrote. As war became a distinct possibility,
he condemned Adams and the administration as “emissaries [and] dependents of [William] Pitt.”
The breakdown of U.S.-French relations, Randolph, believed, could be traced back to the British
government. Randolph promised resistance by “the free American people” before they
participated in a war against France. Still very much invested in the radical rhetoric of the French
Revolution, Randolph believed Federalist offenders deserved the ultimate penalty. “Before that
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period arrives I hope to see the advisors of such measures brought to the block; this is the only
atonement which can be made by them for their political sins,” he wrote.67
Randolph’s rage reflected the political mood in Virginia. Republicans were determined to
defeat Federalists in the state and federal elections of 1798-99. The party planned to drive all
Federalists from state office, prepare for potential conflict with the federal government, and
promote the candidacy of Thomas Jefferson for the presidency in the 1800 election. The failure
to eradicate Federalist influence would result in an “[a]nglo-monarchic-aristocratic-military
government,” argued John Taylor of Caroline. After they routed their opponents in the state
elections, Republicans used their majority in the Virginia General Assembly to dismiss
Federalists from the state government. In Richmond, the legislature prepared for a military
showdown between state and federal government. Realizing that the federal government
controlled the Harper’s Ferry arsenal, the only substantial collection of arms in Virginia,
Republicans passed long-stalled measures to build a new armory in Richmond, reorganized the
militia, and passed tax provisions to pay for it all. Years later Randolph proudly admitted that
Virginia prepared and planned to fight the federal government during the crisis. “Who could say
that freemen had not a right to arm against John Adams and his provisional army[?],” Randolph
asked. 68
Creed Taylor, leader of the Southside Virginia Republicans, launched an electoral assault
on the state’s Federalists in the congressional elections. In 1798, Taylor searched for a
replacement for the seat of retiring Congressman Abraham Venable. Randolph wanted the seat
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despite protestations that “the idea of representing this district in Congress never originated with
me.” He and Taylor had become politically close while both serving as founders of the town of
Farmville, which was formed from land donated from Judith Randolph’s Bizarre plantation. No
experience had satisfied Randolph more than watching the debates of Thomas Tucker, and now
Randolph wanted a congressional seat himself. As the election approached, he allowed Taylor to
promote his candidacy for the seat representing the fifteenth congressional district.69
Many expected a Republican sweep in the 1799 congressional elections, especially since
the party wielded such power in the Virginia General Assembly. The Republican-dominated
legislature distributed copies of the Declaration of Independence, Alien and Sedition Acts, and
Virginia Resolutions in their effort to convince the public of their views. Overconfidence led
many in the party to escalate radical rhetoric, including talk of secession and the possibility of
military conflict between state and federal governments. The Virginia Gazette published an
accusation that congressional Republican William Branch Giles advocated disunion: “In
company last evening, at the Swan Tavern, I heard a gentlemen say, that you had declared it was
your desire to see a separation of the state, from the General Union!” Federalists, on the other
hand, promised voters a moderate government that would protect Virginia from attack and
maintain liberty through the Union. The palpable anger of the Republicans seemed ready to
explode. In Fredericksburg, when John Marshall assured voters that Federalists would govern by
the Constitution, a mob of Republicans threatened to beat him. Federalists appealed to the
merchants in more populated areas and settlers west of the Blue Ridge Mountains by arguing that
the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions were schemes designed by the planter gentry to maintain
their power. Republicans’ radicalism disturbed many, including Patrick Henry. The once staunch
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Anti-Federalist had quit politics after the ratification debate and resisted numerous offers to serve
in national and state government. In the winter of 1799, George Washington convinced Henry to
stand for election to the Virginia General Assembly. In the growing uneasiness about the
radicalism of the Republicans, John Randolph walked into his first political controversy.70
In March 1799, a month before the election, the Virginia Gazette attacked Randolph as an
abolitionist. In a series of public letters, political enemies reported that during a recent discussion
Randolph had contended that his “principle was to serve no one” and declared it “wrong that
anyone should serve” him. During a conversation about his belief in egalitarianism, Randolph
revealed his hatred for slavery. “Mr. John Randolph, jr. another of the candidates,” alleged
William Hopkins, “advocated the emancipation of our slaves.” If elected, Randolph allegedly
said, “he would endeavor to carry the measure [emancipation] through congress.” Anxiety over
Haiti and the federal government had altered attitudes toward slavery in Virginia and had
diminished most of the revolutionary-era optimism about its eventual demise. Traveling through
the state in 1798, Methodist circuit rider Francis Asbury noted that antislavery movements were
limited to Quakers, Methodists, and two remaining manumission societies. The people of
Virginia as a whole had no desire to eliminate slavery, according to Asbury. In February, rumors
of a potential slave revolt in Petersburg had caused considerable anxiety in Southside Virginia.
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The freeholders of Randolph’s district wanted to maintain slavery and insisted that their
representative should protect it.71
The well-known radicalism of the Randolph brothers lent credibility to the allegation and
forced Randolph to explain himself. Friends and supporters denied that Randolph made the
specific remarks. Some enemies argued that he planned to free his own slaves, in an effort to
avoid the family’s creditors. On the contrary, Randolph sold slaves the year before to pay part of
his brother’s debts. In a public letter he defended himself against the specific allegation of going
to Congress to pass an emancipation bill. “Let it be understood that even if I were the strongest
advocate for the emancipation of our slaves (which is not the case) and if every man in the state
of Virginia were of the same disposition, I would oppose the execution of that measure by the
congress of the United States,” he insisted. In late April, the Gazette posted several letters that
exposed Randolph’s antislavery attitudes. Francis Watkins, the man who heard the initial
conversation, agreed that Randolph never advocated such a congressional measure. He insisted,
however, that Randolph had admitted his general antislavery views. Sixteen years later, Nancy
Randolph, the center of the Bizarre scandal, recalled how Randolph often talked of freeing his
own slaves:
There are many who remember, while your slaves were under mortgage for the British
debt, your philanthropic assertion that you would make them free and provide tutors for
them. With this project, you wearied all who would listen. When by the sale of some of
them, a part of the debt was discharged and an agreement made to pay the rest by
installments, you changed your mind. This was not inexcusable, but when you set up for
71
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representation in Congress, and the plan to liberate your slaves was objected to in your
District, you published, to the astonishment of numbers, who had heard you descant on
your liberal intentions, that you never had any such idea.
Although Randolph wrote her account in anger, it accords with the accounts published in the
Gazette. Randolph printed a handbill of his denial of the charges and distributed it throughout the
district. As he campaigned in Southside Virginia, he assured fellow freeholders that he supported
slavery.72
In April 1799, just days before the election, Randolph agreed to appear alongside Patrick
Henry at the town of Charlotte County Court House. Henry’s absence from politics had only
accentuated his legend, which made the gathering a spectacle. Despite later fanciful suggestions,
Henry and Randolph did not debate that day but instead simply addressed the voters. In his bid
for a seat in the state legislature, Henry offered a deeply emotional speech, warning against
conflict between Virginia and the federal government, and using the image of Washington and
the memory of the American Revolution effectivly. “Where is the citizen of America who will
dare to lift his hand against the father of his country?,” he asked. The old Anti-Federalist now
pleaded with voters to elect Federalists to keep the Union together. The mere presence of Henry,
the great orator of the Revolution, captivated the crowd. In contrast, Randolph followed Henry
with remarks so undistinguished that they went unrecorded. Contemporary accounts simply
stated that Randolph offered a scathing rebuke to the Federalist party and its attack on liberty.
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The sight of the scrawny twenty-six-year-old beardless man with his high feminine voice
campaigning for the fifteenth congressional district remained with them, however.73
Voters elected both Randolph and Henry in the April elections. Overall, the elections
proved disappointing for Virginia Republicans. Federalists won eight seats in the House of
Representatives and staved off Republican domination of the congressional delegation. John
Marshall helped lead Federalists to success by distancing himself and his party from the Alien
and Sedition Acts. Principles of law, Constitution, and order became pillars of the Federalist
campaign. The preparations for war and the radicalism of the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions
sobered voters. The freeholders of Virginia saw the threats before them—federal power, slave
revolts, standing armies—and divided on how to confront them. Merchants from the coast and
small planters in some western districts chose the Federalists. The old gentry and large planters
in the Tidewater and Piedmont elected Republicans to defend their interests. For Republicans
who dominated the state government, the results were stunning. “The Virginia congressional
elections have astonished everyone,” Jefferson wrote. In the far west, however, where
Republicans supplanted some Federalists, John G. Jackson believed that the Republicans would
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ultimately win because “the truth is on our side and that truth will be omnipotent.” Randolph
prepared to take the Republican truth with him to Congress.74
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Chapter 4: “The Interest and Feelings of the Southern States:” John Randolph and the
Congressional Defense of Slavery and Slaveholders, 1799-1807
In December 1799, John Randolph returned to Philadelphia as the congressional
representative for his rural Southside Virginia district. As he prepared an attack on the new
standing army in his maiden congressional speech, a group of petitions landed before the House
of Representatives. Among them lay the petition of free black Philadelphia minister Absalom
Jones, urging Congress to outlaw the international slave trade and “emancipate” all of the
nation’s slaves “from their present situation.” An inveterate abolitionist, Jones had long used the
Free African Society and his African Episcopal Church of St. Thomas to fight for freedom and
interracial harmony in Philadelphia. Now at the end of the eighteenth century, Jones wanted
Congress to take a stand against slavery before it moved south to Washington, D.C., and asked
sympathetic congressman Robert Waln to introduce the petition. In response, seasoned proslavery representative John Rutledge, Jr. of South Carolina condemned the action as a
consequence of the “new-fangled French philosophy of liberty and equality.” Beginning on
January 2, 1800, the House debated the petition and Congress’s responsibility regarding slavery.1
Since the debate concerning the Quaker petitions in 1790, Southerners in Congress had
become resolute in their defense of slavery against Northern interference. In January 1800,
Virginia congressman “Lighthorse” Henry Lee reminded his colleagues that Southern
constituents sent them to Congress “to protect the rights of the people and the rights of property.”
1
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Indeed, Lee insisted that “Congress had no authority but to protect it [slavery].” Massachusetts
congressman George Thatcher expressed the North’s growing hatred of slavery when he declared
the institution “a cancer of immense magnitude, that would some time destroy the body politic.”
The political Union faced disaster “except that a proper legislation should prevent the evil,” he
added. John Brown of Rhode Island agreed with Thatcher’s prognosis. “No subject surely was so
likely to cause a division of the States as that respecting slaves,” he remarked. Yet Brown agreed
with Lee that Congress had no right to interfere with slavery. Furthermore, Brown opposed any
plan of emancipation that would encourage freed slaves to migrate to the North.
Still stinging from being labeled an abolitionist during the campaign, John Randolph
offered brief remarks on the antislavery issue so as not to “encourage that discussion.” He argued
that Congress had no right to accept the petition nor did it enjoy any power to interfere with
slavery. Furthermore, he wished “the House would have been so indignant as to have passed it
over without discussion.” In his remarks, Randolph echoed Thomas Tucker’s sentiments of a
decade earlier. “The Constitution put it out of the power of the House to do anything,” Randolph
argued. He insisted that the political issue of slavery belonged to the states while the private
conscience of slaveholders must confront the moral problem of slavery. In solidarity with the
Georgia and South Carolina delegations, he demanded respect for the rights of the Southern
states. He urged his colleagues to reject a referral of Jones’s petition to the committee charged
with handling the slave trade and insisted “this be the last time the business of the House would
be entered upon, and the interest and feelings of the Southern States be put in jeopardy.” His
colleagues agreed and rejected Jones’s petition after two days of debate.2
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Randolph came to Congress to talk about anything but slavery. In 1800, when the
Republicans won majorities in Congress and the presidency, other issues seemed more important
than the peculiar institution. It seemed safe for slaveholders dominated leadership positions in
the federal government. Yet resentment of the disproportionate power of Virginia and its
slaveholders in the government meant that slavery remained a persistent irritant. As Randolph
gained power as chairman of the Ways and Means Committee and floor leader of the House, he
defended slaveholders and slavery with legislative maneuvers, blunt political power, and, if all
else failed, inflammatory rhetoric. His stated political goals of frugality, anti-militarism, and a
weak federal government emanated from his desire to protect Virginia, the South, and its
slaveholders. Randolph has often been classified with Southern conservative ideologues such as
John Taylor of Caroline as a founder of conservative Southern nationalism. Such comparison
presents problems since Randolph could never be described as an intellectual or a theorist.
Instead, he was a brute political fighter. From 1799 to 1807, Randolph consistently,
emphatically, and harshly protected slavery by not only defending the rights of the states but also
by fighting to assure that Southerners maintained control of the government. In his effort, he
gave his Northern colleagues a demonstration of the slavemaster in action.
***
The petition distracted Randolph from his most important goal—the dismantling of the
army. Federalists still dominated the House, so the prospect of winning a legislative victory was
remote. Instead, Randolph wanted to make a political stand against the military expansion
enacted by the Federalists. In January 1800, John Nicholas, a Virginia congressman with shifting
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party loyalties, proposed legislation to repeal the law that authorized twelve new regiments of the
regular army and expanded the number of general officers. Randolph seized the debate and
declared Nicholas’s measure too timid. Instead, Randolph “wished to see the whole of it [army],
reprobated as it is by our citizens, abandoned.” He attacked Federalists as centralizers, using
“foreign dangers” to frighten the people into accepting a standing army and diminishing the
nation’s real source of protection, the state militias. “A people who mean to continue free must
be prepared to meet danger in person,” Randolph insisted.3
While Randolph argued that his stance on the army came from his strict republican
principles, he also believed that a standing army threatened Virginia’s social hierarchy. He
warned his Southern colleagues that Federalists would recruit “worthless” members of
communities for the army, who would then “live upon the public” and “consume the fruits” of
those in “honest industry.” In Virginia, Randolph argued, the army would confer power, money,
and prestige on those without land, slaves, or the benefit of a distinguished family. In essence,
Federalists would use democratic means to diminish the power of the gentry. “The military
parade which meets the eye in almost every direction excites the gall of our citizens,” Randolph
said. In democratic fashion, such spectacles could elevate a lower-class person above his social
superiors while spreading propaganda of the federal government at taxpayer’s expense. St.
George Tucker had expressed dismay at these public events and how they eroded deference to
the gentry in Virginia. Randolph insisted that planters could defend themselves and “do not want
their noses held to the grindstone to pay protectors.” During the debate, the class implications of
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the standing army emerged as Randolph’s central concern. “They [planters] put no confidence,
sir, in the protection of a handful of ragamuffins,” he argued.4
On the following day, Randolph retracted the word “ragamuffin” from his comments and
stressed that the poorest of his community “ought to excite compassion, and not gall.” He
reiterated his concerns about the standing army. But the “ragamuffin” comment provoked anger
among Federalists and military men in Philadelphia. On January 10, 1800, two marines taunted
and threatened Randolph while he watched a performance at the Chestnut Street Theatre in
Philadelphia. When the crowd exited the theater, one of the soldiers grabbed Randolph’s coat
and nearly sparked a stampede on the stairs. Joseph Nicholson, Randolph’s closest friend and
fellow congressman, prevented the soldiers from harming his colleague. The next day, Randolph
sent a letter to President Adams demanding an investigation. The incident at the playhouse
represented an attack on the legislative branch and an insult to the “majesty of the people,”
Randolph wrote. Even as Randolph attacked the leveling potential of the military, he resorted to
democratic rhetoric to evoke public outrage toward the Federalists. He insisted that Adams take
action: “In their name [the people’s], I demand that a provision commensurate with the evil be
made, and which will be calculated to deter others from any future attempt to introduce the reign
of terror into our country.” In his effort to make the incident a political weapon, Randolph
abandoned deference to create a public spectacle. President Adams sent Randolph’s letter to the
House “without any other comments on its matter of style.”5
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The House investigated the incident but found nothing beyond the misdeeds of the
soldiers. The affair, however, propelled Randolph to the center of national politics. The audacity
of this freshman challenging the President heartened supporters and outraged enemies. “J.
Randolph has entered into debate with great splendor & approbation,” wrote Thomas Jefferson,
who believed the young Virginian would emerge with an “increase of reputation.” Federalists
condemned his insolence. “This stripling comes full to the brim with his own conceit and all
Virginia democracy,” wrote Abigail Adams. Soon Randolph’s reputation for theatrics and
hyperbole spread throughout the nation. The Pittsburgh Gazette labeled him a “forward, spoilt
boy…remarkable for his intemperance and incivility.”6
The upcoming election of 1800 inspired Randolph’s exaggerated rhetoric aimed at
exposing the Federalist threat of monarchy. In 1800, Northern and Southern Republicans again
united behind Jefferson while Federalists condemned him as a slavemaster and a Jacobin. In the
North, Jefferson’s enemies condemned the Republicans’ use of egalitarian rhetoric to build
political support, pointing to the hypocrisy of slaveholders encouraging democracy. One
Federalist commentator refused “to learn the principles of liberty from slave-holders of
Virginia.” Southern and Northern Republicans set aside reservations to build a coalition between
planters in the South and small farmers and artisans of differing ethnicities and religions in the
North. Jefferson’s supporters in both regions revealed a deep paranoia toward monarchy, and
many remained convinced that the Federalists planned to assert tyrannical control over the
nation. Randolph believed that the Federalists colluded with the British monarchy and that
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neither would relinquish power. “Tories of Britain and America, shall impose Mr. Adams upon
the people against their consent,” Randolph wrote. He expressed faith in the people to correct the
abuses of Adams and the Federalists. “When the people begin to examine into their own
concerns, woe be unto those who have abused their unsuspecting confidence,” Randolph wrote.7
In late summer 1800, rumors of slave rebellion in Virginia threatened the Republican
coalition. In August, reports that slaves were plotting an uprising in the Richmond area came to
the attention of Governor James Monroe and other Virginia authorities. After an investigation
that included the interrogation of slaves, Monroe confirmed the existence of a conspiracy. “The
plan of an insurrection has been clearly proved, & appears to have been of considerable extent,”
Monroe informed Jefferson. According to reports, a literate slave named Gabriel plotted an
uprising that would free the slaves and establish equality in Virginia. Inspired by the French and
Haitian revolutions, Gabriel persuaded others to join in the effort to win their freedom. On
August 30, he and his men planned to march on Richmond and secure their freedom or
overthrow the government. When the hour of attack came, however, a violent Virginia
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thunderstorm created chaos among the plotters. Frightened slaves revealed the plans to
authorities, who rooted out the conspirators and thwarted the rebellion.8
In September 1800, slave patrols and Virginia militia gathered slaves suspected in
participating in the conspiracy, who then appeared before the state’s oyer and terminer courts,
designed to handle slave justice. Randolph attended some of the proceedings, where the
influence of radical revolutionary rhetoric on the slaves became apparent. “They manifested a
sense of their rights, a contempt of danger and a thirst for revenge which portend the most
unhappy consequences,” he wrote. Although the slaves acted upon language that Randolph once
espoused, he refused to sympathize with those who hoped to produce a “general massacre.” The
failed uprising reminded Republicans such as Randolph that a racial reign of terror could prove
the consequences of their ideology. Randolph believed the “spirit” that produced Gabriel and his
failed rebellion could “deluge the southern country in blood.”9
The potential slave uprising could have easily damaged Republican electoral chances.
Monroe concealed damaging information concerning the possible involvement of two
Frenchmen from his political enemies, even Richmond’s Federalist mayor, James McClurg. By
mid-September, state authorities had executed twenty-five suspected conspirators, with many
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more heading for the gallows. Gabriel himself remained at large, which left many citizens in the
Richmond area nervous and angry. The spate of executions smacked of vengeance instead of
justice, and Monroe realized the political consequences of mass hangings of people who fought
for their liberty. “Where to rest the hand of the executioner, is a question of great importance,”
Monroe wrote to Jefferson. “[T]here is strong sentiment that there had been hanging enough,”
Jefferson responded. The Federalist press already condemned Jefferson as a hypocrite
concerning slavery and more executions would only prove slavery’s dehumanizing effects on all
white men. “The other states and the world at large will forever condemn us if we indulge in a
principle of revenge,” Jefferson wrote. In late September, authorities captured and executed
Gabriel. Monroe ended the executions despite pleas by many planters to continue them.
Randolph refused to condemn them and expressed relief that the only blood shed was “that
which streamed upon the scaffold.”10
In the months after the rebellion, Randolph, Monroe, and the Republicans hoped to
downplay the incident. When the crisis passed, Monroe assured the legislature that the state
never really was in any danger, while he continued to hide critical details from the public. The
threat of insurrectionary slaves filled the imagination of Southerners with paranoia about their
servants’ behavior. “It has come out that the fire in Richmond within these two years was the
work of the negroes,” James Callender wrote to Jefferson. “I learnt with concern in Bedford that
the important deposit of arms near New London is without even a centinel [sic],” Jefferson
wrote. “[W]e cannot suppose the federal administration takes this method of offering arms to
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insurgent negroes; yet some in the neighborhood of the place suspect it,” he added. Monroe and
the Republicans portrayed Gabriel’s rebellion as an aberration of slave society, but Jefferson’s
letter revealed the chronic fear of a slave uprising.11
Randolph worried most about the political consequences of the rebellion. “You have
doubtless heard the story with every exaggeration [and] will not be surprised to learn that our
federalists have endeavored to make an electioneering engine out of it,” he wrote to Joseph
Nicholson. The French-inspired rhetoric of liberty and equality sparked the rebellion, Federalists
argued, and in an example of gross hypocrisy Republicans hanged people who took the ideas
seriously. “Liberty and Equality has been infused into the minds of the Negroes,” the Federalist
Virginia Herald stated. In that paper, a “private citizen” reminded the public that anyone who
held slaves “can never be a Democrat” and that Republicans deceived themselves if they put
“any faith in any compromise between liberty and slavery.” The Northern Federalist press cast
Jefferson and his party as demagogues, enticing the lowest orders of Northern society with
expressions of democracy, but the rebellion proved that the Republicans were tyrants
masquerading as democrats. “He who affects to be a Democrat and is at the same time an owner
of slaves, is a devil incarnate,” one Federalist writer insisted. Northern critics believed the failed
Gabriel’s rebellion foretold the violence assured by Jefferson’s election. Gabriel’s Rebellion put
Northern Republicans in an awkward position, forcing them to indirectly defend an institution
they despised. William Duane, a radical egalitarian, absolved Southerners when he claimed that
“it is very well known that the people of the Southern states generally, entertain no wish more
ardently, than to get rid of the curse which England has inflicted on America.” In the campaign,
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the Republicans from the free states lionized Jefferson as the architect of liberty and the enemy
of tyranny, downplaying his role as slavemaster.12
In the fall of 1800, Republicans held their coalition together, defeated Adams, and
eliminated the Federalist majority in the House. Jefferson failed to win a clear victory, however,
when he tied his own vice-presidential running mate, Aaron Burr, in electoral votes. In the winter
of 1800, the House of Representatives prepared to decide the election after Burr refused to
withdraw from consideration. Initially, Randolph rejoiced in a Republican victory and stressed
that the political movement was much larger than a single candidate. “I believe that
republicanism depends not on a few orators, statesmen, and philosophers but on a diffusion of
general information throughout the mass of society,” he argued. Randolph insisted, however, that
Jefferson deserved “the support of the people” and that to refuse him the office could lead to
sectional animosity, if not worse. Southerners considered the political union dear but “it was
cherished as the means, not the end of national happiness.” In February 1801, the House of
Representatives deadlocked over the election as Jefferson failed to win a clear majority. In
Virginia, nervous planters feared the loss of the election, which led Governor Monroe to prepare
the militia for use. Others considered an emergency national convention to force Jefferson’s
election. On February 11, when it appeared that the House might not decide the election,
Randolph assured Monroe that measures had been prepared to protect Virginia’s interests. “The
design is to defeat the election [of Jefferson] in my opinion. A Senator told Mr. J. Nicholas that
12
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they would choose Wilson Nicholas as president [pro tempore] of the Senate if we came to no
election,” Randolph wrote. Randolph expected that that the ascension of the slaveholding
Virginian, Nicholas, to the presidency should calm fears of Southern Republicans. The
precautions became unnecessary when the House finally selected Jefferson on February 17,
1801.13
***
In the wake of Gabriel’s rebellion, Virginians faced a dilemma over the future of slavery.
Despite Monroe’s assurances, most planters believed that the authorities barely averted a
calamitous racial uprising. In response, many Virginians openly questioned the wisdom of
private manumissions. A decade earlier, the hopeful belief in liberty led planters such as Richard
Randolph and Landon Carter to arrange for their slaves’ freedom and care, which seemed to
point the state toward eventual freedom. Virginians, however, had grown skeptical of such
measures, as evidenced by the accusations against John Randolph during his initial congressional
campaigns. The failed rebellion only heightened racial awareness in Virginia and raised
questions about the growing free black population. In John Randolph’s district, which included
Charlotte, Prince Edward, Cumberland, and Buckingham counties, the population of 24,000
slaves outnumbered the district’s 21,000 white citizens. The disparity prevented Randolph from
even raising private concerns about slavery. Yet on November 17, 1800, just weeks after the
capture and execution of Gabriel, Randolph composed his last will and testament, which
addressed his private feelings about slavery:
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I request that the management of my estate continue under my friend Major Scott who
will direct every thing relative to it as if it were his own, and that the profits, after my
debts are paid [,] be accumulated and vested in some eligible fund for the support of the
helpless slaves and when that purpose is effective it is my desire that every individual
negroe of whom I may die possessed be restored to that freedom which is his just and
natural right and of which has been so long and basely deprived.
Although the document lacked the bitterness that marked his brother’s will, John Randolph still
subscribed to the belief that emancipation should occur privately and from the planter’s
beneficent feelings.14
Randolph, however, exhibited no sign of backing away from slavery or the plantation
society in Virginia. When not attending Congress, he remained at Bizarre with Judith or in
Richmond with friends, leaving Roanoke the exclusive domain of slaves, managers, and
overseers. His friend and neighbor Joseph Scott managed plantation finances, the sale of crops,
and the care of slaves at the plantation. Randolph relentlessly expanded his holdings on and
around the Roanoke River. He jealously protected his interests at Roanoke. For example, he
restricted access to the road that ran on the edge of the plantation to only approved family and
friends. When one neighbor erected a mill nearby on the Roanoke River, Randolph forced its
removal, fearing river traffic would interfere with his loading docks. When 700 acres adjacent to
the plantation almost fell into the hands of a “monied man,” Randolph used his connections and
power to secure the land. The plantation consisted of 3,000 acres when he inherited it in 1794 but
would grow to 8,000 by the time of his death in 1833. Slaves cultivated tobacco, wheat, and corn
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on Roanoke plantation’s three sections, the Ferry Quarter, Middle Quarter, and Lower Quarter.
Since he resided elsewhere, Randolph remained aloof from the slave population on the
plantation. In March 1801, Scott compiled the first comprehensive list of the eighty-four black
residents of Roanoke plantation: thirty-six adults and ten children resided at the Lower Quarter,
while sixteen adults lived in the Middle Quarter. Eight adults lived at the separate Ferry Quarter;
eight children split time between the Middle and Ferry Quarters, a sign of marriages between
slaves from different quarters. Scott failed to designate family structure, thereby obscuring a full
view of slave life at Roanoke. The 1801 list also included eight free blacks who lived on the
plantation, probably slave spouses. Randolph’s personal servants, slaves on loan to Bizarre, and
children younger than twelve were missing. In 1800, Randolph owned between 120 and 140
slaves. Of all those slaves, he maintained personal relationships with only a few, Essex White,
Juba, and John. These servants lived and traveled with him, often sleeping in the same room,
even at Bizarre and Roanoke. But they could never forget that they were, above all else, his
slaves.15
Randolph honed his skills as slavemaster at Bizarre as he dealt with the consequences of
his brother’s decision to free the plantation’s slaves. The emancipationist plans hung over the
heavily indebted estate. Few would have blamed Judith Randolph for finding a loophole to avoid
the manumission. The slaves, however, demanded their promised freedom. John and Judith
Randolph constantly struggled to maintain order over the slaves while earning enough profit to
settle Randolph’s debts. As years passed, the slaves grew more hostile and even staged work
15
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stoppages in protest of the failure to give them their freedom. When Randolph left for
congressional sessions, Judith often pleaded with the slaves and reassured them that they would
eventually be freed. When he returned, however, John Randolph exerted control over them,
sometimes against Judith’s will. “My heart delights not in the miseries of my fellow creatures,”
she wrote. “I am guiltless even in thought of inhumanity towards an unfortunate race of beings.”
John Randolph kept his slaves docile. “These poor Negroes feel a degree of awe of you which I
fear will be but too necessary to restrain them until their emancipation,” she wrote.16
The family had to pay the personal debts of Richard Randolph and the remaining debts of
John Randolph, Sr. before the emancipation of any slaves. “I am at a loss to know what steps to
take in relation to his request of emancipating his [Richard Randolph’s] slaves—not that it can
be done now,” John Randolph wrote to his stepfather. He set slaves to clearing lands and
planting new fields to increase the tobacco yield at Bizarre. Personal debts already impoverished
Judith Randolph, who often borrowed money from Creed Taylor for her survival. Now she faced
the loss of her slaves, her primary means of income. Her brother-in-law never missed an
opportunity to admonish Judith for her expensive taste and the difficulty in which she now found
herself. “I have always been mindful of the wide distance between our means of gratification,”
she wrote. Since his sojourn to Philadelphia in 1793, John Randolph lived a frugal life, avoiding
accumulating any unnecessary debts. He continued to pay his father’s debts, which he considered
humiliating. “I am somewhat embarrassed by the approaching necessity of paying the amount of
a certain bond from my father to my uncle Richard,” he wrote, recalling the original debt from
before his birth. In planning for the emancipation of his brother’s slaves, Randolph remained
16
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cognizant of his own financial interests. “I am also ignorant how far they or any of them may
have claims upon me for any of my transactions relative to their disposal,” he informed Tucker.
The prosperity of Roanoke required more land and slaves, which meant Randolph must make
peace with slavery. Judith’s finances deteriorated as she continued to prepare for life without the
slaves.17
Virginia’s slave problem continued to worsen as the Randolphs planned the Bizarre
emancipation. The revelation of another slave plot in 1802 centered in counties south of the
James River, only increased the fear of Virginia planters. Randolph inquired of Monroe about the
“alarming report respecting an insurrection prevalent or rather close to have taken place in the
southern counties” in Southampton, Virginia. In May 1802, Monroe found himself monitoring
the trials of “slaves on the charge of conspiracy & insurrection.” For Monroe, the number of
threats and plots revealed a change in Virginia’s slave population. “The spirit of revolt has taken
deep hold of the minds of the slaves,” he argued. “The symptoms are attributable to some other
cause.” In addition, President Jefferson received numerous reports of slave unrest and
conspiracies from all corners of the South. One man warned him of “an intended landing of the
French incendiary negroes” in South Carolina. Another informed him of a thwarted plot in
Georgetown, just a few miles from the new capital in Washington. Jefferson and Monroe
attempted secret negotiations with Great Britain for colonizing Virginia’s most troublesome
slaves and free blacks but that nation refused, fearing that the blacks would spread unrest. In
Virginia, the failure of colonization plans only exacerbated fear of the growing free-black
population. In 1804, the new governor, John Page, informed Jefferson that the Virginia General
17
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Assembly was considering a plan for “the removal of at least 19,000 free negroes and
mulattoes.” The failure of colonization led the Virginia General Assembly to consider legislation
expelling all manumitted slaves from the state.18
***
Randolph and his Virginia colleagues expected that the Republican presidential and
congressional victories would usher in a revolution overturning the Hamilton financial system
and the excesses of the previous Federalist administrations. Jefferson broke from the past when
he discontinued the formal levees favored by previous administrations and most public
ceremonies, particularly those that resembled the events of a monarchical court. In his inaugural
address, however, Jefferson demonstrated a willingness to decrease the intense partisanship. The
new president’s reconciliatory theme of “we are all federalists, we are all republicans,” troubled
his strongest supporters. Virginia congressman William Branch Giles informed Jefferson that the
staunchest Republicans feared “the principle of moderation adopted by the administration.”
Federalist congressman Manasseh Cutler of Massachusetts believed that Jefferson might “prove
a prudent man,” but the radical Republicans would dominate the president: “If he pursues a wise
and prudent tone of conduct, he will have a hornet’s nest of Jacobins about his ears.” Even
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Timothy Pickering believed Jefferson would “look more to the Federalists than to Jacobins for
his support.”19
Randolph believed that diminishing the power of the federal government was the most
important goal for the newly-elected Republicans. First, Congress and the President must strip
the federal government of much of its power and restore it to the states. Without this first crucial
step, Randolph believed that the electoral victory would prove meaningless. Jefferson’s
conciliatory attitude toward Federalists gave him doubts. “[I]f we procured not a substantial
reform in the government, our work, will be good for nothing. Of this, I have little hope,”
Randolph wrote. “I see but little prospect of readjusting the federal machine. Still less of
restoring somewhat of equality between the two great forces of the body politics—the state &
federal.” Giles urged Jefferson to promote amendments, repealing the necessary and proper and
general welfare clauses in Article 1, Section 8 of the Constitution. Southerners, especially
Virginians, wanted the general welfare clause repealed since it posed the most danger to their
interests, especially slavery. Alexander Hamilton had urged a broad interpretation of the general
welfare clause to justify his economic programs and Southerners believed the federal
government could eventually use it to justify an emancipation plan. If Jefferson refused these
reforms, Randolph argued, “we shall soon be blended into one mass and find ourselves in the
point of monarchy to which our constitution has so strong [and] so alarming a tendency.” Indeed,
before the Seventh Congress ever convened, Randolph demonstrated considerable suspicion of
the executive office: “[I]t is the monster which threatens our destruction.” As the Seventh
19
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Congress prepared to convene, Randolph wondered whether the public would support such
alterations. “Will men prefer the loaves [and] fishes of the hour to the glory of regenerating their
country, of restoring to our manners [and] our language the nervous tone of independence?” he
wondered. For his part, Jefferson found exercising power far more difficult than he realized.
“What is practicable must often control what is pure theory; and the habits of the governed
determine a great degree what is practicable,” he wrote. The public had grown used to the
stability created by Hamilton’s system, and Jefferson realized that pulling it down would prove
difficult.20
When the Seventh Congress convened in December 1801, slaveholders dominated the
highest ranks of the government. Jefferson’s closest advisor, James Madison, served as Secretary
of State. The new President also selected Thomas Tucker, long defeated in South Carolina
politics, as the Treasurer of the United States. Before he left office, President Adams appointed
Virginia Federalist and slaveholder, John Marshall, as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. The
United States Senate selected Virginia planter Wilson Cary Nicholas, a close Jefferson ally, as
president pro tempore. Secretary of the Treasury Albert Gallatin, a Pennsylvania Republican,
served as President Jefferson’s most important antislavery advisor. The government’s new
location on the Potomac River, between the slave states of Virginia and Maryland, minimized the
antislavery voices that were so prevalent in Philadelphia. The new capital of Washington, D.C.,
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with a population of 14,000, soon had 3,000 slaves. Congress adopted the slave laws of
Maryland to govern the city.21
For the first time since 1789, Federalists or devotees of Alexander Hamilton would not
control the House of Representatives. The Hamiltonian economic program became law as a
result of Federalist control of the House speakership. The Speaker appointed the chairmen of
standing permanent committees and temporary select committees, which wrote bills and built
support for measures. On the first day of the session, the House selected Nathanial Macon as
Speaker on the first ballot. Macon, a stalwart Jeffersonian and a North Carolina planter, was one
of the most popular members of the House. Randolph and Macon had forged a close friendship
since the young Virginian had arrived at Congress. As the new Speaker filled House committee
assignments, he planned on Randolph taking a major role in shaping the new Republican
Congress. When the House turned the select Committee on Ways and Means into a standing
committee, Macon passed over far more experienced legislators to make Randolph its chairman.
Soon the House voted to give the committee the full power of appropriations and revenue. In
only his second term, Randolph controlled the legislative branch’s role in the nation’s finances.22
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Jefferson hoped to rely on his personal friends and informal alliances in Congress to pass
desired legislation. The unofficial floor leader of the Republican caucus would work with the
Speaker to plan the House schedule, direct legislation to committees, and direct the
administration’s initiatives. Without any real party machinery, the floor leader and the caucus
would make majority workable. Jefferson wanted Giles, who had served in the House for eleven
years, to lead the Republican legislators. But Jefferson’s desire failed to prevent a struggle for
control in the House. Early in the Seventh Congress, when Giles left the House for business in
Virginia, Randolph and Maryland congressman Samuel Smith struggled with each other over
control of the Republican caucus. “[T]here evidently appears much rivalry and jealousy among
the leaders,” Connecticut congressman Roger Griswold wrote. When Giles returned he
reasserted his control over the caucus. “In the House of representatives [sic], M. Giles leads the
ministerial phalanx, and is the only member of it whose capacity is adequate to conducting the
measures of party. Mr. Randolph attempted to lead, but failed,” stated the anti-Jeffersonian
Washington Federalist. The failure to command his colleagues troubled Randolph. “Johnny
Randolph is perfectly astonished that his great abilities should be overlooked,” Griswold wrote.23
Randolph believed he represented the interests of Virginia more faithfully than any other
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Randolph thought his state remained in perpetual danger from an array of sources. Indeed, he
realized that the power of the slaveholders of the Piedmont and Tidewater required constant
vigilance against the federal government, slaves, and democratic forces. Within Virginia, the
representation system of the Constitution of 1776 assured that the counties in eastern Virginia
continued to control most of the seats in the General Assembly even as settlers populated
counties west of the Blue Ridge Mountains. In early 1802, Randolph reacted to rumors that
western settlers were talking of secession to remedy the representation problem. Behind the
movement to divide Virginia, Randolph saw sinister centralizing forces, hoping to divide the
state and diminish its power. Virginia’s size and political system gave the state enormous
advantages in the federal government, while preventing other states from dominating. “They
know that to reduce the large state is the first great step to consolidation,” he argued.24
In 1802, the House debated a bill that could change the basis of congressional
apportionment. The plan would fix the ratio at one congressional representative for every 33,000
persons (currently 30,000), which would limit the number of congressmen from small Northern
states. In the debate, representatives who supported the increased ratio argued that the House
represented the people, a democratic notion that Randolph considered “heretical and improper.”
Any belief that he and his fellow congressmen represented anyone but the states “should be
exploded on its first annunciation,” he believed. Randolph saw this bill as an effort to “diminish
the confidence of the people in the State governments.” Ideas about democracy, sectionalism,
and slavery fed on each other and threatened the planter interests. The federal government would
fill that chaotic void and swallow the states’ power and individual liberties. He condemned such
24
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democratic language despite using it in the past to justify his own political battles. In January
1801, when the Republicans dismantled the Sedition Act, he argued that the American people
were the basis of American political power. “Their voice was more powerful than that of the
court and their President.” Although he had once expressed support of the expansive ideas of
liberty and citizenship, Randolph now rejected the idea that the “the people” exercised power in
any way but through the state governments. They may have been sovereign, but the people never
truly ruled. In contrast, Jefferson and Madison maintained a belief that “the people” ruled
directly through their government and favored a more expansive electoral process. They believed
that a government selected by a responsible republican citizenry would respect the restraints and
responsibilities of law, order, and moral justice. For Randolph, the gentry represented the truest
idea of citizenship. The reversal of his earliest stance revealed the malleable nature of democratic
language. As his Northerner colleagues exhibited a commitment to democracy, Randolph
became less tolerant of the idea of the popular governance.25
In the earliest days of the Seventh Congress, Randolph realized that Northern
Republicans posed an obstacle to unchecked Southern power. In the expiring days of the
Federalist-dominated Sixth Congress, Maryland congressman Joseph Nicholson had urged the
House to strengthen the current federal fugitive slave law, thus making it easier to recover
runaways. After Gabriel’s Rebellion, more slaves fled the border states for freedom and
Maryland citizens called for federal assistance in recovering runaway slaves in free states. The
House appointed a committee to consider the bill, but the electoral turmoil prevented any action.
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Nicholson revived the bill and hoped that the Republican majority could pass it in the Seventh
Congress. His bill would strengthen the current federal fugitive slave law by imposing a fivehundred-dollar fine on anyone harboring or employing runaway slaves. Furthermore, the federal
government would force free blacks to produce papers proving their free status or risk being
declared fugitive slaves. Northern Republicans and Federalists joined together to narrowly defeat
the bill, 46 to 43. Contradicting his rhetoric about a strong central government, Randolph voted
for this far-reaching expansion of federal power.26
The failure of the bill confirmed Randolph’s fear that the Republican majority would
prove unworkable. Hostility to the Adams administration had united Republicans for the
electoral victory, but the majority was “by no means marked,” he wrote to his stepfather.
Specifically, he blamed Northern Republicans for the “discordance of opinion in the majority”
and considered them a threat to Southern power. “The Eastern gentlemen generally seemed
content with the change of men, [and] wish not to pursue it much farther. We are for a change of
important principles,” he wrote. While most Northern Republicans agreed with many of the
Jeffersonian economic goals, they proved less acquiescent on the matter of slavery. In little time,
the House knew what Randolph and the Virginia delegation hoped to protect. “The inordinate
ambition of Virginia begins also to be better understood by both parties,” Roger Griswold
observed.27
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As chairman of the Ways and Means Committee, Randolph intended to use his power to
weaken the federal government. He planned to use the committee’s appropriation and revenue
power to overturn the Hamiltonian financial system. Randolph insisted that he was “determined
to pay the debt off, to retrench every unnecessary expense, military, naval, [and] civil to enforce
economy as well upon men calling themselves republicans as upon federalists.” In addition, he
worked closely with Treasury Secretary Gallatin, who often attended committee meetings, to
reduce the national debt and eliminate taxes. In the process, Randolph planned to make
Congress the dominant power in budgetary matters. As Ways and Means chairman, Randolph
decided when and if the committee met, drafted most of the bills that it produced, and appointed
any sub-committees. Nothing happened on the committee unless Randolph approved it. The
Washington Federalist referred to him as “Chancellor of the Exchequer,” but when a tax bill that
he drafted required an amendment twice as long as the original bill to repair its deficiencies, it
became obvious that power instead of finances was his real strength.28
In addition to controlling the nation’s finances, Randolph wanted control of the
Republican congressional caucus. Although he worked closely with Giles, Randolph believed
himself a better representative of Virginia’s interests. During the apportionment debate, Giles
had supported the lower ratio to empower smaller states, which Randolph deemed damaging to
28
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Virginia’s power. In December 1802, Giles failed to appear at the new congressional session,
having fallen ill in Virginia. Without Giles, the House fell into chaos, unable to move important
business through the process. Once it became apparent that Giles would probably fail to return to
the House, another power struggle occurred between Randolph and Samuel Smith. “I firmly
believe that the majority would split into Violent Coteries,” wrote North Carolina Congressman
William Barry Grove.29
Jefferson wanted neither Randolph nor Smith as leader. Instead, he had recruited Caesar
Augustus Rodney, a Delaware Republican, to run for the House in order to eventually assume
the leadership. “I really wish you were here,” Jefferson wrote to Rodney. He believed Rodney,
an accomplished attorney, could make the House more efficient and shorten the sessions.
Jefferson and Randolph had never formed a close relationship, and the President believed him
unequal to the task of congressional leadership. But Randolph’s power, stemming from the Ways
and Means Committee, proved highly valuable in passing the administration’s legislative
economic agenda. Regardless of Jefferson’s misgivings, Randolph was able to exert enough
influence to prevent Rodney from taking power when he arrived at the session.30
Initially, many House Republicans refused to acknowledge Randolph’s power, especially
since he seemed so unlikely a leader. His strange physical appearance fascinated his colleagues
and led many to misjudge the congressman who looked like a “beardless boy.” The illness that
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robbed him of virility also plagued him politically. Congressman Samuel Taggart’s description
of Randolph to a friend revealed how many people must have perceived Randolph:
He is rather taller than middle size, extremely slender, he never had a razor on his face
and has no more appearance of beard than a boy of 10 years old, and his voice is the
same…By his appearance one would suppose him to be either by nature, or manual
operation fixed for an Italian singer, indeed there are strong suspicions of a physical
disability.
To combat the whispers, Randolph offered a daily masculine performance as gentry planter,
coming to conduct House business dressed in riding clothes and knee length boots. His dress,
often slovenly put together, evoked republican simplicity and the gentry all at once. During
debate, Randolph’s dress, behavior, and rhetoric displayed the authority of the slavemaste in his
domain. If anyone failed to receive the message, the ever-present riding whip in Randolph’s
hands informed them. In his new role, the Virginia planter demonstrated his mastery.31
In the Eighth Congress, he used his power over revenue and appropriations to build
support and demand loyalty on votes. The young Virginian, William Plumer noted, was “profuse
in censuring the motives of his opponents—artful in evading their arguments, & preemptory in
demanding the vote.” In a matter of months, Randolph commanded the House effortlessly.
Plumer observed him “[s]itting on his seat insolently & frequently exclaiming I hope this motion
will not prevail—or when it suited his views, I hope this will be adopted.” In debate, colleagues
came to fear his nasty insults, often aimed as supporters as well as enemies. “With an almost
31
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feminine voice,” noted one observer, Randolph “utters the most biting sarcasm with a manner the
most irritatingly courteous, and a voice that resembles the music of spheres.” Men feared
Randolph’s bitter rhetorical style even if they questioned his masculinity.32
Randolph refused to treat many of his colleagues with any modicum of respect. Usually
only Southern planters commanded his immediate respect. For the most part, he saw himself as
superior to the majority of his colleagues, as he had since he entered Maury’s school. Plumer
characterized him as “assuming & very arrogant.” Samuel Taggart observed that Randolph’s
“insolent haughty overbearing disposition knows no bounds.” Even fellow Republicans found
themselves subject to his “aristocratic hauteur,” observed Simeon Baldwin. Randolph relied on
naked intimidation and humiliation to build coalitions and achieve legislative victories. Plumer
summed up the House Republicans’ thoughts on their leader: “[T]hey hated him.” Although
President Jefferson never truly trusted Randolph, he handled him gingerly since he ushered
through legislation. “The truth is, his talents are necessary to them, and for a season he
[Jefferson] will bear over them,” Plumer added.33
***
President Jefferson could scarcely afford parochialism or short-sighted political behavior.
From the moment he became president, the troubling state of European affairs dictated
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moderation and deliberate decisions. Napoleon’s expansionism threatened Europe with
despotism even as the French ruler trumpeted his devotion to liberty. In March 1801, Jefferson
learned that Spain had secretly ceded the Louisiana Territory to France. He feared that this
cession signaled Napoleon’s plan to expand his empire to North America. In response, the antiBritish Jefferson pursued rapprochement with England.34
Jefferson knew that the United States needed to improve relations with Great Britain,
regardless of his personal ideology. A generation after the American Revolution, Britain
remained the U.S.’s most important trading partner. By 1800, a quarter of British exports headed
for the United States. New England merchants and Southern planters relied on access to Britain’s
markets. The outbreak of war between Britain and France had presented a lucrative opportunity
to New England merchants and shipping companies. The warring powers prevented access to
each other’s Caribbean colonies, but American shipping interests interceded and facilitated
access to those markets. This carrying trade blossomed as American merchant ships reloaded
goods and paid duties in U. S. ports before sailing to Europe. This broken voyage allowed the
Americans to maintain their neutral status and avoid diplomatic problems. Between 1790 and
1807, the value of the carrying trade had increased from $500,000 to $60 million, making the
United States the largest neutral transporter of goods in the world. The British believed that this
carrying trade exploited wartime conditions and hindered the war effort against France. Since the
war began in 1793, Britain had seized American ships in search of contraband and runaway
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British sailors, whom the British navy often impressed. Realizing the need to maintain good
relations with Britain, in light of Napoleon’s rise, Jefferson retained Federalist stalwart Rufus
King at the Court of St. James to negotiate for America’s maritime rights. King’s diplomatic
effort helped ease tensions over ship seizures and the carrying trade.35
In 1801, Britain and France reached a peace agreement at Amiens, which hurt New
England shipping interests but reopened tobacco and cotton markets for Southern planters.
Randolph himself experienced a lucrative year at Roanoke during the peace, as crops flourished.
The peace failed to comfort Jefferson, however, especially since Napoleon sent troops to restore
French power on the island of Haiti. Jefferson believed that France’s presence in the Western
Hemisphere threatened American access to New Orleans. The United States had long feared that
European politics and wars would interrupt access to that key port on the Gulf of Mexico. Spain
still governed the territory and in 1802 revoked Americans’ right of deposit in New Orleans. In
response, many Federalists demanded war with France, insisting that it was necessary to defend
the interests of western farmers. Randolph accused New Englanders of pushing for a war to
revive the carrying trade. “This darling object however is in the estimation of N. England second
to that of alienating the minds of the western people from the present administration, or of,
35
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embarrassing the finances of the U.S. by a foreign war,” he wrote. He insisted that Republicans
wanted peace but admitted that “N. Orleans is the only embarrassment.”36
Jefferson also wanted to avoid war while pursuing a solution to the problem of New
Orleans. In 1803, Toussaint Louverture’s Haitian forces defeated Napoleon’s armies, leaving
Jefferson concerned that a frustrated Napoleon might sell Louisiana. When the peace between
France and Great Britain collapsed and European war resumed, Jefferson concluded that
Napoleon might part with the city and sent Robert Livingston to Paris to negotiate the purchase.
Randolph disagreed with the idea and argued that “to buy it is to buy off a war.” But he also
rejected the calls for the United States to seize the territory since “to conquer it is to depart from
our character.” The nation would have to wait until France attacked before it could seize the
territory, Randolph insisted. In general, he feared the acquisition of New Orleans or Louisiana,
believing it would change the character of the American republic. Napoleon surprised the
Americans when he offered the entire Louisiana territory for $15 million. The deal would secure
500 million acres of land, give the American people incalculable room to expand, and prevent
France or Spain from occupying it. Livingston seized the opportunity and signed the treaty.37
New England Federalists objected to the acquisition of such an ethnically diverse region,
which they believed would diminish the power of their section and increase the power of the
South. Article III of the purchase treaty stated that Louisiana’s inhabitants should be made
36

Stokes, “John Randolph,” 234; Broussard, Southern Federalists, 56-7; John D. Grainger, The
Amiens Truce: Britain and Bonaparte, 1801-1803 (Boydell Press, 2004), 164-5; JR to Caesar
Rodney, January 4, 1802, Randolph Papers, LC; Wood, Empire of Liberty, 644; Brown,
Toussaint’s Clause, 191; JR to SGT, [1802], Randolph College, Lynchburg; JR to Monroe,
January 3, 1803, Monroe Papers, LC.
37
JR to SGT, [1803], Randolph College, Lynchburg; Peter J. Kastor, The Nation’s Crucible: The
Louisiana Purchase and the Creation of America (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004);
Jon Kukla, A Wilderness So Immense: the Louisiana Purchase and the Destiny of America (New
York: Knopf, 2003).
143

American citizens “as soon as possible.” Abraham Ellery wrote to Alexander Hamilton that New
Orleans was “a place inhabited by a Mixture of Americans, English, Spanish, and French…and
where the white population bears so small a proportion to the black.” Nearly half of Louisiana’s
population was black, both slave and free. While many New Englanders feared that Louisiana’s
Catholicism and mixed-race population would dilute the white republic, their main concern
emanated from the disproportionate power it would give to the slave states. Virginia and its
slaveholders would dominate the political system, guaranteeing the political extinction of the
Federalist party and the subjugation of New England. With the three-fifths compromise inflating
Southern power, the acquisition of Louisiana meant that “western & southern states, will, on all
occasions, decide the election just as they pleased,” William Plumer argued. Timothy Pickering
insisted that the purchase represented a “great evil” since it empowered slaveholders. He began
advocating a constitutional amendment repealing the three-fifths clause and even urged talk of
New England secession. “I am convinced, that the accession of Louisiana, will accelerate a
division of these States,” wrote Uriah Tracy of Connecticut.38
In October 1803, Randolph led the legislative effort in the House to fund the treaty and
make the purchase effective. Despite his private reservations about the constitutionality and
wisdom of the purchase, Randolph left nothing to chance and had himself appointed head of the
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select committee addressing the occupation and settlement of the territory. When the matter
came before the whole House, Randolph found himself defending President Jefferson’s loose
interpretation of the Constitution to justify the purchase. Opponents of the measure wanted
Jefferson to release all the correspondence pertaining to the purchase to disprove Spanish claims
that it still owned Louisiana. Although Randolph had long condemned secrecy in the affairs of
the government, he stifled the efforts to force Jefferson to release the documents. The Louisiana
issue was the first time that Jefferson relied on the new floor leader, and he continually sent
information to Randolph during the debate. Jefferson wanted no deviations. Yet, on October 27,
Randolph opposed a bill that gave all administrative authority in the Louisiana Territory to the
executive branch during the early part of the territory stage, cutting Congress out. Randolph
insisted that he “did not believe that, under any circumstances, it was proper to delegate to the
Executive a power so extensive.” If the president gained such power at the expense of Congress,
he would not likely ever surrender it, Randolph argued. Jefferson selected Caesar Rodney to lead
the bill through the House. Afraid of losing influence, Randolph changed his position and
supported the measure.39
In the debate over Louisiana’s settlement and organization, Randolph found himself
answering charges that the South would rush to settle the territory. “It destroys the perfect union
contemplated between the original parties by interposing an alien and a stranger to share the
power of government with them,” argued Roger Griswold. If Southerners settled the territory and
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Congress admitted states quickly, the three-fifths clause would assure the destruction of New
England’s power, critics argued. Randolph assured his opponents that while Louisiana’s citizens
would enjoy constitutional rights, any future states from the territory would enter the Union “not
on the footing of the original States, or of the States created under the Constitution.” In essence,
Randolph shared the fears about the diversity of the Louisiana population, and he hoped that
settlement and incorporation into the Union would be slow. Regardless of objections, Randolph
secured passage of the appropriations to make the Louisiana Treaty effective and complete the
purchase. In New England, critics insisted that the acquisition of Louisiana marked the triumph
of the Virginia-led “slavocracy” that would destroy the Union. “Virginia holds her
preponderance, as a mistress of the Union!—a title more dear to the lazy arrogance of her
plantation barons, by an avowed inequality,” Fisher Ames insisted. Randolph believed that
Virginia’s “territory, population, and wealth” along with “her character for wisdom, moderation,
and firmness” justified its “weight in the confederacy.” Randolph insisted upon a republic led by
Virginia.40
Northern concerns about the expansion of slavery were anything but phantom fears.
Kentucky and Virginia slaveholders wanted to bring their slaves with them as they settled the
territory of Indiana, justifying Northern fear about the spread of the institution. Indiana’s
territorial governor, William Henry Harrison, a Virginia planter, presided over a convention at
Vincennes that petitioned Congress to lift the Northwest Ordinance’s ban on slavery and allow
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importation for ten years. Petitioners argued that the ban violated their constitutional right to
property and would retard the territory’s economy. Randolph headed the special committee
considering the request and upheld the Northwest Ordinance’s prohibition of slavery. The
committee report argued that the Ordinance “wisely calculated to promote the happiness and
prosperity of the Northwestern country, and to give strength and security to that extensive
frontier” and that removing the ban would be “highly dangerous.” Randolph and his committee
rejected the argument that slavery would promote economic growth and settlement. Far from an
antislavery statement, however, the report contained no condemnation of slavery and reaffirmed
the supremacy of economics in the committee’s decision. Randolph’s report stated “[t]hat this
labor, demonstrably the dearest of any, can only be employed to advantage in the cultivation of
products more valuable than any known to that quarter of the United States.”41
In late 1803, the dim reality of slavery’s spread became evident. In South Carolina,
western farmers had requested more and cheaper slaves. With Louisiana now open, speculators
saw an opportunity to satisfy those demands and make enormous returns on their investment in
foreign slaves. In 1803, the South Carolina legislature reopened the foreign slave trade. The
decision provoked outrage throughout the nation, especially in Virginia. Randolph privately
condemned the decision as shortsighted, greedy, and dangerous and an attempt by South
Carolina planters to expand profits from the slave trade rather than hard work. “All her rice,
indigo, and cotton is to be converted into slaves,” he wrote. The devotion to profits had
destroyed “the opulent nabobs of St. Domingo” and South Carolina now invited a similar
41
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catastrophe. “In less than five years the course of these wretches will be recruited by two
hundred thousand native Africans.” South Carolina’s decision invited a slave rebellion on the
scale of Haiti. “The lower country of S. Carolina and Georgia can never be recovered in case the
negroes get possession,” Randolph warned. Echoing the sentiments of his stepfather, he
condemned the motives behind the action: “I tremble for the dreadful retribution which this
horrid thirst for African blood, which the legislators of that state are base enough to feel.” South
Carolina courted “indelible disgrace” by opening the trade. “It beho[o]ves Virginia, in my
opinion, to look to the consequences.”42
Many Virginians openly condemned South Carolina’s decision to reopen the foreign
slave trade as a betrayal of the revolutionary antislavery spirit. The revival of the trade “makes
every friend to freedom and humanity weep for the want of foresight, and the entire
abandonment of every noble feeling, by one of our sister states,” wrote the editors of the
Alexandria Expositor. All agreed that the reopening of the trade complicated the future of
slavery in Virginia. In the Piedmont, poor agricultural practices continued to force planters
westward, which created a surplus of slaves. For years, the interstate slave trade had provided
countless slaves to Kentucky and Tennessee markets and Louisiana looked even more lucrative.
Diffusionists, such as Jefferson, believed that slaves would find freedom in the West, while
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others hoped for slavery’s perpetuation. Now South Carolina’s decision would dilute the slave
market and destroy both plans.43
In response to South Carolina’s actions, Pennsylvania Republican David Bard revived the
proposal of a ten-dollar tax on all imported slaves, which would punish traders bringing slaves
into the state. The sum represented a trifling amount considering the profits that the slave traders
stood to make. Bard, a Presbyterian minister, proposed the plan from “the principle of morality”
and to assure the world that the United States truly opposed slavery. “It will show the world that
the General Government are opposed to slavery and willing to improve their power, or far as it
will go, for preventing it.” South Carolina’s Benjamin Huger vehemently opposed the tax and the
moral outrage from which it emanated. “On this point [morality] the Union ought to be silent,”
he argued. Southerners would serve as “the exclusive judges of her [the South’s] own conduct,”
he continued. Randolph allowed Bard’s measure to reach the House floor but he refused to
support Bard’s measure and voted to postpone the proposal until it died. The regulation of the
foreign slave trade presented the federal government with an opportunity to strike at the
institution. Randolph, however, refused to translate his private outrage into public policy.44
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Although Bard’s tax failed to make it out of the House, strong antislavery legislation
concerning Louisiana did pass Congress. During the organization of the Louisiana Territory,
antislavery Northern men and Upper South diffusionists in the Senate passed legislation that
banned the foreign slave trade, restricted the importation of any slave unless accompanied by an
owner for the purposes of “actual settlement,” and prohibited the admittance of any slave who
arrived in the United States after 1798, which disallowed foreign slaves imported from South
Carolina. Outraged, Louisianans petitioned Congress to reopen the slave trade and to allow the
territory to govern itself. They demanded the right “to the free possession of our slaves, and to
the right of importing slaves into the district of Louisiana.” Territorial Governor William C. C.
Claiborne, a Jefferson appointee, supported antislavery measures but warned Jefferson that
Louisianans might rebel if the trade remained closed. “I find an almost universal sentiment
exist[s] in Louisiana in favor of the African trade,” Claiborne informed Secretary of State
Madison.45
In December 1804, Randolph chaired the House committee that considered the petitions
of the Louisiana slaveholders. After reviewing them, the committee reported its disapproval of
the slavery restrictions. The United States had only the options of “force and affection” to
integrate Louisiana into the United States. Randolph and the committee dismissed force out of
hand, deeming it “repugnant.” Instead, the nation must win the residents of the territory over
with affection and that meant accepting slavery without restrictions. The committee failed “to
conceive how the United States are more interested in the internal government of that Territory
than of any State in the Confederacy.” Despite Randolph’s earlier assurances of not admitting on
45
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equal footing states that emerged from the Louisiana territory, he and the committee certainly
believed that Louisiana would enjoy the same rights as the slave states. Indeed, the report argued
that the decision rested with the people, making popular sovereignty the deciding factor in
whether or not to allow slavery. In March 1805, federal officials relented and opened the
domestic slave trade. In the next two years, Louisiana imported over 5,000 slaves from South
Carolina alone. Soon after the Louisiana question was resolved, Randolph presented a petition to
the House to allow slavery into specific counties of Indiana.46
Northerners who had expected Virginians to lead Southern antislavery efforts expressed
disappointment at the developments in South Carolina and Louisiana. “The gradual abolition
scheme which had so able an advocate in Judge Tucker, of Virginia, was admitted as most
favourable in theory, but it cannot be executed in one State, while slaves are admitted freely into
another, having the same habits friendly to the slave trade,” wrote a Massachusetts editor.
Randolph resented the increased Northern attacks on Virginia power and slavery. “[T]he enemies
of freedom,” he argued, “are without an exception, in this country, enemies of Virginia.” Those
who attack its power spoke with “the tongue of envy.” With each attack on Virginia power,
Randolph’s devotion to his state’s plantation society seemed to grow. “When I cross the
Potomac, I leave behind me all the scraps, shreds, and patches of politics which I collect during
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the session, and put on the plain homespun, or (as we say) the ‘Virginia cloth,’ of a planter,
which is clean, whole, and comfortable, even if it be homely,” he wrote to Gallatin.47
Randolph’s sectionalist rhetoric and attitude contradicted Jefferson’s attempt to build a
national political movement. Although no less devoted to Virginia, the President treated his
Northern supporters with respect and took them into his confidence. It became clear shortly after
Randolph emerged as leader that Jefferson would prefer someone else to lead the House
Republicans. When Jefferson’s sons-in-law John Wayles Eppes and Thomas Mann Randolph
won seats in the House, they offered him a way around Randolph’s leadership. In November
1803, Eppes relayed instructions from the President during a committee hearing. Randolph saw
the incident as a slight and declared his independence from such instructions, “without any
consideration from which a motion comes.” But realizing his mistake, Randolph then wrote an
apology to Jefferson professing his “high esteem and veneration” of the President. Jefferson
requested a “more unreserved communication” with Randolph. They never conferred. Instead,
Jefferson and the Republicans became more perplexed and disapproving of Randolph’s behavior.
In 1804, Randolph seized on the Republican hatred of the judiciary and forced the impeachment
of Supreme Court Justice Samuel Chase, the most despised Federalist on the court. Jefferson
hated the Federalist-dominated judiciary but disapproved of the impeachment and saw
Randolph’s performance as House manager during the trial as an embarrassment. “This business
of removing Judges by Impeachment is a bungling way,” Jefferson confided to William Plumer.
By 1805, Jefferson’s instructions and suggestions to the House were coming increasingly
through Eppes. “I was surprised to find Mr. Eppes, the son-in-law of the President, in debate in
47
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the House on this subject—state the very ideas of Jefferson—the very same he mentioned to me
in private conversation,” Plumer noted in early 1804. Randolph proved unsuitable for leadership
as he found it difficult to handle the demands and inquiries that constantly besieged him. “As
much free will as you please in everything else, but in politics I must never be a neccesstarian
[sic],” he wrote to Gallatin.48
***
Randolph’s stubborn refusal to acquiesce became apparent over the issue of Yazoo land.
In 1795, while visiting his friend Joseph Bryan in Georgia, Randolph witnessed the unfolding
Yazoo land fraud case. In the 1780s, as the new American government struggled with excessive
debt and economic chaos, most states ceded their western lands, a valuable source of revenue, to
the federal government. Georgia refused to cede its thirty-five million western acres, most of it
acquired from Indians in the region known as Yazoo. The flourishing of cotton cultivation
inspired a frenzy of land speculation. Georgia limited the land’s distribution to a thousand acres
per person, but speculators used nefarious methods to accumulate as much as 50,000 acres. The
Tennessee Yazoo Company, Virginia Yazoo Company, and South Carolina Yazoo Company
soon appeared, each angling for more of the territory between Georgia and the Mississippi River.
While the speculators struggled to gain control of the land, the Spanish government and
numerous Indian tribes also claimed ownership. As President George Washington negotiated
with Spain for clear title to the land, he also insisted that Georgia honor all treaties that bestowed
ownership on the tribes. In 1789, however, the Georgia legislature sold twenty-five million acres
to the three Yazoo companies. But each company collapsed after the state demanded payment in
48
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hard currency. In the mid-1790s, new Yazoo companies tried to monopolize western lands.
These companies included U.S. senators, governors, and federal judges among their investors. In
1795, some of these men used their inside knowledge and bribery to secure the passage of the
Yazoo Act in the Georgia legislature, which granted the sale to four Yazoo companies. Every
legislator who voted for the sale had invested in a Yazoo land company. In total, the companies
paid $500,000 for thirty-five million acres of land.49
Outraged Georgians burned the offending politicians in effigy and demanded that the
legislature repeal the sale. The state’s most respected man, James Jackson, resigned his United
States Senate seat and returned to the Georgia legislature and secured passage of the Repeal Act,
which voided the sale. The repeal occurred just as the New England Mississippi Land Company
bought eleven million acres from the Georgia Mississippi Company. The New England investors
who bought land found that the Repeal Act prevented its resale. Investors throughout the nation
now held title to land they could not sell. Randolph witnessed the hysteria and condemned the
Yazoo speculators and believed that the Repeal Act represented the fulfillment of the people’s
will.50
Angry investors of the New England Mississippi Land Company lobbied President
Washington for federal intervention. The president believed that the Georgia legislature’s repeal
could “deeply affect the peace and welfare of the United States,” causing conflict with Indians
and Spain. In addition, Federalists argued that the Repeal Act violated the contractual obligations
49
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of the original Yazoo Act. Although Randolph and other Republicans believed that the matter
rested with the people of Georgia, Washington and the Federalists believed that the conflicting
claims of the Spanish, New England investors, and Indians gave the federal government
jurisdiction. Georgia, however, rebuffed efforts by the Washington and Adams administrations to
settle the dispute. After Spain ceded control over the Mississippi territory in 1798, a Georgia
constitutional convention, led by Jackson, reaffirmed the state’s right to rescind the original
Yazoo Act, but it opened the possibility of ceding the land to the federal government.
Commissioners of the United States government began discussions with state officials to finally
settle the Yazoo claims. Dependent on Northern support, President Jefferson wanted to solve the
crisis. In 1803, he selected Madison, Gallatin, and Levi Lincoln for a commission to satisfy the
claims. The commission recommended a settlement of five million acres for the predominantly
Northern investors.51
In January 1804, Randolph opposed the Yazoo settlement as a violation of “the cardinal
principle of my political opinions…the sovereignty of the States.” The proposal, he argued,
empowered the federal government and robbed the people of Georgia of their rights. Randolph
suspected that the administration’s Postmaster General, Gideon Granger, manipulated Jefferson
and the Southerners into pushing for settlement. Granger had served as the president of the New
England Mississippi Company before joining the administration, and he stood to gain
considerably from the Yazoo plan. In 1805, when the House took up the question of
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compensation for the investors, Randolph launched a vicious attack on the “Yazoo squad,”
whom he labeled as plunderers who “buy only to sell, and sell only to buy,” and now planned on
robbing the federal treasury.52
Although Jefferson wanted to put the matter behind the nation and the Republican party,
Randolph determined to block the settlement: “This is one of the cases which, once being
engaged in, I can never desert or relinquish, till I shall have exercised every energy of mind, and
faculty of body I possess, in refuting so nefarious a project.” He contended that the Republicans
had assumed their offices determined to end corruption in government. When even many
Southern Republicans joined New England Federalists on the Yazoo issue, Randolph went on the
attack. “Of what consequence is it that a man smiles in your face, holds out his hand and declares
himself the advocate of those political principles to which you are also attached, when you see
him acting with your adversaries upon other principles,” he asked. When the House took up
debate on the matter, he “treated no man that was opposed to him with either respect or
decency,” wrote Plumer. In particular, Randolph attacked the Northern “moneyed capitalist” for
exploiting the honest republicans of Georgia and the South in an effort to “rob unborn millions of
their birthright and inheritance.” Enemies reminded Randolph of Virginia’s inordinate power in
the government, and that the president himself wanted the settlement. Randolph countered by
stating that Virginia had selflessly ceded its own valuable western lands for the good of the
nation while speculators engaged in corruption to acquire territory.53
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Randolph furthermore ridiculed “the feeble cry of Virginian influence” and singled out
New England’s Granger as the great Yazoo corrupter. Granger, Randolph contended, appeared
on the House floor, where he bribed and coerced congressmen to vote for a settlement. The
action violated the public trust since Granger, a member of the executive branch, had a claim for
160,000 acres of Yazoo land. Randolph characterized Granger as a “jackel” who roamed the
streets of Washington corrupting honest republican men: “At night, when honest men are in bed
this obscene animal prowl[s] through the streets of this vast and desolate city, seeking whom he
may tamper with.” In particular, Randolph insinuated that Granger had offered “a profitable
contract for carrying the mail” to Kentucky congressman Matthew Lyon. Randolph declared
Lyon, a stalwart Republican who had once been jailed under the Sedition Act, an “independent
man” now fallen to corruption.54
An infuriated Lyon attacked Randolph and the elite planters he represented. Lyon
responded that slave labor allowed the Southern Republicans to enjoy a life of genteel
partisanship, in which they could control and denounce those who lived by free industry. He
condemned Randolph’s upbringing in the “bosom of opulence, inheriting the life services of a
numerous train of the human species.” Randolph’s characterizations of land speculation as a
dishonest and parasitic business particularly stoked Lyon’s ire. The Kentucky congressman
insisted that Randolph and the planter gentry acquired slaves in as dishonest a fashion as any
land speculator while claiming that “no man can be honest and independent unless he has
inherited lands and negroes.” Lyon cast the debate as one between the honest democratic
laborers of the North and the small farmers of the emerging western territories against the
54
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repressive and corrupt planting aristocracy of the South. Randolph’s Yazoo diatribes represented
an attack on “free” white people by slaveholders who did not allow “a man to vote in the
people’s elections, unless he is a landholder.” In this regard, Lyon cast the debate as one of free
men of principle versus a slave aristocracy bent on fighting any motion or idea that threatened its
power. Lyon hoped that opening up the Yazoo lands would encourage western settlement and
destroy the lingering power of the gentry. Randolph needed to free “the stolen men in his
possession” if he planned to attack honest men, Lyon insisted.55
Randolph fell silent for one of the few times in his career. Lyon’s attacks had turned
personal and nasty, particularly when he compared Randolph’s face with “that of an ape or a
monkey.” Lyon, a consummate troublemaker who had nearly been expelled from the House for
spitting in Roger Griswold’s face, hoped to provoke Randolph into a duel. Randolph refused to
issue a challenge to such a socially inferior man, which only validated Lyon’s condemnation of
the aristocratic slaveholder. But if Randolph refused to tangle with Lyon, he instigated
confrontations whenever Yazoo emerged in the House or in public. During dinner one evening at
a local boardinghouse, the conversation turned to the Yazoo debate. North Carolina Republican
Willis Alston expressed his support for the settlement in terms that Randolph deemed
unacceptable. After dinner, Randolph followed Alston to the parlor and threw wine in his eyes,
then smashed the glass on his face. When a struggle ensued, Randolph tried to hit his colleague
with a wine bottle, before fleeing to his room, where he locked the door and threatened to shoot
anyone who entered. A local judge ordered Randolph’s arrest but the charges were dropped.56
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Representatives in the House watched in amazement as Randolph raged against the
Northern interests in the debate. Samuel Taggart wrote that Randolph addressed the House in
“robes of vengeance.” In debate, he insulted anyone who dared defend the Yazoo settlement or
the interests of Northern speculators. “I never witnessed so much rage & indignation in a
deliberative assembly,” Plumer observed. During one session Randolph singled out Connecticut
congressman Samuel Dana for abuse and ridicule. Dana, unlike so many others in the House,
refused to be intimidated. Realizing that his colleague did not fear him, Randolph threatened
personal revenge. “Ah, Have you come to this—I am ready for you!” Dana responded. Randolph
backed down. The spectacle of John Randolph wore on his colleagues and Northern Republicans
rebelled against his leadership. “The eastern democrats seemed to forget their opposition to the
federalists—they both unite as men—& they act as the Inhabitants of free, not slave, States.
Randolph in vain invoked the aid of party—eastern demo’s [sic] would not rally under his
banners,” Plumer wrote. Despite Randolph’s efforts, the House voted 63 to 58 to indemnify the
claimants but he never ceased efforts to prevent payment to the claimants. 57
The Yazoo issue became the dividing line of Randolph’s politics, and he used it to
separate the centralizers from those devoted to states’ rights. Randolph saw the issue as the best
chance to fly “the banner of States rights in opposition to federal usurpation.” After 1805, he
defined most of his political enemies and friends by where they had stood on the matter. “The
Yazoo business is the beginning and the end, the alpha and omega of our alphabet. With that our
differences began, and with that they will end,” he declared. Although he still respected
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Jefferson, their political courses had begun to diverge. Foreign policy pressures from Europe and
questions concerning America’s continental integrity inspired President Jefferson and Secretary
of State Madison to pursue a more nationalist vision, from which Yazoo distracted attention.
Randolph believed that the protection of states’ rights in general and the rights of the Virginia, in
particular, should dominate the public business. Although Congress approved the settlement, he
used the appropriation power of the Ways and Means Committee to deny payment to claimants.
Speculators eventually sued until the Marshall Court declared Georgia’s Repeal Act illegal in
Fletcher v. Peck (1810) and ordered Congress to pay the claims. As the Yazoo debate consumed
the House, Randolph also managed the House trial of Justice Chase. During arguments it became
apparent that Randolph could not match the legal thought of Chase’s attorney Luther Martin and
he turned again to theatrics. “In the midst of his harangue the fellow cried like a baby with clear,
sheer madness,” wrote Senator Manasseh Cutler. The Senate refused to convict Chase. With the
twin spectacles of Yazoo and the Chase trials, Randolph damaged his standing with the
administration and many Republicans. Gallatin concluded that the humiliating spectacle of the
trial and the hateful rhetoric of the Yazoo debate “destroyed his [Randolph’s] influence” and
believed that his popularity was “sunk forever.” 58
In January 1805, Jefferson expressed his displeasure with Randolph’s bizarre behavior
and states’ rights course in a conversation with Senator John Smith of Ohio. “He did not know
what course to pursue with Mr Randolph—he would never consult him—or his friends—but
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regardless of them all pursue his own course—That some measures were he thought wild &
impractible [sic],” Smith reported. Attorney General Levi Lincoln told the President of a talented
legislator in the Massachusetts State Senate, Barnabas Bidwell. When Bidwell won a seat in the
Ninth Congress, Lincoln assured the President that the new congressman was “a uniform and
warm and [a] supporter of the measures of the existing administration.” In December 1805,
Jefferson placed the concerns of the administration in the hands of the freshman congressman
from Massachusetts. The decision to place the House business in the hands of a New Englander
enraged Randolph. “Mr. B[idwell] was considered the leader of the New England interest which
Mr. R[andolph] cordially hated,” Jefferson’s private secretary William Burwell wrote. During
Bidwell’s maiden congressional speech, Randolph conspicuously attended, dressed in leather
riding breeches, blue riding coat, and his signature high-top riding boots. He sat closely and
listened for fifteen minutes before he rose and made his way out of the chamber, all the time
striking the palm of his hand with his ever-present whip.59
***
As his second term began, Jefferson realized that Randolph’s erratic leadership would
harm the administration, especially since a serious international crisis loomed. The
administration struggled to maintain neutrality in the European war while bickering with Spain
over details of the Louisiana Purchase. In 1805, British anger over the carrying trade led Prime
Minister William Pitt to issue new Orders-in-Council to increase the search and seizure of
neutral American ships. During seizures, the British navy continually impressed suspected
runaway British sailors. In the decade since the war began, the British navy had seized thousands
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of men and the number now increased. Jefferson appointed James Monroe to the Court of St.
James to continue Rufus King’s negotiations on maritime issues but Madison suggested a special
commissioner to assist in negotiations when it became clear that the British mistrusted the
strongly pro-French Monroe. Randolph had long wanted a diplomatic post, a fact well known
among friends and colleagues. In 1805, Virginia congressman Christopher Clark urged the
administration to appoint Randolph. While the appointment would have removed the
quarrelsome congressman from the House, it would have placed the temperamental man in a
foreign court. His performance during the Chase trial revealed that he was no match for skilled
legal minds. President Jefferson instead appointed Baltimore Federalist William Pinkney, one of
the nation’s most skilled lawyers, who could build bipartisan support for a prospective treaty on
impressments.60
After the British negotiations stalled, Monroe and Pinkney visited Madrid in an attempt
to secure West Florida for the United States. President Jefferson believed the territory belonged
to the United States as a part of the Louisiana Purchase, a problematic assumption since the
nations had never agreed on the established borders. Napoleon, however, controlled Spain and
resented the American diplomatic attempts to force the cession of West Florida, especially after
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merchants from New England had run supplies to Haitians while his troops tried to subjugate the
island. At the end of 1805, Napoleon declared that West Florida would remain under Spanish
control. Toying with the Americans, however, he hinted that cash might change his mind. In
December 1805, Jefferson’s annual message urged Congress to prepare for war over Spanish
Florida and a potential conflict with Great Britain.61
Randolph retained his powerful chairmanship of the Ways and Means Committee, despite
the loss of the administration’s favor. He approved the request for defense expenditures but
urged Jefferson to find an “amicable settlement” with both Britain and France since “the best
interest of the Union cry aloud for peace.” Jefferson wanted peace and prepared to pay
Napoleon’s demands for West Florida, which he considered essential for American security. On
December 21, 1805, Secretary Madison summoned Randolph and asked him to secure $2 million
for West Florida. If President Jefferson wanted money for that purpose, Randolph replied, the
request should have come in the annual message. The proposal smacked of back-room deals and
he rejected it. Jefferson took the proposal to Bidwell, who eventually secured the $2 million
appropriation. In response, Randolph declared the president an apostate of republicanism. “My
confidence in the principles of the man entertaining those sentiments, died, never to live again,”
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Randolph said. Now, he asked Congress to weigh Jefferson with the “same scale with which we
measured John Adams.”62
West Florida served as the impetus for Randolph’s complete break from Jefferson.
Centralizing influences had corrupted Jefferson, Randolph claimed. Increasingly, Randolph
believed that Madison pushed the president in that direction, but he also believed that the
influence of Northern Republicans swayed the president. In January 1806, Andrew Gregg,
Pennsylvania Republican, proposed a resolution to prohibit the importation of all goods
manufactured in the British empire until that government curbed impressments and ship seizures.
Gregg’s resolution fulfilled the Jeffersonian desire to conduct foreign affairs through commercial
policy, which would hopefully avoid war. From the beginning Gregg stressed the importance of
the measure to the nation and urged members to shed “geographical distinctions” and serve
national economic interests, a rebuke of both Southern Republicans who proposed no change in
policy and New England Republicans who called for war with Great Britain. Randolph saw the
Northern Republican influence behind the measure that now manipulated Jefferson.63
On March 5, 1806, Randolph attacked Gregg’s resolution as nothing more than “incipient
war measures.” In what William Plumer described as “a bitter, severe and eloquent phillipic,”
Randolph accused Northern merchants of sacrificing Southern interests to protect the carrying
trade. This “fungus of war” fed on the misery caused by Napoleon’s megalomania. “I, for one,
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will not mortgage my property and my liberty, to carry on this trade,” he contended. In his
comments, Randolph urged Southern solidarity against the power of Northern economic interests
and the federal government. He urged “inhabitants of that Southern country” and its “simple,
agricultural people” who wanted “to travel in peace to market with the produce of their labor” to
oppose Gregg’s resolution.64
The debate over non-importation revealed a transformation in Randolph’s vision of the
world. Great Britain, he now argued, represented “the sole bulwark against universal dominion.”
The “noble and generous” sentiments of the French Revolution disappeared under Napoleon’s
rule. Now Republicans wanted to aid Napoleon by striking at the British economy and eventually
sparking war. If the United States could defeat Great Britain’s navy, and he doubted that it could,
the “iron sceptre of the ocean will pass into his hands who wears the iron crown of the land.”
While House Republicans argued that Gregg’s resolution aimed at securing economic
independence from England, Randolph insisted that it represented a measure to support the
expansionist impulse of the administration, which would backfire. An ascendant Napoleon
would then invade America and stoke rebellion in Louisiana, with “its discontented and
repinding [sic] people, whose language, manners, and religion, all incline them to the invader.”
Randolph urged Republicans to remain committed to “the true territory of the United States, not
your new fangled country over the Mississippi, but the good old United States…the old thirteen
states.” The cultural relationship between the coastal states and Great Britain became important
to Randolph, the proud planter who idealized the connections between the Virginia gentry and its
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British antecedents. Indeed, he now disavowed the addition of Louisiana. “The purchase was the
greatest curse that ever befell us,” he argued. Randolph’s attacks led the way for the defeat of
Gregg’s resolution. Although Jefferson never really supported the measure, he now pressed for
the passage of Joseph Nicholson’s alternative non-importation bill, which targeted specific nonessential items that other nations could easily supply and would not be implemented for nine
months. In perverse delight, Randolph ridiculed the Northern Republicans for producing a weak
bill that he compared to “chicken broth.”65
During the debate, Randolph leveled unprecedented and vicious attacks on the
administration and particularly Madison. “The stenographer cannot relate them,” Plumer
insisted. News of his remarks puzzled the President. “Randolph’s late conduct is very
astonishing, and has given me much uneasiness,” Jefferson told Plumer. “I do not know what he
[Randolph] means.” Indeed, Samuel Taggart noted how Randolph’s attitude and demeanor
toward the president changed as he spoke for several hours at a time. “I see more and more
evidence daily of a change in Randolph’s conduct and sentiments,” he wrote. Randolph now
believed Jefferson and Madison were sacrificing republican government and Southern interests
to spark a conflict with Great Britain for the interests of New England merchants. Once at war,
the administration would seize power for the federal government, just as Republicans once
accused Federalists of producing the French war scare. In the end, only Napoleon would benefit.
Some reported that Randolph urged Republicans to travel to Braintree, Massachusetts, and
apologize to John Adams for opposing his war measures against France. Federalists watched
with glee as Randolph attacked the Northern Republicans who supported the president. “I find
65
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that federal members have every day listened to John Randolph with unmixed pleasure, in
opposition to the mean dastardly democrats of N. England!,” wrote Timothy Pickering.
Randolph carried a small group of Southern Republicans with him into opposition to the
administration, but his old friend Joseph Bryan warned Randolph that his recent remarks meant
he had “passed the Rubicon.”66
Many Southerners shared Randolph’s suspicions of the influences on Jefferson. The
Richmond Enquirer lionized Randolph for standing against “the principal officers of the
government.” The Georgia legislature passed resolutions commending his “virtuous and manly
opposition” to the Yazoo settlement. “The administration may do what it pleases. It favors
federal principles,” Randolph wrote. The party needed purification, which meant a return to true
Southern domination. “The old republican party is ruined past redemption. New men and new
maxims are [the] order of the day.” The followers, dubbed Old Republicans or Quids, included
Nathaniel Macon, James Mercer Garnett, Richard Stanford, and Joseph Bryan—all Southern
planters who wanted to prevent the election of Madison to the presidency. For months, Randolph
courted James Monroe as a candidate, especially after realizing that Jefferson’s decision to send
Pinkney to assist in the negotiation with England had angered the diplomat. “We may differ on
the subject of the present administration, all parties here (I speak of the republicans) unite in
support of Monroe for president,” Randolph informed Nicholson. Jefferson’s government
“stands aloof from its tried friends whilst it hugs to its bosom men of the most equivocal
character.” The Old Republicans led a mutiny of the President’s supporters, aggravated by
66
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Randolph’s barrage of accusations that the administration conducted policy in secret. Jefferson
resented the attacks, especially the charges of secrecy in his administration. “[W]e know that we
shall hear the cant of backstairs’ councilors. But we never heard this while the declaimer was
himself a backstairs’ man, as he calls it,” Jefferson wrote to Bidwell. Aware of Randolph’s
maneuvering, Jefferson warned Monroe, “You must not commit yourself to him.” 67
When the House convened for the second session of the Ninth Congress in December
1806, Willis Alston wanted to separate Randolph from his source of power—the Ways and
Means Committee. Alston proposed a change of House rules to removed the power of appointing
committees from the Speaker and instead allow their selection by ballot. Randolph’s
unpopularity would surely exclude him from the chairmanship if not the committee itself. Macon
and Joseph Clay prevented the effort, but Randolph did not attend the opening session. Speaker
Macon had long refused to appoint members who were not present to committees and now
declined to name Randolph to the Ways and Means Committee. When Randolph appeared thirty
minutes after the decision, he became convinced Jefferson had engineered the maneuver. Soon,
James Mercer Garnett, a close friend and ally of Randolph, resigned his seat on Ways and Means
and Macon appointed Randolph in his place. Four days later, the committee informed the
Speaker that it had selected Randolph as chairman. Macon found himself torn as he tried to
remain loyal to both Randolph and Jefferson. After this episode, many whispered that, indeed,
67

Richmond Enquirer, Nov. 5, 1805, National Intelligencer, December 16, 1807; Plumer,
Memorandum, 608; JR to George Hay, January 3, 1806, Randolph Papers, UVA; JR to Monroe,
Sept. 16, 1806, Monroe Papers, LC; JR to Edward Dillon, 1806, John Randolph Letters, Virginia
Historical Society; JR to Joseph Nicholson, April 12, 1805, Nicholson Papers, LC Risjord, The
Old Republicans, 62-6, 73-7; JR to Joseph Nicholson, June 24, 1806, Nicholson Papers, LC;
Ammon, James Monroe, 245; Robert E. Shalhope, John Taylor of Caroline, 121-2; Tate,
Conservatism and Southern Intellectuals,16-7; Abernathy, South in the New Nation, 313-4; JR to
William Branch Giles, February 12, 1806, Boston Public Library; TJ to Barnabas Bidwell, July
5, 1806 quoted in Lacy, “Jefferson and Congress,” 171.
168

Randolph controlled the Speaker. “Some enemy, whom we know not, is sowing tare among us,”
Jefferson wrote to Macon. Each man knew precisely who sowed dissension and know that
Randolph used Macon’s intense devotion to the slaveholding South as leverage.68
Along with Bidwell, Thomas Mann Randolph and John Wayles Eppes tried to counter
Randolph’s effort to divide the Republican party. Each man stood fast against intimidation and
returned his attacks during debate. In one exchange, Thomas Mann Randolph accused him of
using language typically “inadmissible in society” on the floor of the “sacred” House, and the
two Virginians barely avoided a duel. The President’s supporters maneuvered to unseat
Randolph in the Virginia elections, even trying to recruit his old benefactor, Creed Taylor, to run
against him. “I am hunted down with the whole Yazoo pack at my throat,” Randolph remarked.
The freeholders of Randolph’s district never wavered in their support and continued to reelect
him. Many congressmen surely agreed when Thomas Mann Randolph declared John Randolph
“bankrupt as a political statesman.” Across the nation, Jefferson’s supporters splintered, but
Randolph’s defection was the most indicative of rift among Southern slaveholders. “There are
now in the United States—Yazoo, Jefferson, Randolph, Butler, Lyon, Elliot, McKean, Duane,
Lewis, and Clinton Republicanisms,” wrote the Trenton Federalist.69
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***
In February 1806, New Jersey Quaker James Sloan again raised the idea of duties on
imported slaves. Immediately, Randolph urged the House to move on, “with the view of getting
rid of this business.” Barnabas Bidwell entered the debate, however, and urged his colleagues to
prepare legislation for the abolition of the foreign slave trade on the first day of 1808, so “that
there may be no room for disappointment or surprise, and that the world may know the policy we
mean to pursue.” Recognizing that most House members did not want to deal with the “delicate
and irritating subject” of slavery, Bidwell believed it absolutely vital that Congress quickly pass
a bill abolishing the trade and move on. Failure to abolish the trade “will weaken us as a nation,”
Bidwell argued. Although his remarks went unrecorded, Randolph naturally opposed the
measure. The sight of Jefferson’s new floor leader from Massachusetts advocating antislavery
measures fulfilled his worst fears. President Jefferson had grown largely ambiguous about
slavery in public policy, but he never disavowed the increasingly resolute antislavery sentiments
that emerged from Northern Republicans. In December 1806, he encouraged Congress to move
quickly and abolish the trade at the earliest legal date, the first time an American president used
his office to encourage a major restriction of slavery. Jefferson wanted to “withdraw the citizens
of the United States from all further participation in those violations of human rights which have
been so long continued on the unoffending inhabitants of Africa, and which the morality, the
reputation, and the best interests of our country, have long been eager to proscribe.” Jefferson’s
urgency reflected his lingering commitment to natural rights ideology.70
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A special House committee chaired by Peter Early of Georgia produced a bill that
outlawed the foreign slave trade and instructed the federal government to sell any slaves captured
during enforcement of the ban. Having the federal government participate in the auctioning of
slaves repulsed James Sloan, who offered an amendment that would mandate freedom to slaves
captured during enforcement. But Nathaniel Macon argued that such a plan would force
unwanted blacks on both the North and South. Freeing foreign slaves into the nation represented
“an evil far greater than slavery itself,” Early argued. Growing fear of free-black inhabitants
made that prospect unthinkable in the South. The House defeated Sloan’s proposal, but the issue
unified Northerners who would never condone the federal government auctioning slaves.
Bidwell offered an amendment that gave captured slaves to the respective states, thereby
absolving the federal government of responsibility. The House agreed to the proposal but the
debate had stirred considerable hostility. Nearly everyone agreed that the trade should end, but
Southerners remained suspicious of the federal government exercising any regulatory power over
slavery. “I can scarcely recollect an instance in which members seem so generally to agree in the
principles of a bill, and yet differ so widely as to its details,” remarked Connecticut congressman
Benjamin Tallmadge.71
Northern Federalists and Republicans joined together to condemn slavery as an evil,
startling many Southerners. Horrified planters watched as John Similie proposed the death
penalty for slave traders caught violating the ban. “A large majority of people in the Southern
states do not consider slavery as even an evil,” Early informed his colleagues. After a
contentious debate, Southerners succeeded in striking the death penalty from the bill. With the
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debate nearly over, Early won support for an amendment excepting coastal slave trade from the
ban. On February 13, 1807, the House outlawed the foreign slave trade in a roll call vote, 113 to
5. Randolph did not vote.72
The Senate demanded changes to the bill, which stirred Randolph from his silence. The
Senate believed that Early’s exemption of the coastal trade would encourage smuggling and
render the entire ban powerless. In response, the Senate proposed ending the coastal slave trade
altogether, forbidding any ships to carry slaves state to state. On February 26, 1807, an enraged
Randolph finally addressed the House. Restricting slave trading along the coast denied the
slaveholders their personal property rights and amounted to federal interference with slavery.
The South would regret the day it granted such power to the central government as it would
“blow up the Constitution in ruins,” he argued. “It might be made the pretext of universal
emancipation.” “The next step would be to forbid the slaveholder himself going from one State
to another.” Randolph refused to consider any compromises and threatened disunion: “If ever the
time of disunion between the States should arrive, the line of severance would be between the
slaveholding and the non-slaveholding States,” he proclaimed. The idea of Union between such
disparate people now seemed tragically flawed to him. Northern Republicans, Randolph argued,
would allow Southerners to die if the slaves ever revolted. With the hostility of the North
assumed, Randolph just asked his colleagues to “remain neutral” and “not erect themselves into
an abolition society.” For the first time in public debate, Randolph defended the holding of
slaves, with no rhetorical pretensions toward antislavery feelings. He considered it “no
imputation to be a slaveholder, more than to be born in a particular country.” And he advised his
fellow Southerners that if the federal government continued to violate their constitutional right to
72
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slavery, “let us secede, and go home.” Similie responded that those Southerners who “do not
like the Union, let them say so—in the name of God let them go.” The Senate relented and
restored coastal trade, with restrictions, but Randolph tried to stir his fellow Southerners to
oppose it. Congress passed the bill but not before Randolph threatened open defiance of the
foreign slave trade ban. When all else failed, he threatened to confront Jefferson over the bill and
pressure him to veto it. In the end, however, he made no such appeal. Jefferson signed the bill
and the U.S. participation in the foreign slave trade legally ended.73
Randolph’s vehement opposition to abolishing the foreign slave trade paralleled the
changing attitudes of Virginians towards slavery. While men such as Madison and Tucker once
believed that a spirit of republicanism would inspire emancipation, the opposite had occurred.
Instead, the state became more dedicated to the ideas of racial differences and the rights of
property. Indeed, just as Randolph opposed the federal ban on the slave trade, St. George Tucker
made racial distinction a critical part of Virginia law. In the case of Hudgins v. Wright, Judge
George Wythe declared that the Virginia Declaration of Rights applied to all Virginians,
including slaves. The case made it before Tucker, who sat on the Virginia Court of Appeals. If
Tucker reaffirmed Wythe’s decision a legal basis for conscription could be established. Instead,
he argued that racial distinctions made slavery inevitable. Furthermore, these distinctions—of
skin, hair, and nose—placed the “burthen of proof” of freedom on any black person. In 1803, the
Virginia legislature defeated by 90 to 61 a bill that would banish slaves from the state if they
received their freedom. Later it passed legislation that forced slaves freed after May 1, 1806, to
leave the Old Dominion. The spirit that inspired Tucker’s plan of gradual emancipation and
73
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Richard Randolph’s will had largely passed away. John Randolph, who considered himself an
antislavery man, now actively and publicly worked to protect slavery from interference and
protect the slaveholders’ right to hold slaves.74
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Chapter 5: “Outcast of the World:” Sectionalism and Nationalism in John Randolph’s War of
1812
In December 1811, a new generation of congressmen in the House of Representatives
urged President James Madison to declare war against Great Britain. The congressional
leadership believed Britain’s persistent attacks on maritime rights represented an attempt to
subjugate the former colonies. The new House speaker Henry Clay argued that choosing peace
would sacrifice the “nation’s best treasure—honor!” Looking on with disdain, John Randolph
condemned the incessant chant for war. A dozen years earlier, Randolph had arrived in the
House devoted to the idea that war and republicanism were incompatible. The nation should
always work toward peace and choose war only when an enemy directly attacked, Randolph
thought. For months, he walked the House floor with his pack of dogs at his side while he
pleaded with his colleagues to make peace with England. The nation was ill prepared for the
military, economic, and social upheaval caused by war, particularly the type of devastating war
waged in the Napoleonic conflicts. Those who challenged Randolph risked a verbal lashing, a
challenge on the field of honor, or even a physical beating. In the Richmond Enquirer, Thomas
Ritchie labeled him a “nuisance and a curse.” In the House, Republicans elected the first-term
congressman Clay to the speakership after he promised to control Randolph’s bizarre behavior
and stop his intimidation of colleagues. In the midst of his antics, however, Randolph offered a
sobering message to fellow Southerners. This war of honor, he argued, was instead a war of
expansion. Freshmen John C. Calhoun and Felix Grundy had argued that the United States could
easily seize Canada and deny the British empire into North America colonies. In their demand
for conquests, Randolph contended, these “war hawks” would sacrifice the Union, the nation’s
basic means of protecting liberty: “You are laying the foundation for secession from the Union—
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on the north, by the possession of Canada, and on the borders of the Ohio, for another division.
The Ohio has been made the line between the slaveholding States and those which hold no
slaves.” Most importantly, he reminded his Southern colleagues that an imperialistic war would
aggravate sectional “jealousies and animosities” and ultimately unleash the enemy in their
midst—their slaves.1
Randolph’s effort to protect slavery, Virginia planters, and the South put him at direct
odds with the foreign policy of President Jefferson and eventually President Madison. The
problem of American maritime rights plagued both presidents as the nation became caught up in
the conflict between France and Britain. While both nations seized American merchant ships,
Great Britain’s continual impressments of sailors forced both presidents to focus their attention
on that nation. Randolph opposed conflict with Great Britain, which he believed would result in
economic chaos and physical destruction in the United States. Yet, as Randolph became more
reflective of his place in the planter gentry of Virginia, he came to see a potential AngloAmerican war as a civil war. From 1806 until 1812, Randolph became the most stubborn and
persistent critic of Republican foreign policy and the growing desire of American policymakers
to use war to settle the conflict with Great Britain. While he often framed his opposition in the
classical republican opposition to armies and war, he revealed to James Monroe that he feared
1
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that war would make them all slaves. He believed it was especially important that “the Southern
States” confront this “mournful truth.” He insisted however that the problem of foreign affairs
“equally concerns the whole Union.” Although he would threaten disunion just months later in
the debate over the foreign slave trade, Randolph remained committed to the Union. What
seemed like a contradiction made sense to Randolph. The Union should survive only if it
protected slavery, Virginia, and the South.2
***
During his first presidential term, Thomas Jefferson and his Secretary of State, James
Madison, conducted a foreign policy of true republican vision. In addition to carrying out
military reduction, the administration eased tensions with France, secured the purchase of
Louisiana and New Orleans, and kept European powers off the American continent. Jefferson
adhered to republican ideology, even when war became necessary. For instance, when the United
States government refused to pay tribute to the African Ottoman state of Tunis, the
administration found itself at war. The navy conducted the conflict in a limited capacity, using
few resources and touching few non-combatants. Republican purists, such as Albert Gallatin and
Randolph, objected to the cost of the war, fearing it would derail the Republicans’ economic
goals. “This tripolitan war is utterly incompatible with the repeal of the internal taxes and the
payment of the debt,” Randolph wrote to his stepfather. Regardless of Randolph’s concerns,
America’s victory in the Tripolitan War seemed to demonstrate the application of republicanism
in foreign affairs.3
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Randolph remained largely uninvolved in foreign matters during Jefferson’s first term
because the House of Representatives played a limited role in matters of diplomacy. Like many
other Americans, Randolph expressed growing disillusionment with Napoleon when his
imperialist designs became clear. As he soured on France, his affection for the British grew.
Randolph embraced life as a planter and began to idealize the ethnic and cultural links between
Great Britain and the colonists who settled the United States and Virginia. His changing attitude
explains his warm friendship with Massachusetts Federalist Josiah Quincy, who likewise
displayed a deep Anglophilia, primarily a love of British aristocratic traditions. The relationship
between the United States and Great Britain was natural, and emanated from important cultural
bonds. He came to idolize the Anglo-Saxon past of his ancestors, which shaped his political
views. While Jefferson appreciated the cultural power of his own Anglo-Saxon heritage, he
envisioned a nation where ethnic differences would be diminished as people moved westward.4
Randolph found such ideas contemptuous and believed that the administration should
find a diplomatic solution to problems with Great Britain. In 1806, James Monroe, minister to
Great Britain, and William Pinkney continued their quest to secure a treaty with Great Britain
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that would end the ship seizures and impressment. The situation became urgent when
Napoleon’s Berlin Decree inaugurated the Continental System, which prevented American ships
from unloading cargo in European ports. The Continental System and British Orders-in-Council
caught American merchants, farmers, and manufacturers in an economic pincer. The diplomatic
situation intruded on the honest labor of the planter, Randolph believed. On his plantation,
Randolph continued to make considerable profit and he wanted nothing to interrupt that. His
overseer assured him that the plantation would “make more tobacco than ever.” The plantation
would prosper “as long as the right of property and of personal liberty remains untouched ([to]
how long that will be is more than I can tell.)” Randolph feared that any involvement in the
European war would harm the tobacco market. As pressure from France and Great Britain
increased, Randolph began to fear for his own prosperity.5
Monroe and Pinkney extracted important concessions from Great Britain during treaty
negotiations. In the proposed Monroe-Pinkney Treaty, England accepted the carrying trade,
narrowed the definition of contraband, reduced shipping duties in British ports, and promised not
to disturb American trade within five miles of the Atlantic coast. The failure to include a clause
on impressments angered Jefferson, although the British government offered private assurances
of curtailment of the practice. Furthermore, Britain insisted that the United States must reject
French commercial restrictions. Jefferson believed such a measure would, in effect, make the
United States an ally of Great Britain and would lead to war with France. In early 1807,
President Jefferson refused to submit the Monroe-Pinkney treaty to the Senate, after Northern
merchants advised against it. Remembering the public condemnation of Jay’s Treaty, the
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administration refused to release its details. The president was convinced that the public debate
over non-importation proved “a formidable obstacle to the negotiation.” The developments
convinced Randolph that Napoleon would never allow Jefferson to accept any treaty and that the
French emperor now seemed unstoppable: “Nothing is left for Europe but to receive the law of
the conquerer.”6
Randolph believed that Jefferson and Madison truly wanted a war with Great Britain and
that the rejection of the treaty had produced a “war trap.” More than any time since 1798, the
nation appeared close to war and Randolph believed the consequences would prove catastrophic.
Randolph insisted that if President Jefferson failed at pushing the nation into war, President
Madison would succeed. In his disillusionment, He was “determined not to have a Yazoo
President,” and encouraged Monroe to stand as a candidate for president in 1808. “What, my
dear Sir, is to enable us to resist the influence necessarily attached to a great warlike apparatus,
whether naval or military it is the reaction upon our political institutions that I dread,” he wrote
to Monroe. If Napoleon’s war reached the United States, the republican government would fall to
tyranny and the people would become “wholly slave.” If Jefferson wanted war, Great Britain
would have to attack, Randolph insisted.7
***
On June 22, 1807, Britain provoked the Americans in Chesapeake Bay when the fiftygun warship H.M.S. Leopard stopped the American frigate U.S.S. Chesapeake in search of
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runaway British sailors. The captain of the Chesapeake, James Barron, refused British efforts to
search the American ship. The Leopard fired on the American vessel, killing three and injuring
eighteen. The administration demanded that the British government formally apologize, pay
reparations for the attack, and end impressment. When Britain refused, war hysteria swept
Virginia and the nation. On July 2, President Jefferson recalled American ships and ordered
British vessels to leave United States ports. Three days later, the President proposed the raising
of 100,000 men for the militias. Federalists and Republicans laid aside their party differences and
demanded satisfaction from Great Britain. The New York Commercial Advertiser reported that
most of the nation was expressing outrage, “which ought not be suppressed.” In Richmond,
where Randolph served as jury foreman in the Aaron Burr trial, he watched as Virginian called
for war against Great Britain. Mobs in Norfolk demanded a military response to the British
attack. Governor William Cabell reinforced Virginia’s defenses as rumors spread of a potential
attack on Norfolk. When Jefferson asked Cabell to call up the militia, Virginians responded in
droves. A young generation of men talked openly about going to war for the sake of honor. In
Kentucky, Henry Clay proclaimed “peace a curse.”8
The attack on the Chesapeake outraged Randolph, but talk of war made him suspicious.
“I shall not be the less disposed to withdraw her from it [war] or carry her through with honor,”
he wrote. By August, Americans thirsted for revenge. Joseph Nicholson informed Albert Gallatin
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that “all distinctions of Federalism and democracy vanished. The people are ready to submit to
any deprivation.” Jefferson had turned cautious, in part, because drastic military cuts made
during his first term left the nation unprepared. He postponed calling Congress into session and
hoped that national sentiment would create a groundswell for war and force passage of the
appropriate military measures. Randolph refused to lose sight of how the nation had arrived at
this point. “I have tried to avert from my country a war which I foresaw must succeed [from] the
follies of 1805-6,” he wrote. He believed Jefferson’s rejection of the Monroe-Pinkney treaty
created a war-like atmosphere. When Congress met in October 1807, the Chesapeake “sensation”
had calmed and Randolph again reiterated his belief that the United States needed to enjoy
“peace with all of the world.” If the nation capitulated to an Anglo-American war, he believed,
the people would soon have “a French alliance around our necks.”9
In late October, Congress convened in a cautious and sober mood, much to the
disappointment of Jefferson. “The members, as far as I can judge [,] are extremely disposed for
peace,” He wrote to Thomas Mann Randolph. The President wanted to avoid a repitition of the
previous sessions, when John Randolph used his power as chairman of the Ways and Means
Committee to thwart important measures. Many were therefore shocked when Nathaniel Macon
failed to appear at the first session and stand for election as Speaker of the House. Indeed, many
believed Jefferson asked Macon to forego the election. An apoplectic Randolph failed to delay
the election, and Republicans selected Joseph Varnum of Massachusetts. In one of his first
decisions, Speaker Varnum chose George Washington Campbell of Tennessee as the new
9
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chairman of the Ways and Means Committee. Randolph had lost his greatest source of power.
Gallatin remained the only man of the administration who believed the decision wrong. “It was
improper as related to the public business, and will give me additional work,” Gallatin wrote.10
With Randolph out of the way, the administration pushed Congress to build gunboats and
improve fortifications in a program of defense preparation. In turn, Randolph taunted the
administration for not capitalizing on the war fever during the summer. He insisted that he would
have voted for war measures in the aftermath of the Leopard’s attack but the passage of time
allowed him to approach the issue with a clear head. In fact, Randolph would probably have
voted against the administration, since he exhibited suspicions of the war talk for most of the
summer. He used his indecisiveness and perversity in politics to mock Jefferson. Randolph now
urged the administration to find a diplomatic solution to the Chesapeake issue. Britain had
expressed repentance at the incident but resisted any substantive changes in policy. Instead, it
remained dedicated to preventing the United States from assisting France. On November 11,
Britain issued a new Order-in-Council that banned all trade with the French. In December,
Napoleon responded with the Milan Decree, which returned the ban in kind. The two acts made
neutral trade nearly impossible for America. Randolph floated the idea of a full-scale nonimportation act, banning American trade with all nations, but Jefferson feared that the nation
would never “abide by all its hardships.” Surely, such a drastic economic policy “will end in
war,” Jefferson wrote.11
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***
On December 22, Congress passed the Embargo Act without congressional debate.
Despite his misgivings, Jefferson and his congressional leaders had hammered out its details in
secrecy and passed it within four days. Although Randolph had advocated such an embargo a
month earlier, he now rejected Jefferson’s proposal, in a nakedly political decision. As the
election approached, Randolph wanted more than anything to hand Jefferson a defeat, which he
hoped would damage James Madison’s presidential chances. He argued that the administration
designed the plan to “lead to immediate war” with Great Britain, forcing the United States to
assist Napoleon, he asked. “What indeed could Buonaparte require more from us than a nonimportation and non-exportation?” And behind the move he saw the hand of James Madison.12
Indeed, Madison believed that the United States could best solve its diplomatic problems
through commercial policy and convinced Jefferson to try the embargo. In early December,
Gallatin had opposed the measure as potentially disastrous. “In every point of view, privations,
suffering, revenue, effect on the enemy, politics at home, etc., I prefer war to a permanent
embargo,” he argued. On the other hand, the provincial Madison believed that banning all
imports would restore the nation to its republican roots. In a series of anonymous letters to the
National Intelligencer, the Secretary of State laid out his hopes: “It [the embargo] forces
frugality…It fosters application of labor, which contributes to our internal sufficiency for our
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wants. It will extend those household manufactures, which are particularly adapted to the present
stage of our society.” Deprivations would strengthen citizens’ resolve and renew American
character. The austerity of republican society would protect the nation from its shortages and the
opulent British empire would suffer without American raw materials. “We shall be deprived of
market of our superfluities. They will feel the want of necessaries,” Madison wrote. A less
idealistic Jefferson chose the embargo, in part, to prepare the nation for war.13
The embargo devastated the American economy and precipitated the nation’s most
serious sectional crisis yet. In a matter of weeks, the Trenton Federalist reported, the embargo
had “thrown a vast number of poor persons out of employment at this inclement season.”
Jefferson failed to build popular support for the embargo, insisting that the measure was a
congressional policy. High Federalists argued that slaveholding Southerners passed the economic
restrictions to destroy New England’s commercial economy. “A Southern Aristocracy has sprung
out of long possessed power; it aims to depress the growth of these Northern States, to crush
their commercial enterprise, and restrain the means of our wealth and prosperity,” wrote one
critic. Congressman James Sloan proposed that the federal government abandon its seat in the
South and return to Philadelphia. John Taylor of South Carolina attacked the idea, recalling the
“teasing and pestering…about slavery” that Southerners had once endured in that city.
Northerners, he added, “had no regard to our feelings.”14
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Southerners protested New England’s claim of economic martyrdom, since nonimportation also harmed the South’s economy. With markets closed to tobacco and cotton, the
region experienced rampant inflation and serious deprivations, but Southerners insisted that they
would bear their burden in order to break the nation’s dependence on trade with Great Britain.
Echoing Madison’s arguments, the Richmond Enquirer encouraged citizens to embrace home
manufacturing “to keep up the prices of their produce, and to furnish supplies.” Their effort at
self-sufficiency would inspire citizens to “employ themselves in improving the interior of the
United States. Draining swamps and marshes, clearing land, opening roads, making bridges,
causeways and canals, making and enlarging gardens, planting orchards and vineyards…building
and repairing houses, barns, stables, and other outhouses will employ many persons and horses,
and much money.”15
Northerners and Southerners accused one another of sectionalism that violated the tenets
of republican disinterestedness. Many in New England and the mid-Atlantic openly defied the
embargo, arguing that resistance offered the only way to survive the assault by the Southern
slavemasters who ran the government. In upstate New York, networks of smugglers sent goods
over the Canadian border and on to European markets. New England state governments defied
federal authorities and talked of open resistance. Accusing the central government of usurping
“unconstitutional powers,” the Rhode Island legislature openly discussed disunion. Timothy
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Pickering again advocated secession, while New York congressman Barent Gardenier used the
Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions as justification for disunion. Jefferson became obsessed with
the embargo’s enforcement as New England resisted. He pushed Congress to close loopholes,
increase penalties, and allot additional troops to combat smugglers on the New York-Canadian
border. “I think it so important in example to crush these audacious proceedings,” Jefferson
wrote. In this “topsy-turvy” situation, Thomas Ritchie speculated that “the chain that binds these
states will soon be dissolved.” 16
In April 1808, Congress approved Jefferson’s request for an additional 10,000 men for
the nation’s army. The request surprised many in Congress. The military expansion would
prepare the nation for conflict with Great Britain and help combat smugglers, but Randolph
opposed the request, accusing Jefferson of attempting to stir the nation with “military mania.”
The measure, Randolph argued, negated the administration’s contention that the embargo was a
peace initiative. “This embargo, which was to have been both the shield and sword, has turned
out to be a sorry defence, and must be bolstered and buckramed up by six thousand bayonets,”
Randolph said during the debate. “I foresee, that by an eternal and perpetual recurrence to a
standing military force in every emergency, the militia will be laid aside.” He lamented “the
general backsliding from principles” of republican antimilitarism. Samuel Taggart marveled at
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how Jefferson, with Wilson Cary Nicholas leading the Republicans, ruled the House
proceedings. “[H]e can manage everything in the national legislature by his rod,” he wrote.
Randolph undermined the president, whenever possible, trying to break his grip on the House.
Some even suspected that Randolph leaked confidential documents and information to embarrass
the administration.17
Randolph believed his congressional colleagues failed to understand that the United
States now existed in an “age of revolutions and changes.” The military expansion would
inevitably lead to the nation’s involvement in the Napoleonic conflict, he argued. “Great Britain
is endeavoring to seduce you by very coarse caresses and clumsy address indeed, and France to
intimidate you [into] war; each is anxious to bend you to her purposes; and differ only in the
means.” When the House voted for the army expansion, Randolph characterized it in apocalyptic
terms: “The century before the last was an age of religious fanaticism—the world was ruled by
priestcraft; the next was the century of political intrigue and negotiation—the taking of a single
town was the work of a campaign; this is the military age, a great portion of the world being
overrun and subjugated by military despotism.”18
***
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In his opposition to Jefferson and Madison, Randolph joined the Federalist push to have
the embargo repealed. Since the passage of the measure, Massachusetts congressman Josiah
Quincy had delivered nearly a thousand petitions urging the Congress to repeal the measure.
Quincy had spurned the Federalists who advocated disunion and formed a loyal opposition to the
embargo, which concentrated on exposing the policy’s inherent unfairness to the Northern
shipping industry. In the congressional debate, he claimed that New England’s suffering
outweigh that of other regions. Southern planters were able to store their tobacco and cotton, but
New England fisherman watched their catches rot. Southerners had characterized New England’s
opposition to the embargo as disloyal and unpatriotic, even as the region suffered extreme
deprivations, he continued. “Patriotism is a great comfort to men of the interior,” he said. The
coastal regions lost both their product and capital, causing starvation in urban areas. “You cannot
lay a man upon the rack and crack his muscles by a slow torment, and call patriotism to soothe
the sufferer.” The South, and especially Virginia, barely suffered in comparison. If Congress
failed to repeal the embargo, Quincy argued, an insurrection in New England could prove
unstoppable.19
Randolph said he had listened to Quincy’s remarks “with very great pain” and
condemned his friend’s effort “to draw lines of distinction between different sections of this
great Continent.” He admitted “that there are parts of the country which suffer more than others”
and agreed that Congress must end the “ruinous” embargo. But he reminded his colleagues that
fishermen could eat their fish and the rice farmers their rice, but tobacco farmers were left with a
“ridiculous and nauseous” product. Even if New England suffered “out of all proportion” it had
19
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no right “to violate the laws and sap the foundation of the Union,” Randolph insisted. He tried to
transcend sectional hostility and build a consensus on repealing the embargo. Turning his fire on
the administration, Randolph insisted that while the administration promised the embargo would
force Great Britain to relent in its commercial policies, the measure would actually destroy the
Union: “We have waited with upcast eyes watching her downfall till our own begins to
approach.”20
Republicans deemed Randolph’s alliance with the Federalists as a nefarious attempt to
bring down the administration and deliver the presidency to Monroe. In Virginia, many of
Randolph’s friends turned against him, while enemies had his “destruction at heart.” His own
election was not until April of 1809, but he maneuvered to place Monroe in the presidency.
Randolph traveled the state trying to correct “misrepresentations which had gone abroad in
regard to my conduct,” but the President’s supporters had “marked him” for his disloyalty. He
and the Old Republicans urged Monroe to stand as a candidate in the upcoming election.
Throughout Virginia, Monroe’s name was advanced as a candidate opposed to the embargo and
Jefferson’s foreign policy. At one July 4 celebration in Richmond, a reveler toasted, “John
Randolph and his proselytes—May they be immersed in the Font of popular sentiment, and
baptized of their political heresy ere the next Presidential election.” Randolph believed his
political career finished. “You know the old proverb—‘that a cuckold is the last man in the
parish who knows his disgrace.’ It may be applied, in some sort, to a declining politician,” he
wrote. The campaign to elect Monroe failed miserably, and caused a rift between Jefferson and
20
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Monroe. In early 1809, Randolph headed to Washington for the incoming Madison
administration with “an aching head and heart.”21
***
James Madison inherited an economic and political crisis. In New England, hardship
reduced a million citizens or more to “beggary,” which damaged much of the Republican support
in the region. After more than a year of the non-importation policy, Great Britain refused to
repeal the offending Orders-in-Council or end impressments. Indeed, the British merchants fared
well under the embargo as they exploited their colonial Canadian economy. Jefferson and
Madison remained stubbornly committed to the embargo and wanted to break the Northern
smuggling rings. In January 1809, the administration secured passage of the Enforcement Act,
which allowed the president to suspend due process of law, encouraged unreasonable search and
seizure, and ignored rights against self-incrimination. The measure reignited threats of open
rebellion in New England. With the administration’s policies under severe criticism, Jefferson
now handed Madison the “broken sceptre” of power, as Randolph saw it. Despite his hatred of
Madison, Randolph conceded that he would deserve “immortal honor if he steer[s] the nation
through the peril which surrounds it.” Despite Jefferson’s effort to maintain some type of
restrictive policy, Congress repealed the Embargo Act and set March 4 as the date of
expiration—Jefferson’s last day as president. Madison remained committed to the idea of non-
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importation and believed his own election was an endorsement of the measure, but he left the
creation of a new policy to Congress.22
In late February, Congress proposed a Nonintercourse Act to replace the embargo. The
new law would prohibit commerce only with Britain and France, and open trade with the rest of
the world. A contingent of Southern Republicans still believed non-importation a viable weapon
of coercion and inserted a diplomatic weapon into the bill. The president could open trade with
either nation if it ceased violating American maritime rights. Madison opposed the proposal,
since he still favored a full embargo. Josiah Quincy believed the Nonintercourse Act
indistinguishable from the embargo since it also targeted Great Britain, and he urged Congress to
abandon any restrictive measures. New England merchants bitterly condemned the proposal as a
part of the South’s attempt to ruin Northern commercial interests. Quincy argued that New
Englanders needed to “manage our own commercial concerns according to our own interests,
and no longer put them into the keeping of those who hate or those who envy our prosperity.”
Those Southerners believed that some type of restriction of trade must be maintained. Anything
less amounted to capitulation to Great Britain’s power. “If we yield now, they will trample us to
death,” argued Nathaniel Macon. Northern Republicans, tired of embargo and frightened of war,
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believed that the only option was the Nonintercourse Act. Almost everyone in Congress
applauded the embargo’s demise, but no consensus on a successive policy could be reached.23
Randolph pleaded his case against the Nonintercourse Act since the American people
already “stood a test that no other country on earth ever did or ever will stand.” New measures
would lead to new miseries, most likely in the form of war. The nation needed to admit failure in
its commercial policy and accept England’s domination of the sea; only then would the people
enjoy peace and prosperity. Non-importation had only caused bitterness and left Europe
unmoved. “We are marked, not merely to Europe but to ourselves, as a divided people, imbecile,
distracted—and why? Were we a divided people eighteen months ago? We were not, sir; we
were strong in the sentiment of obedience to the laws.” America’s “unwise councils” decided to
insert the nation into the Napoleonic struggle, and now European powers were “quarrelling with
our bread and butter.”24
The Southern adherence to non-importation puzzled Randolph. “From some notion of
honor and dignity, quite incomprehensible to me, we are to stick to this thing,” he said. Despite
the devastation to their own interests, the Southern congressional delegation argued that to end
restrictions before Great Britain halted its violations of American shipping rights amounted to
American capitulation. Randolph subscribed to the notion of Southern honor, but its application
to foreign policy would prove suicidal. “If a man knocks you down, you do not require to be told
that he has broken the peace. The question is, how will you get reparation?” Despite his
objections, the House passed the Nonintercourse Act. Cobbled together from various plans, it
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forbade trade with all of the British empire and all nations controlled by France, prohibited
armed vessels of the two warring nations from entering any American port, and gave President
Madison power to lift restrictions if one of the nations ceased violations of American maritime
rights.25
On March 4, 1809, as Madison assumed the presidency, the Eleventh Congress convened
for a special session. In May, Randolph fought to repeal the army bill that Congress had passed
the previous year, since many congressmen now talked of war with Great Britain. The
government had spent millions on the army, while neglecting the states’ militias. “The old army
is rotten to the core,” he said. He used the opportunity to attack Jefferson’s fall from principles.
“He came into this government the friend of reform and economy, and continued to practice
economy as much as any man could who had the command of a fleet of gunboats, a standing
army, and resources cut off by an embargo,” he argued. Randolph believed, however, that the
blame for Jefferson’s corruption lay with Republicns, who gave the president millions for the
military. “I am for putting down the standing army; for arming the militia,” he declared. 26
Randolph’s opposition once again placed him in an alliance with the Federalists, which
fueled Southern suspicious about his loyalty. New England dissent against the Southern
Republicans soon became focused on slavery. Those Republicans who still aligned themselves
with the language of liberty were subjected to intense attacks. “Surrounded by their slaves, the
love of liberty is sublimated to a passion—and they go to the capital with a zest for personal
independence, that is whetted by the continued sight of the miseries of slavery,” wrote William
Thornton. Randolph supported New England’s opposition to non-importation, but remained
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cognizant of his responsibilities to the South. In June, Massachusetts congressman Edward
Livermore proposed exempting Haiti from the Nonintercourse Act, in effect ending the embargo
against the island. New England merchants wanted restoration of the lucrative Haitian trade.
Jefferson had pushed Congress to impose the embargo against the island in an attempt to satisfy
Napoleon and cut off the trade to a black republic, which Randolph reviled. The decision had
ended a source of lucrative trade for New England merchants. Randolph jumped into the debate.
“He had nothing to do” with Congress’s 1806 embargo against the black republic and had even
skipped the House vote on the matter. Despite his failure to vote, however, he had long
condemned the commercial interactions with the perpetrators of the hemisphere’s largest slave
rebellion. Randolph remarked that he “ had been astonished that, long before the traffic to that
island was stopped by our Government, a sense of self-preservation had not united the interests”
of the South. Although he recognized that opening the trade would prove strategically important
in defeating the French, the stakes were too high. Opening trade with Haiti would “work in the
Southern country a dreadful evil.” The House defeated the proposal 97 to 1.27
Regardless, Randolph’s Republican and Southern enemies branded him Federalist, a
British sympathizer, and even a spy. Critics labeled him “an enemy to his country” and “a ‘lover
of British gold.” They believed his public support for Britain pointed to collusion with the
enemy. Jefferson and his supporters wanted to end Randolph’s congressional career before he
could derail Madison’s presidency. For the first time, he drew a Republican challenger in his
district. “We united with others of the Destrect [sic] to shut him out in the late Election but
Randolps [sic] Eliquency [sic] was such that we fell a long way in minority,” wrote one of his
27
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enemies to President Madison. After leaving office, Jefferson reported from Virginia that
Randolph and Monroe “avoid seeing one another, mutually dissatisfied.” Many Virginia
Republicans wanted to isolate, discredit, and then defeat Randolph. In the summer, the Richmond
Enquirer published a scathing critique of Randolph by “Criticus.” He applauded Randolph’s
struggle for “uniformity” but denounced his penchant for accusing others of “treacherously”
abandoning republican principles. “Criticus” delighted in Randolph’s damaged public image
since he had “satyrized [sic] every member of Congress.” Randolph’s political disloyalty
revealed his “Nose of Wax,” shaped by his hatreds and jealousies. Many of his enemies hinted
that Randolph accepted bribes from the British government to oppose the embargo and nonimportation. “He certainly admires the British nation more than I do. I never said what I am sure
is false, that he was under British influence. No man is more free of extraneous influence of any
kind than he is,” wrote Albert Gallatin. Although Randolph survived a challenge at the polls, he
returned to Virginia in the summer of 1809 despised by many of his old allies.28
***
As Randolph returned home, Madison waited for the European response to the
Nonintercourse Act. The relentless attacks on him darkened Randolph’s mood. “My health is
very indifferent, and my spirits worse, so that nothing can be more sad and gloomy than my life
has been of late,” he wrote. He feared that the United States would soon end up in Europe’s war

28

The Supporter (Chillicothe, OH), February 16, 1809; TJ to James Madison, March 30, 1809,
The Papers of Thomas Jefferson: Retirement Series (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
2004), 1:92; Josiah Jackson to James Madison, June 1, 1809, The Papers of James Madison,
Presidential Series ed. Robert Rutland, (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1984). 1:
218; Richmond Enquirer, June 16, 1809; Albert Gallatin to William Henry Harrison, September
27, 1809, The Writings of Albert Gallatin, ed. Henry Adams, (New York: Lippincott, 1879),
463, Bruce, John Randolph, 1:364, 591; For another attack on Randolph see the letter from
“Dentatus” in the March 27, 1809 edition of the Enquirer.
196

and that increased his despair. “Bonaparte has crushed Austria, it will be our turn next.” As the
world stood on “the verge of despotism,” Randolph believed that Madison’s anti-British policies
aided Napoleon. “I am unable to express what I feel at the present prospect of our affairs
managed as they have been for nearly four years past.” More than simple policy, he recognized a
change in America’s temperament. “If I could see something like the old spirit of independence,”
he wrote, “I should have some hope.” In typical Randolph fashion, he never defined that spirit or
what it meant. Instead, he grew more erratic and frustrated as his enemies attacked him. In
November 1809, he missed the opening of Congress due to a “nervous affliction of the whole
system.” He experienced an episode of one of his chronic illnesses, but he also dreaded his
reception during the next session. “My enemies, as well as friends, were anxiously desiring my
arrival at Washington,” he wrote in December. He dreaded the coming political attacks. “Enough
of politics—I am sick and disgusted.”29
Since the spring, the diplomatic situation had taken bizarre turns. After the passage of the
Nonintercourse Act, Great Britain issued a new Order-in-Council, which addressed some
American complaints. In April, the British minister, David M. Erskine, approached Madison
with a proposal for the United States to drop trade restrictions on Britain. In return, England
would repeal the Order-in-Council that sanctioned the search and seizure of American ships.
Eager to solve the problem, Madison agreed, and in April he re-opened trade with Britain.
Impressments continued, but the agreement did promise rapprochement between the two nations.
British Secretary of Foreign Affairs George Canning rejected Erskine’s agreement once he saw
the details and accused the diplomat of going beyond his orders. Madison then reinstated

29

JR to James Mercer Garnett, September 14, 1809, Randolph Papers, UVA; Bruce, John
Randolph, 2: 746; JR to Nicholson, January 24, 1810, Nicholson Papers, LC
197

nonintercourse measures against Britain as the Americans expressed anger at the Erskine affair.
Randolph saw the failure as “a sort of rejoinder” to Jefferson’s rejection of the Monroe-Pinkney
treaty.30
As the crisis continued, Randolph composed a series of letters attacking Madison and
American policymakers for aiding Napoleon and France with the nation’s policy toward Great
Britain. In January 1810, he published his letters, addressed them directly to Madison under the
pseudonym “Mutius”. “It is the interest of the United States to be at peace with all nations,” he
wrote. He wanted the letters to isolate the pro-French Secretary of State Robert Smith, who
directed a campaign in Washington to drive Albert Gallatin from the cabinet. The Secretary of
the Treasury remained President Madison’s voice of reason and probably the best chance to
avoid war. Smith and the pro-French Republicans were pushing Madison into the arms of
Napoleon, “whose touch is pollution and whose embrace is death,” Randolph argued. Although
he knew enemies would label him a “Tory and friend of Great Britain,” he insisted that England
remained “the freest government of Europe.” But he wanted no war with France, either. The
United States must return to true republicanism and strive for peace, but in the European struggle
for power, it must resist assisting France. The consequences would prove dire if Great Britain
suffered defeat. “When England does fall, she will fall like the strong man in the scripture; she
will embrace the pillars of the temple of human liberty and human safety, and its destruction will
be the last effort of her desperate strength.”31
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At the beginning of 1810, while Randolph recovered in Virginia, Congress prepared for
the expiration of the Nonintercourse Act at the end of the session. The years of embargo and
nonintercourse had devastated Southern planters, especially cotton farmers, who wanted more
moderate measures against Great Britain. In December, Nathaniel Macon proposed a plan that
permitted British and French imports if shipped in American vessels. The solution would revive
American shipping and open markets to agricultural interests. Randolph found the details of the
new plan uninteresting, especially given his diminished influence in the House. Through most of
the winter, he remained on his plantation as others informed him of events. In February,
however, he took notice of William Branch Giles’s and other pro-French politicians’ cry for
“War!” and decided to return to Washington.32
In March, he surfaced in the capitol to fight the growing war movement and found House
Republicans “in a state of disorganization and inefficiency.” He expressed his surprise that the
House had failed to end the “evil” non-importation policy. Capitalizing on the confusion, he
moved to reduce the army, restore the militia, and thwart passage of a new nonintercourse bill.
He immediately proposed a reduction of the military and reiterated his long held beliefs about
the army and militia. “If we are to have war, we know that we, the people of the United States
must fight the battles.” Furthermore, he pointed out the cost of the army, an important factor
since commercial restrictions reduced the nation’s revenues. His attendance took many by
surprise, and he almost secured enough votes for his army reduction bill. With the House in
confusion, Randolph’s plan to stop any non-importation bill seemed possible of achievement.
The Senate rejected Macon’s Bill, and the House seemed unable to agree on a suitable
32
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replacement. In May, the House settled on Macon’s Bill No. 2, which lifted restrictions on all
imports but proffered a carrot. If either England or France ceased attacks on the American
maritime interests, the United States would reinstate the nonimportation measures against the
other. Gallatin hoped the measure would restore tax revenue, but the bill appeared to be an effort
at manipulation and bribery. Few liked the bill and even Macon opposed it. Thomas Gholson of
Virginia also labeled the bill as bribery, and said it “held up the honor and character of this
nation to the highest bidder.” Randolph saw “every thing in confusion—and every body at
variance” in the House as the members could not agree on alternatives. With the end of the
session approaching and the Nonintercourse Act set to expire, Republicans felt compelled to pass
some type of response. In May, Congress passed Macon’s Bill No. 2, which stunned even the
cynical Randolph: “Is it a sort of scarecrow, set up to frighten the great belligerents of Europe; or
is it a toy, a rattle, a bare plaything, to amuse the great children of our own political world?”33
Madison believed that Macon’s Bill No. 2 exposed America’s weakness to the world.
The United States’s inability to protect its ships on the Atlantic encouraged aggression by other
nations. The bill rewarded Britain’s high-handed behavior. Trade was reopened and since the
British navy ruled the Atlantic, the United States found itself as England’s trading partner.
Madison maintained that an embargo still represented the best policy but hoped he could use the
new bill to force an opening with France.34
As the congressional session ended, Randolph noted disgustedly the “low and
contemptible” state of the House of Representatives. He resented sitting “hours in a corrupted
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atmosphere and listening to every possible modification of nonsense.” Congress seemed
unwilling or unable to grapple with serious questions. Previously, Randolph had dominated the
House floor, where he thrived on debate, hurled abuse, and expounded his republican dogma.
Now, he lamented that only fifty members listened to a “sensible” speech by Josiah Quincy.
“The two houses have tumbled about their own ears.” In addition to Congress’s troubles, “the
Cabinet is all to pieces” as dissension continued between Smith and Gallatin. If they succeeded
in getting rid of Gallatin, “Madison must go down with him,” wrote Nathaniel Macon. Randolph
usually would have delighted in Madison’s misfortune, but “the incapacity of Government has
long ceased to be a laughing matter.” After he learned that John Taylor of Caroline planned to
quit politics and return permanently to his Virginia plantation, he mused, “Conscience
perpetually whispers ‘why do you not go and do like wise’?” At the end of the session, Randolph
planned to leave the “dull” and “stupid” environment of Washington and never return.35
Randolph’s opposition to the army invited advocates for war to unleash another round of
political invective against him. “If ever a man deserved the curses and execrations of his country,
It is he, who, in the hour of danger, exerts himself to divide and distract its public councils. It is
he who seeks, in the moment of peril, to palsy and deaden the arm of its government—Has not
Mr. Randolph done this?,” wrote “Philo-Patris” in the Carolina Gazette. In July, “Americanus”
attacked Randolph’s anti-military sentiment as treasonous and destructive: “At a time when the
world is in arms, and we know not how soon we may be called to measure our strength with
some mighty foe, would we wish to ‘break down!,’” he wrote. “Americanus” contended that
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Randolph had never visited a military post or made an effort to understand the nation’s military.
The attacks portrayed Randolph as both a naïve relic of a bygone era and a pro-British dupe. The
old republican dogma against standing armies was meaningless in the United States’s current
crisis. James Mercer Garnett urged Randolph to answer the charges quickly. With the
government in decline and the nation in danger of war, the republic needed him, Garnett insisted.
“Retirement under such circumstances, would be called desertion. Or would be a step, that you
yourself would probably condemn.”36
***
During congressional recesses, Randolph continued to live at Bizarre, where he grew
argumentative and moody. Few cared for and loved John Randolph as much as his sister-in-law
Judith, but he increasingly bullied and took advantage of her. While she continually consoled
him during his political troubles, John thought nothing of pressuring her to sell him cheap land,
commandeering her slaves, or making unilateral decisions about her children. “I have shed as
many tears over your misfortune as my own,” she wrote him in search for sympathy. As his
difficult private personality and public persona collided, she found him nearly unbearable. If she
dared consult other people’s opinions about decisions, he exploded. “You cannot be ignorant that
he cannot bear the least opposition,” Judith wrote to St. George Tucker. By 1810, he desired
isolation and wanted to leave both Washington and Bizarre. When Judith decided to finally
emancipate the Bizarre slaves at Christmas 1810, Randolph sent his young cousin, Richard
Kidder Randolph, to take his slaves to Roanoke. Randolph had no purpose at Bizarre other than
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being a master. “You have an undoubted right in every sense to be master of your own house,”
Judith wrote.37
In June 1810, after the torturous congressional session, Randolph headed to his Roanoke
plantation. In his first days there, he faced a drought-induced crop shortage and a troublesome
overseer. “I have been involved in a disagreeable dispute with a rascal of an overseer [an
Irishman] who threatened to bludgeon me,” he wrote. After the overseer broke down his door
with an axe, Randolph swore out a complaint against him. Before he left Washington, he had
written about a violent change of spirit that “is general in the southern country.” His encounter
with the overseer confirmed it. But despite his trouble, he wanted to make a life at the distant
Charlotte County plantation with his more than 150 slaves. As the world stood on the precipice
of disaster, he saw the plantation as his refuge.38
In July, Richard Kidder Randolph, disgusted with slavery, contemplated moving to New
England. He asked his cousin, John Randolph, for his advice concerning a move to the free
North. John Randolph’s response revealed his own private turmoil over slavery. “Like you,” he
confessed, “it was my misfortune to be educated in a country which calculated to disgust me.”
Plantations and slavery produced hardships, debt, and complications. “I framed the design, not
long after I came of age to sell my property and estrange myself from the land that gave my
birth.” Slavery loomed “uppermost in my thoughts.” He still believed slavery was “a mischief to
our country but shall We therefore desert her because of her weakness and misfortunes?” He
37
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believed that planters could live in an “independent condition” better than anyone else. To leave
Virginia because of slavery would be a vast mistake. “What should we say to an Englishman
who should migrate to America because he thought old England were struggling with difficulties
which she could never surmount?” But in the end, he realized that the decision remained a
private one of conscience. “I foresee the pain which this sacrifice is to cost you.” Richard K.
Randolph left for New England, and his cousin realized he would never see him again.39
Living in isolation at Roanoke, Randolph brooded over the effect of international
problems on the slave South. He believed that foreign affairs threatened the South and slavery.
The deterioration of Anglo-American relations caused him to envision the “sacking of our towns,
savaging of our coasts” once Britain unleashed its fury. Southerners courted this disaster with
their increasingly militant rhetoric. He began taking large amounts of opium after an injury to his
foot, and it seemed to aggravate his despair. In the fall, as he contemplated the future, he copied
part of Samuel Taylor Coleridge’s poem or “ecologue” on war, Fire, Famine, and Slaughter:
Ninety months he by my truth
Hath richly cater’d for ye both
And in an hour would ye repay
An eight years work—Away! Away!
I alone am faithful
I Cleave to him everlastingly
Coleridge wrote the piece in 1796 as warfare between France and Britain escalated to
catastrophic levels. After a decade of struggle to restore republicanism to the nation, Randolph
now was obsessed about the destruction of his way of life. He had tried to encourage peace in
international relations, but fellow Southerners condemned him for it. In the face of national
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turmoil, he rededicated his life to the principles of the republican freeholder. In 1810, as a sign of
his commitment, he began signing every letter and document as “John Randolph of Roanoke.”40
***
Events compelled Randolph to abandon plans for retirement and return to Washington.
After Erskine’s failed attempt to put Anglo-American relations on solid footing, the Madison
administration urged the French to accept Macon’s Bill No. 2. In the summer, French Foreign
Minister duc de Cadore sent a cryptic note to the Americans revealing that France would revoke
the longstanding Berlin and Milan Decrees on November 1, but only if the United States
reestablished all prohibitions against England. President Madison jumped at the opportunity and
declared French compliance with American policy. On November 2, Madison restored full
commercial relations with France and offered Britain ninety days to revoke the offending
Orders-in-Council. If British authorities failed to do so, the United States would reestablish nonimportation measures on February 2, 1811. Even Madison’s most fervent supporters believed
this move was too trusting of the French and too rash with Britain. Napoleon rarely negotiated in
good faith, and the English government knew it. The British ignored Madison’s attempt to
pressure a repeal of the Orders-in-Council.41
On January 22, 1811, John Randolph of Roanoke appeared in the House with his usual
pack of dogs, itching to fight those who wanted a war with England. The months of isolation,
reflection, and opium had worked him into frenzied opposition. When the House came to order,
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his dogs howled and barked as each House member rose to talk. During one debate in which
Randolph spoke for hours, he asked the House to recess, which it did. Willis Alston expressed
disgust that the House still demonstrated any respect for “the puppy.” While leaving the session,
Alston struck one of the dogs after he tripped over them. On the staircase out of the House,
Randolph threatened his old nemesis: “Alston, if it were worth while, I would cane you. And I
believe I will cane you.” Randolph then hit Alston with a hickory cane, drawing blood. Several
colleagues jumped on Randolph, wrestling the cane away from him. Alston ended up with the
cane, ready to strike Randolph, but then declined to harm him. A bemused William Duane
informed Jefferson that “Randolph is up to his old freaks.” A Washington, D.C., grand jury fined
Randolph ten dollars for the attack. Fascinated spectators arrived in the House gallery to watch
the increasingly argumentative and aggressive man. “There is no speaker in either House that
excites such universal attention as Jack Randolph. But they listen to him more to be delighted by
his eloquence and entertained by his ingenuity and eccentricity, than to be convinced by sound
doctrine and close argument,” wrote Washington Irving. 42
In early 1811, Madison asked John Wayles Eppes, chairman of the Foreign Relations
Committee, to put together a new, stronger non-importation bill against Great Britain, although
Napoleon had failed to live up to the promises of the Cadore letter and continued to seize
American ships. Randolph now wondered whether the president really controlled his own
administration. “The truth seems to be that he is president de jure only. Who exercises the office
de facto, I know not; but it seems agreed on by all hands that ‘there is something behind the
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throne greater than the throne itself.’” Madison and his administration bristled under the
continual indignities suffered at the hand of England and wanted to resist its power. Napoleon,
Randolph believed, now controlled American policy, and Secretary of State Smith seemed
determined on fulfilling the dictator’s wishes. “Every thing appears to announce the coming of a
master. Thank God! I have no children,” Randolph wrote. The House again rejected Randolph’s
proposals for the repeal of all nonintercourse laws. The Madison administration seemed
directionless, but Randolph seemed somewhat relieved when the President replaced the
troublesome Smith with James Monroe.43
In Washington, the inevitability of war with Great Britain became the consensus among
Republicans. The complicity of Southerners in the war fever enraged Randolph, and he focused
his attacks on them. In late January, John Wayles Eppes and his committee crafted a bill to
prohibit all British goods from American ports. After weeks of delay, the committee, which
included Randolph, hammered out the details of the bill. For weeks, Randolph irritated his
colleagues with incessant ridicule, especially of Eppes. On February 27, the committee meeting
went past midnight as Eppes pressured members over the details. Drinking heavily during the
meeting, Randolph ridiculed and belittled his opponents as he warned that non-importation and
war would lead to Southern secession. The more intoxicated he became, the more personal were
the insults, even ridiculing the girth of one colleague. As dawn approached, Randolph labeled his
colleagues dupes of Eppes, who pressured individual members to support the bill. By the end of
the session, Eppes fumed at Randolph’s behavior. The meeting broke up at daybreak, and no
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carriage was willing to carry Randolph to his Georgetown mess. As he walked through the predawn morning. Someone hurled a rock at his head in what some suspected was an assassination
attempt. He had succeeded in enraging his colleagues, especially Southerners. His breach with
Eppes seemed headed for the dueling ground, and some believed Eppes wanted to kill Randolph.
Yet, as with most of Randolph’s encounters with the duel, he escaped the confrontation.44
Although Randolph addressed the House fewer times than during any previous session,
he drew enormous criticism. He lashed out at anyone who contradicted or opposed him. A duel
with journalist William Duane almost occurred, after the journalist attacked Randolph for
bringing his hunting dogs onto the House floor “in defiance of decorum, and in contempt of what
in civil society is called gentlemanly good manners.” Duane saw Randolph behind a nefarious
plot against the administration and accused Gallatin of secretly supporting his old friend. The
press labeled Randolph a nuisance whose actions were as “a study of revenge, immortal hate,
and courage never to submit or yield.” Despite his relentless promotion of a return to
republicanism, his actions emanated from “the rude effervescence of passion—not the dictate of
your conscience, but the mad incitement of inordinate hate.” From Monticello, Jefferson
followed his behavior with interest. “The example of John Randolph, now the outcast of the
world, is a caution to all honest and prudent men, to sacrifice a little self-confidence and to go
with their friends,” he wrote.45
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Jefferson wanted to end Randolph’s career. In the spring of 1811, he prodded his son-inlaw Eppes to move into Randolph’s district and challenge him. “Besides your service in the
house, what greater service could you render your country than by the exclusion of John
Randolph, the envenomed enemy to a democratical republican government,” Jefferson wrote.
Eppes, who owned property and a home in nearby Buckingham County, opposed Randolph in
the April congressional election. Although he never officially declared, word spread of Eppes’s
candidacy, news that struck Randolph with “great force.” Jefferson’s Virginia friends stepped up
their efforts to oust Randolph. “We understand that a poll will be taken for Mr. Eppes, by some
of his friends in every county of the District, lately represented, or misrepresented by John
Randolph,” the Richmond Enquirer declared. “Mr. Eppes is as much an ornament of Congress,
as Mr. R is a nuisance and a curse.” Despite Jefferson’s enthusiasm, Eppes could not defeat
Randolph, who maintained strong support in his district. With little time, Eppes made few
appearances and lost by 500 votes.46
As Randolph secured his re-election, the situation with Great Britain deteriorated. The
new British minister Augustus J. Foster demanded the immediate repeal of non-intercourse
measures since Napoleon had failed to truly repeal his decrees. Tensions also escalated after the
United States finally seized West Florida. In late spring, American naval ships preemptively
attacked British ships in retaliation for the Chesapeake affair. In the western territories, the
earliest stages of an Indian war rumbled. While Republicans argued for a war to defend the
nation’s honor, Randolph saw nothing more than a war for “personal aggrandizement.” As he
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traveled through Virginia, he fully realized the Southern lust for war. “The character of the
country is disgraced by a brutality which breaks forth very often,” he wrote.47
Back at Roanoke, Randolph exhibited increasingly bizarre and unstable behavior. His
stepbrother Beverly Tucker watched as Randolph grew “moody and morose, capricious,
suspicious of friends, sarcastic and bitter toward those he loved best, and a riddle to all around
him.” Tucker later described the “change in his temper” as “insanity.” It seems unlikely that
Randolph experienced a full mental breakdown, but he did undergo a mental transformation. As
the nation seemed headed toward war, he mourned “over the degradation of the Old Virginia
from her ancient past.” The “Virginia Presidents who have debauched the public spirit” had led
the nation and the state into a militarist nightmare. Perhaps the most disturbing and alienating to
Randolph were the democratic methods that Republicans used to sell the idea of war. “I am alone
and out of the world—buried alive,” he wrote. “The thoughts of our unexampled situation drove
me from my bed about half past two this morning and I have not yet returned to it. I made a very
vehement speech in imagination to Mr. Speaker.”48
In recent elections for the Twelfth Congress, Western and Southern states had elected a
group of militant leaders. These men argued the idea of national honor as national interest,
evoking memories of the American Revolution, which many of the candidates were too young to
remember. They made passionate appeals to the public using emerging democratic methods to
form national policy. In August, Duane’s Aurora contended that “war and submission are now
the only alternatives.” The new breed of militant young congressmen included Kentucky’s Henry
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Clay and Richard M. Johnson, Felix Grundy of Tennessee, and John C. Calhoun, a Yaleeducated planter from upcountry South Carolina. Their ideas of republicanism had shifted from
the idealistic notions of community toward an individualistic and energetic republicanism, which
adhered to the growing market society. Market-oriented assertiveness now informed their ideas
of foreign affairs. In this spirit, men such as Clay and Calhoun openly advocated aggressive
expansion. “The conquest of Canada is in your power,” Clay told the United States Senate in
1810. In 1811, Hezekiah Niles founded the Weekly Register to promote war and anti-British
sentiment. Niles assured his readers that when war came, Canada would fall with relative ease.
These slaveholders embodied the Jeffersonian ideal of nationalism and expansion. As they
prepared for their first session of Congress, Duane’s Aurora reminded them that “the voice of
every American is FOR WAR.” Randolph observed these developments sourly, convinced that
the nation “shall dance to the French piper.”49
The bold advocacy of war, expansion, and Anglophobia puzzled and angered Randolph.
If these men had missed the American Revolution, they had also missed the worst days of the
Reign of Terror and the Haitian slave revolt it inspired. Since 1808, rumors of slave rebellion had
plagued Virginia and the South. In January 1811, nearly 500 slaves marched on New Orleans
seeking to establish a black republic in the Louisiana territory. Randolph believed that Virginia
should prepare for a slave insurrection instead of war with the English, Southerners’ natural
ethnic allies. With its face turned toward Europe, the Virginia Assembly’s “stupidity and apathy”
49
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left the state unprepared to meet an uprising. The fervor to defend national honor distracted them
from the practical problem of living in a slaveholding republic. In the rush to declare war against
Great Britain, they seemed to forget the volatile nature of the enemy in their midst. In February
1811, Randolph adamantly opposed a bill that offered financial relief for a sea captain whose
ship had been seized when he was caught bringing slaves into the United States. Randolph
argued against the bill “on the ground of the danger of giving any the least license to the
introduction of slaves into this country, or of the maroons, brigands, or cut-throats from St.
Domingo, or elsewhere.” He was amazed that his Southern colleagues seemed to have already
forgotten “the occurrences in the neighborhood of New Orleans.” Southern slaveholders’
“attention will perhaps, be fervently drawn to this subject by the blaze of their houses and the
shrieks of their wives and children,” he wrote to Garnett.50
***
The new Twelfth Congress experienced a unique dilemma as it convened in November
1811— how to deal with John Randolph. His insults and violent temper and the constant
presence of his dogs interrupted business his colleagues planned for war. The new members
looked for new leadership in part to thwart Randolph. His old Republican compatriot, Nathanial
Macon, would prove too conscientious to allow an unimpeded march to war. “The friends of Mr.
Madison hate him and will elect Mr Henry Clay of Kentucky who is a young man never before
in this House.” Clay promised to control the House and enforce its rules. In the party caucus,
Republicans agreed that the Speaker “must be a man who can meet John Randolph on the floor
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or on the field, for he may have to do both.” The new Republicans elected Clay as House
Speaker. 51
When the House convened on November 5, Speaker Clay moved quickly to consolidate
the war movement in Congress by stacking the Foreign Relations Committee with pro-war
members to serve alongside Randolph. The committee’s first assignment was to deal with
Madison’s annual message, which informed Congress of Great Britain’s unwillingness to repeal
the Orders-in-Council. “Congress will feel the duty of putting the United States into armour,”
Madison advised. Grundy and Calhoun dominated the committee and built a powerful case for
war, even arguing that Napoleon had repealed the Berlin and Milan Decrees, despite evidence to
the contrary. The “war hawks” made the case for a nationalistic continuation of the American
Revolution, which had been “sanctified by the blood of our fathers.”52
On December 10, 1811, Randolph condemned the report and wondered “how gentlemen,
calling themselves Republicans, could advocate such a war.” The emotional plea to the
revolutionary past represented a gross manipulation of American memory. “If we must have an
exposition of the doctrines of Republicanism, [I] should receive it from the fathers of the church,
and not from the junior apprentices of the law,” Randolph quipped. The Revolution served as the
anti-militarist example, an honest citizenry repelling the British invader. When the nation
resorted to the standing army, it rested in the hands of George Washington. “Where now is the
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Revolutionary hero to whom you are about to confide this sacred trust?” The nation could trust
no one with military power in the current environment of militant expansionism. Echoing the
Federalists’ long-held suspicions about Louisiana, Randolph asserted that the conquest of
Canada would “strengthen the Northern balance of power.” The previous month, the House had
debated the representation changes from the recent census, which revealed gains for the North
and the West. Southerners would unleash an imperial war that would undercut their political
power and debase the idea of a republican government. “This war of conquest, a war for the
acquisition of territory and subjects, is to be a new commentary on the doctrine that Republics
are destitute of ambition—that they are addicted to peace, wedded to the happiness and safety of
the great body of their people.”53
In constructing the case for war, Calhoun and Grundy failed to confront the explosive
ethnic and racial problems, Randolph argued. The Republicans contended that Canada would
naturally join the war effort against Britain and rebel against its colonial masters. “We shall drive
the British from our continent,” Grundy argued. “I am willing to receive the Canadians as
adopted brethren.” Randolph argued that Republicans ignored the underlying ethnic connections
behind the merging idea of nations. Canadians would never rebel against Great Britain, their
natural ally, he insisted. The United States refused to accommodate the English, “those whose
blood runs in our veins,” while trading with “Turks, Jews, and Infidels.” Conflict with Great
Britain amounted to a civil war and, probably, cultural suicide. Republicans saw the nation’s
future in the west in the Louisiana Territory, where they believed that ethnicity seemed to matter
less. In November 1811, Randolph fought the statehood bill for Louisiana in an effort to prevent
“foreigners having any part in the Government.” The mixtures of French, Spanish, Creole, and
53
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African people in the territory presented a multi-ethnic future for the nation that Randolph
despised. He now saw the true United States as an ethnic entity with Anglo-Saxonism as the
basis for all of the United States’s most important customs and institutions. He insisted that the
common English heritage should bind the inhabitants of the original thirteen states with Great
Britain. Now, Republicans seemed obsessed with New Orleans, which was “filled with a disloyal
and turbulent people; alien to our institutions, language and manners.” Once Louisiana became a
state, he continued, their citizens would eventually reveal their inherent “blind devotion to the
most ruthless military despotism.” Social order and stability required racial and cultural
solidarity.54
No division of the population disturbed Randolph more than that between black and
white. Randolph remarked that he approached the topic “as tenderly as possible—it was with
reluctance that [I] touched it at all.” Southerners, who now argued for a militant crusade against
fellow white people, entrusted their lives to their slaves. During the Seven Years’ War and the
American Revolution, Randolph argued, slaves remained loyal to their masters. Ignoring his own
radical past, he professed fear that “the French Revolution had polluted even them.” Slaves
demonstrated a “general contempt of order, morality, and religion, unthinkingly to cherish the
seeds of self-destruction to them and their families.” He truly believed that war with Great
Britain would lead to massive slave revolts noting that “within the last ten years, repeated alarms
of insurrection among the slaves” had become a constant source of anxiety for Virginians:
From the spreading of this infernal doctrine [of the French Revolution], the whole of the
Southern country had been thrown into a state of insecurity. Men dead to the operation of
moral causes, had taken away from the poor slave his habit of loyalty and obedience to
54
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his master, which lightened his servitude by a double operation; beguiling his own cares
and disarming his master’s suspicions and severity; and now like true empirics in politics,
you are called upon to trust to the mere physical strength of fetter which holds him in
bondage. You have deprived him of all moral restraint, you have tempted him to eat of
the fruit of the tree of knowledge, just enough to perfect him in wickedness; you have
opened his eyes to his nakedness; you have armed his nature against the hand that has
fed, that has clothed him, that has cherished him in sickness. You have done all this. God
forbid, sir, that the Southern States should ever see an enemy on their shores, with these
infernal principles of French fraternity in the van!
Once European devastation spread to the South, Randolph continued, slaves would murder their
masters and seize the land, a repetition of St. Domingue. While Calhoun, Grundy, and Clay
envisioned a western empire of vast commercial and political power, Randolph foresaw the
destruction of the English world and of liberty itself. The separation of Canada, France’s defeat
of Britain, and the flood of foreign peoples in the territory would excite the slaves into action. In
the end, chaos and violence would consume Britain, Canada, and America. Even if war proved
successful, he argued, the results would devastate the South, since the acquisition of Canada
would shift the balance of power away from the slaveholding South to the free North.55
Americans could prevent such an apocalypse if they adhered to “the promises held out by
their Republican predecessors when they came into power.” Raising an army and navy would
require vast tax revenue and sacrifice. The House should again opt for peace, “paying off the
national debt… retrenching useless institutions.” Randolph feared, however, that the new
Republicans resembled the old Federalist “Essex Junto.” They were “infatuated with standing
55

Annals of Congress, 12:1, 357-8, 444, 448-451.
216

armies, loans, taxes, navies, and war.” Yet the Republicans condemned the Federalists of New
England and proclaimed themselves the heirs of the American Revolution. Randolph wondered,
“What Republicanism is this?”56
Randolph’s speech represented the pinnacle of congressional antiwar sentiment. The
repeated charges of treason had silenced New England Federalists, many of whom looked to
Randolph to make the case. The speech showed signs of swaying members, particularly the
arguments about the cost of war. Hugh Nelson, a Virginia freshman and neighbor of Jefferson,
noted approvingly Randolph’s influence: “The more I see him the more I like him. He is as
honest as the sun,” Nelson said. “Do not be surprised if before the session closes I am classified
with him as a minority man.” In the past, Randolph’s personality and oratorical skill could have
intimidated and swayed enemies and friends, but the new House members refused Randolph’s
entreaties. Anyone who doubted a new day had arrived in American politics was soon disabused
of such notions when John C. Calhoun responded.57
Calhoun attacked Randolph’s logic as inconsistent and dangerous. While the Virginian
brayed about the lack of security in Virginia and the nation’s ill state of preparation, Calhoun
asked, “whose is the fault?” Calhoun blamed the nation’s problems on dogmatic republicans,
especially Randolph: “Who has been a member for many years past, and has seen the defenceless
state of his country even near him under his own eyes, without a single endeavor to remedy so
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57

serious an evil?” The argument against taxation to support a just war evinced a base feeling of
“avarice.”58
Randolph’s fears of internal dissension among slaves seemed unfounded and unwarranted
to Calhoun: “I believe no war can be less dangerous to internal peace, or national existence.” He
ridiculed the very idea of slavery being anything other than an asset.
As far as the gentleman from Virginia speaks of his own personal knowledge, I will not
pretend to condradict him—I only regret such is the dreadful state of his particular part of
the country. Of the Southern section, I too have some personal knowledge, and can say,
that in South Carolina no such fears in part are felt. But. [sic] Sir, admit the gentleman’s
statement, will a war with Great Britain increase the danger? Will the country be less able
to repress insurrection? Had we any such thing to fear from that quarter, which I sincerely
disbelieve, in my opinion, the precise time of the greatest safety is during the war in
which we have no fear of invasion—then the country is most on its guard; our militia the
best prepared; and standing force the greatest. Even in our Revolution no attempts were
made by that portion of our population; and, however the gentleman may frighten himself
with the disorganizing effects of French principles, I cannot think our ignorant blacks
have felt much of their baneful influence. I dare say more than one half of them never
heard of the French Revolution.
Calhoun saw the South’s slaves as child-like and incapable of understanding or constructing
ideologies. In Calhoun’s South, the slave understood only what the master allowed him to know.
Randolph, however, had witnessed the fleeing slaves during the American Revolution, the
antislavery movement in Philadelphia, Gabriel’s Rebellion, and the unrest of his brother’s slaves
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as they waited for their emancipation. He still believed that slaves would, given an opportunity,
rebel against their unnatural state. Slaves clearly understood their natural human rights.59
In 1812, Calhoun and the Republicans convinced the nation that Great Britain’s abuses
amounted to an attempt at recolonization. Georgia congressman George Troup remarked that
nearly the entire House stood against “the solitary gentleman from Virginia” in opposing conflict
with England. Randolph’s remarks revived the allegations that the British had bribed him.
“Randolph seems to have composed his speeches from the fragments of the tory publications,”
Benjamin Rush wrote to Jefferson. Randolph continued to stress how Americans “received our
indelible character of freemen from our Anglo Saxon Descent.” He wondered how one
colleague could rest “his head upon his pillow without returning thanks to God that he was
descended from English parentage?” From this English heritage flowed “the blessings of life.”60
In March, revelations of a British plot to incite New England’s secession curbed
Randolph’s pro-British talk. President Madison bought secret documents that supposedly
revealed a connection between New England Federalists and the British government. Randolph
doubted the authenticity of the plot, but believed it proved his larger point: war would bring
dissension and division. Such diversions obscured the fact that while the administration focused
on Britain “the Berlin [and] Milan decress are in operation on all they touch.” Dividing the union
would “be the constant object of the British government” if America went to war. “The Southern
States have no points of collision with England,” he wrote in his diary, but war would separate
the sections. The prospect of war was already causing unrest back in Virginia. “My friends write
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me that the alarm is very great among the women, and the state of Society as uncomfortable as
possible should there be war and invasion!” As his colleagues prepared for war, he reminded
them that “the eyes of God are upon us” and asked them to wait six weeks before considering
war. The “oppressive act of the party of power” frightened the people into war, he argued. By
late spring, Randolph was convinced that France wanted Great Britain and the United States at
war and that Madison and the Republican party too far in “propitiate[ing] the French Emperor.”61
Through the spring of 1812, Randolph worked incessantly to postpone the war decision.
In April, Madison urged Congress to pass a temporary embargo against England, although
France still continued to violate American maritime interests. New England condemned the
action as a precursor to war. Hezekiah Niles saw the looming conflict as a cleansing moment for
the republic, which would allow a purge of dissenters. Republicans would then rule “as with the
mind of one man.” President Madison remained skeptical of war, especially when British
minister Foster signaled that his government might alter the Orders-in-Council. The “war hawks”
wanted war, however, and pressured Madison for a declaration. In late May 1812, Randolph rose
on the House floor to respond to rumors that the president would soon ask for a war. As he
began, Speaker Clay interrupted him. John C. Calhoun then requested that Randolph submit his
remarks in writing to the House. “My proposition is, that it is not expedient at this time to resort
to a war against Great Britain,” Randolph said in his appeal to Clay. After several minutes of
debate, Clay succeeded in silencing Randolph. In a letter to his constituents, Randolph claimed
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that his right to speak on their behalf had been denied by Clay. Nothing now could stop the
nation from going to war to support “the destroyer of mankind,” Napoleon. American blood
would surely “flow to cement his power.” The nation would be joined in a war to destroy British
liberty and in the process “put your own in jeopardy.” As he had warned his colleagues, he
cautioned his constituents of the coming doom. On June 1, Madison asked for war against Great
Britain and Congress soon declared it. “This sin, at least, shall not rest upon my soul,” Randolph
told his constituents.62
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Chapter 6: “Chapter of Contradictions:” Slavery, Decay, and Salvation from the War of 1812 to
the Missouri Compromise

On May 10, 1822, William Wilberforce escorted John Randolph of Roanoke into
London’s Freemason’s Hall for the fifteenth annual African Institution. The peculiar-looking
man and “his republican simplicity of manner” intrigued the audience. In the hall, 1,500
abolitionists and antislavery men and women gathered to discuss efforts to ameliorate the
condition of slaves in the Western world. During the previous year’s meeting, the Institution had
expressed its belief that the recent Missouri Compromise enacted by the United States Congress
would “aggravate the evils of slavery in the United States.” During the current meeting, members
urged better enforcement of the ban on the Atlantic slave trade and supported measures that
would lead to “the gradual abolition of slavery itself.” Baron Henry Brougham lamented the
declining antislavery sentiment in the Atlantic world but expressed hope that the people of the
United States would eventually lead the effort to eradicate slavery. He revealed a hope that the
rise of democracy in America would lead to emancipation. Brougham singled out “Mr.
Randolph’s great efforts” in working for the enforcement against “slave trade piracy,” ignoring
Randolph’s vote against the 1807 bill abolishing the foreign slave trade and his continual
thwarting of efforts to strengthen enforcement.1
With no official representatives from the United States in attendance, the audience urged
Randolph to respond. He addressed the crowd on behalf of his nation, though professing that he
“felt inadequate” to do so. “All that was exalted in station, in talent, and in moral character,
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among his countrymen, was (as was also to be found in England) firmly united for the
suppression of this nefarious traffic,” Randolph was quoted as telling the crowd. In no way did
he dare summarize or expound on the antislavery temperament of the United States. “It was
delightful [to him] to know that Virginia, that land of his sires, the place of his nativity, had for
half a century affixed a public brand, an indelible stigma upon this traffic.” He assured the
audience that Virginia “had put in the claim of the wretched objects of it to the common rights
and attributes of humanity.” The audience roared agreement at Randolph’s recognition of the
rights of slaves. With the ringing approval of some of the most prominent Englishmen of the era,
he sat down, satisfied.2
In the United States, news of Randolph’s address to the African Institution elicited mixed
responses from Northerners and Southerners. In the North, Randolph’s emotional and relentless
defense of the right of slaveholders had earned him the reputation as the South’s staunchest
proslavery voice. The Columbian Centinel wished Randolph “had made himself able to add, that
previous to his departure from America, he had liberated the many ‘fellow men,’ that he holds in
slavery.” Instead, critics argued, Randolph’s speech represented the grossest deception
imaginable. The hundreds of slaves at Roanoke provided backbreaking labor “to enable him to
live in luxury, and traverse the globe at his pleasure.” Another Massachusetts newspaper
published a mock toast to Randolph in the supposed dialect of a slave: “Misser Randolph—he
talk a good deal about bobalition in London; be he sing another tune on his plantation.” In
Richmond, Thomas Ritchie reported the event with little commentary but with obvious disdain
for the African Institution. After covering Randolph’s career for several years, Ritchie certainly
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appreciated the congressman’s erratic behavior and his ability to shock supporters and critics
alike.3
Randolph’s speech offended American abolitionist Benjamin Lundy, who idolized
Wilberforce and drew inspiration from the British antislavery movement. He saw vain political
reasons for Randolph’s address and wondered why the attendees tolerated such a display of
deception and hypocrisy. “Perhaps they were delighted to see how eloquently a violent advocate
of slavery could speak against the slave trade simply because it suited his ideas of popularity,”
Lundy wrote in his Genius of Universal Emancipation. Lundy accused Southern slaveholders of
ignoring the rapid “march of mind” toward freedom. Men such as Randolph failed to foresee the
fate of slavery in the Western world, which was becoming increasingly apparent to Lundy. “The
fiend of Slavery in North America is surrounded. The free States of this Union are on the east,
the north, and the west—Hayti and Columbia on the south.” Lundy believed that if Southerners
embraced emancipation now they could avoid the eventual confrontation between master and
slave. “THE ADVOCATES OF LIBERTY ARE SURE OF THEIR MARK,” he insisted.
Randolph met the greatest moral and political problem of his day with “weakness and
inconsistency.”4
Randolph believed himself an antislavery man. After the War of 1812, he struggled to
reconcile his private antislavery feelings, his growing idealization of Virginia’s gentry past, and
his hatred of the Northern antislavery movement. During a decade of political disappointments
and emotional turmoil, in which Randolph found God—or as he believed, God found him—he
privately committed himself to improving conditions for his slaves. In his most expansive
3
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4

moments, he talked of becoming the “American Wilberforce.” He committed himself against the
slave trade and advocated colonization as a possible solution to Virginia’s growing racial
problems. To colleagues in the North, he lamented both the decline of the gentry and the South’s
devotion to slavery. In his mind, he represented the true antislavery man, defending slaves from
cruel overseers and saving them from eternal damnation. Most importantly, he arranged for the
freedom of his slaves after his death, an assurance to himself that he was above all else an
emancipator.5
***
After the declaration of war against Great Britain, the supporters of the conflict tried to
stifle dissent. Randolph’s vehement antiwar rhetoric made him as a leading voice of opposition.
In the summer of 1812, he condemned Speaker Henry Clay for cutting him off during an antiwar
speech, calling it an attack on the “great fundamental principles” of republican government. In
the House, the war supporters of the war stigmatized those who dared question it. Felix Grundy
insisted that all Americans must now decide if they were “for [their] country or against it.”
Virginia congressman John G. Jackson believed “Tar & Feathers” the just deserts of the war’s
critics. By early July, the United States army planned an invasion of Canada. The moment of
debate had ended and all citizens must sustain the war, supporters argued. In Virginia, Governor
James Barbour urged citizens to “present an undivided front to the enemy.” In Baltimore, when
newspaper publisher Alexander Hanson claimed that Madison took his war directives from
Napoleon, a Republican mob beat him and demolished his newspaper building. To Randolph, the
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mob demonstrated the hysteria that all war’s produced, particularly in a growing climate of
democracy. “I cannot trust my pen on the subject of Baltimore Mobs,” he wrote. Many thought
his antiwar speeches inspired treason. The dissenters, labeled by one critic as “Randolphit[e]s,”
threatened the effective execution of the war. “The temper of the 1790s was mildness and
moderation compared with that of the present day,” Randolph wrote. At one July 4th celebration
in Virginia, revelers concluded their evening by burning Randolph in effigy. “If the vengeance of
heaven does not fall on him, the hand of his country will at last overtake him,” a war supporter
wrote.6
In mid-July, General William Hull’s army invaded Canada and immediately suffered a
humiliating defeat. Within a month, British forces pushed Hull’s army back into the United
States and eventually captured Fort Detroit. Randolph had condemned the Canadian invasion and
delighted in the American defeat, ridiculing it as “an expedition for a flock of wild geese.” In
August, news arrived in Washington that the new British government under Lord Liverpool had
repealed the original Orders-in-Council that blockaded France and targeted American shipping.
Many in Virginia urged Madison and Monroe to make peace with Great Britain. Madison
refused, and seeing no alternative to continuing the war despite its growing unpopularity.7
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With elections looming in the fall of 1812, the Republican candidates expressed loyalty
to the President and his war effort. Although Virginia congressional elections were not until
April, John Wayles Eppes began to campaign immediately in the fifteenth district for Randolph’s
seat. Jefferson and the Republicans wanted to defeat Randolph, especially now that he embodied
the antiwar movement. In September, the two candidates appeared together at the courthouse in
Buckingham County. With a stack of books at his side, Eppes offered a learned but tedious
defense of the war while attacking Randolph for failing to support the administration. To his
supporters’ “mortification,” Eppes gave an “extremely feeble” defense of the war. In response,
Randolph argued vehemently and cogently against the conflict, winning the agreement of the
audience, who considered the invasion of Canada a failure. “There is no doubt of R’s. reelection,” wrote one observer after the meeting. The Republicans began circulating rumors that
the British bribed him for his opposition to the war. “[T]he more ignorant and vicious part of the
community have been told that I am a foreign pensioner,” he wrote. “Those miserable wretches
do, or affect to believe that I am abounding in British gold.” Enemies spread these rumors among
the lowest classes, to whom Randolph would never defend himself. By the fall of 1812, the
administration’s poor conduct of the war had diminished Eppes’s chances against Randolph.
Randolph expected that the “spirit and intelligence of my constituents” would end “the
persecution of six years,” since he had first opposed the Jefferson administration’s Yazoo
settlement. In the next congressional session, many realized Randolph would present a potent
opposition to the war and the Madison administration. In South Carolina, General William Butler
refused to run against John C. Calhoun for a simple reason: “You can meet Randolph in debate. I
cannot.”8
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In the presidential election, the war, and specifically the Southern domination of the
government, led to sectional tensions. As the Americans struggled to regain footing in Canada
and faced the dangerous Indian threat in the West, a coalition of Northern Federalists and
Republicans built an opposition movement against Madison’s war. They united behind New
York City mayor Dewitt Clinton to unseat Madison. Casting themselves as a peace party, the
Clintonians and Federalists wanted to end the reign of Virginia presidents, who they believed
opposed the commercial interests of the Northeast. The campaign effort portrayed Clinton as a
pro-commercial man, free from French influence. While Clinton’s supporters focused on the
failed invasion of Canada as proof of Madison’s incompetence, the president’s supporters placed
their hopes in a cabinet shuffle, urging that Monroe take control of the military and end the
conflict. Rumors also abounded that Jefferson or Eppes would take over the State Department. In
November, Madison won reelection with little Northern support outside Pennsylvania.
Federalists increased their numbers in Congress, however, and demonstrated a sectional
cohesion. The administration prepared for a contentious congressional session over the conduct
of the war. In December, Monroe admitted to Randolph that the nation now stood in “an
embarrassing situation.” The administration had placed “great reliance on the unpopularity of an
American war in G. Britain,” but instead the conflict had roused the support of the British public.
After Napoleon’s failed invasion of Russia, it now seemed likely that Britain would emerge
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victorious in Europe. Monroe hoped that the nations could reach a peaceful settlement before
Britain sent its seasoned veterans of the European campaigns to America.9
Madison still hoped to salvage the war effort and proposed military changes to achieve
victory. At the end of 1812, he asked Congress for a restructuring of the military, giving the
President and the War Department more control over recruiting and military appointments. In
particular, he hoped to invigorate the army’s leadership by ridding it of aged Revolutionary Warera veterans and political generals. Many pinned their hopes on James Monroe after Madison
convinced him to take over the War Department, in addition to his current duties as Secretary of
State. Most importantly, Madison wanted an expansion of the army and construction of a navy.
However, as Secretary of the Treasury Albert Gallatin informed him that the nation had scarcely
enough money to survive, much less fund the war effort. The embargo and the war had left the
nation’s coffers empty. Congress needed to pass new internal taxes to pay for an expansion of
the military.10
In January 1813, Randolph attacked Madison’s request for new taxes and military
expansion. The proposals confirmed Randolph’s persistent characterizations of Madison as a
centralizer, angling to empower the federal government. Randolph demanded that the
administration produce a list of all government officeholders, which would reveal that Madison
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filled these positions with political cronies. Now, he argued, the President wanted taxes to
reward more friends with military positions. In a nearly three-hour speech, Randolph gloated
over the administration’s predicament, charging that Madison had allowed Napoleon to
manipulate the nation into war but that now “the Ruler of France has turned with contempt from
your reclamations.” With France defeated in Russia, it seemed that the United States would face
Britain’s wrath alone. In his long and emotional speech, Randolph extolled Great Britain,
delighting in its victories over Napoleon. The Americans’ “Christian brothers” in Britain would
finish off the “Devil” Napoleon if the United States abandoned the war effort, Randolph argued.
The common interests, culture, and religion of the United States and Great Britain made this an
unnatural, if not a civil, war. Randolph looked on Britain as a moral arbiter in the Atlantic world.
In particular, he privately expressed support for Britain’s continuing effort to demolish the slave
trade. When Great Britain pushed the United States to clamp down on those slavetraders using
neutral flags to avoid scrutiny, Randolph supported a change in American law. He hoped “that
some expedient will be devised to put a stop to the infamous traffic in slaves by Americans under
foreign colors.” Such an endeavor proved Great Britain’s moral superiority, he argued, and
American assistance in prolonging Napoleon’s reign was a sin. “Let us turn from him—come out
from his house—and join in the worship of the true and living God, instead of spilling the blood
of his people on the abominable alter of the French Moloch.” As he begged for an end to the war,
Randolph sat down and wept before the entire House. Through his tears, he asked how the
United States could wage war against England after it “had done so much in India towards
[bringing] many millions of wretches to christianity!” The Congress passed most of Madison’s
requested measures but Randolph helped defeat the call for new taxes. As the debate concluded,
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Randolph appeared near exhaustion. “I am in a state of collapse,” he wrote to congressman
James Mercer Garnett.11
The Republican press condemned Randolph’s defense of Britain’s war effort as
treasonous or a sign of mental derangement. “Johnny Randolph has been crying like a baby, in
Congress, about the war,” wrote one critic. To Southern Republicans, Randolph’s views put him
in league with New England’s Federalists. In Georgia, the legislature voted to change the name
of Randolph County, which legislators had named to honor him for his relentless opposition to
the Yazoo settlement. Randolph exhibited “such a desertion of correct principles, and such an
attachment to the enemies of the United States, as to render his name odious to the people of
Georgia, and the United States,” one editorial stated. An increasing number of critics argued that
Randolph’s performances in Congress were a sign of “madness.” Such assertions marginalized
Randolph and diminished his views. 12
Randolph’s congressional performance energized political opponents in Virginia and
revived Eppes’s candidacy. Citizens who had supported Randolph’s principled antiwar stand
now abandoned him. His emotional performances before Congress seemed to confirm many of
the worst characterizations of him as an eccentric and self-indulgent slavemaster. A Virginia
Federalist advised voters to reject Randolph and “we shall then hear no more of ‘negro slaves’–
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‘slave holders’—‘Virginia influence.’ The tone will be changed to ‘patriotic Virginians.’” In the
early April election, Eppes defeated Randolph at the polls by 74 votes, and Virginians celebrated
his defeat. “How the mighty have fallen!” the Richmond Enquirer stated. “We rejoice that the
man, who has scattered damnation around the land, is doomed at last by the voice of the people
to the shades of retirement and obscurity.”13
The defeat devastated Randolph, who condemned his enemies’ tactics as the worst ever“
resorted to in Virginia.” In the weeks leading up to the election, Eppes had aimed his campaign
at the voters whom Randolph disdained, new land owners and evangelical Christians. Eppes,
Randolph claimed, had, “descended to attend day and night meetings at the houses of the lowest
order of freeholders.” These citizens enjoyed enough prosperity to buy land, but they remained
beneath Randolph’s social status. Although Eppes came from the same distinguished planter
background as Randolph, he seized on the growing democratic strain in Virginia that encouraged
a broader civic participation. Indeed, Eppes’s willingness to engage a host of religious groups
forced Randolph to engage in electioneering in a new way. During the final week of the
campaign, Eppes attended fourteen meetings of the fast growing Baptist denomination, whose
antislavery views and egalitarian strain disgusted Randolph. In response, Randolph made appeals
to the district’s more respectable Presbyterians. The increased campaigning forced Randolph to
appear before audiences and to defend his actions in Congress while combating those “who told
a thousand lies as they passed thro [sic].” Rumor served as a powerful force in the campaign by
giving influence to those unable to vote. Enemies revived the charges of British bribery and
people of all ranks spread them throughout the district. “Ignorant people were made to believe
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that the British fleet had come into the Chesapeake to aid my election,” Randolph wrote to Josiah
Quincy. Randolph resented the defeat, the means of Eppes’s victory, and the voters themselves.
“I owe the public nothing,” he wrote to Francis Scott Key. Those who knew him realized that the
defeat would aggravate Randolph’s fragile emotional state. “All believe that he will chew the
cud of reflection, the next winter at his own peaceful home,” wrote one observer.14
***
Randolph sank further into anguish, reflection, and self-pity. “I am overwhelmed by
black misanthropy and despair,” he wrote to Garnett. In a particularly dark moment, he asked his
friend Garnett, “tell me why I should not quit this wretched way of life?” His inability to
influence his colleagues or constituents convinced him of the “incurable depravity of my
species.” Initially, he scorned his fellow Virginians. When his young relative Theodore Dudley
headed for medical school in Philadelphia, Randolph advised him to “choose not Virginians for
your companions. I have no doubt that many of the medical students of the South leave
Philadelphia as ignorant of everything worthy to be known in that city, as when they entered it.
This arises from a clannish spirit, which makes them associate exclusively with one another, and
foster their ridiculous prejudices against people of the middle or northern states, of whom, in fact
they know nothing.” Indeed, he joined those who argued that Virginia and the South were a step
behind the Northeast. In exile at Roanoke, he developed warm relationships with Northerners
such as the Philadelphia Quaker George Logan, New York congressman Harmanus Bleecker,
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and Josiah Quincy. His electoral defeat exacerbated his disillusionment. Writing to James Mercer
Garnett, Randolph threatened “selling my estate and retiring to some distant and obscure retreat.”
To Francis Scott Key, he wrote, “I should convert my estate into money and move
northwardly.”15
As Randolph had warned, Virginia remained ill-prepared for the war with Great Britain
or the threat of a slave uprising. “The whole country, watered by the rivers, which fall into the
Chesapeake, is in a state of paralysis,” he reported to Josiah Quincy. While the state’s militia
companies prepared to join the campaign in Canada, wartime speculators exploited the situation,
much to Randolph’s disgust. “The French and Jews, of whom the trading population is
composed, practice the vilest extortion upon their defenders,” he wrote. As prices rose, the
state’s defenses deteriorated. Randolph hoped that the hardships would inspire resistance and
pressure the Republicans to end the war. “The discontent, which had been so long smothered by
a large portion of the people, will break forth to the consternation of their rulers, whom they will
lay upon the shelf with very little ceremony.”16
As Randolph had predicted during the congressional debates, many slaves saw the war as
their opportunity for freedom. When the British navy patrolled Chesapeake Bay, slaves fled for
the coast into the arms of the invader. By the spring of 1813, rumors of slave plots spread
throughout the South and Washington, D.C. The lingering threat of insurrection led some to
question why Virginia’s troops were fighting in Canada while their neighborhoods remained
threatened. That summer, Governor James Barbour asked the state legislature to raise a separate
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army to suppress any potential uprising. “We are all here in a state of great alarm and distress,”
Randolph wrote to Quincy. While the nation worried about the campaign in Canada, Virginia
struggled to subdue “the danger from an internal foe.” The state sent soldiers to the Great Dismal
Swamp, which was near the most restless slave population in the state. Randolph realized that
soldiers sent there would never survive the harsh climate, making them the first victims in an
internal race war looming for Virginia.17
In April 1814, British admiral Alexander Cochrane issued a proclamation that offered
freedom and relocation to runaway slaves in the Chesapeake Bay region. As word seeped into
the Virginia countryside, more slaves fled toward the coast. In response, Virginia limited the
movement of all slaves and free blacks and considered recalling the state’s soldiers from the war
front in Canada to maintain order. “Our negroes are flocking to the enemy from all quarters,
which they [the British] convert into troops, vindictive, and rapacious,” wrote American
brigadier general John Hungerford. During the war, approximately three thousand Virginia
slaves fled to freedom, which increased fears of rebellion. John Coalter, Randolph’s brother-inlaw, argued that even if planters kept their slaves from rebelling or fleeing, the war had planted
the idea of freedom in their minds. Fearing a class of servants enlightened about freedom,
Coalter advocated selling all slaves over fourteen to other states, thus ridding Virginia of its most
dangerous inhabitants.18
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The free black population was blamed by planters for spreading the spirit of
rebelliousness. With the threat of racial unrest looming, John Taylor of Caroline explored the
white contempt for free blacks in two of his Arator essays. He cast slavery as a “misfortune,” but
believed it “incapable of removal.” In their misfortune, master and slave formed a powerful
bond, which subdued the servants’ “furious passions.” Free blacks interfered with the masterslave relationship and thus endangered Southern stability. This “unproductive class” stole from
plantations, corrupted obedient slaves, inspired them to run away, and planted the seeds of
rebellion. Randolph read and agreed with Taylor’s arguments.19
While his neighbors feared their own slaves, Randolph expressed little concern about his
own. In the classic example of slaveholding paternalism, he convinced himself that his slaves
posed less of a danger. They loved him and appreciated how he cared for them. And by some
accounts, the Roanoke slaves did exhibit affection toward Randolph, real or feigned. Josiah
Quincy, Jr. expressed surprise when a man in Washington described a visit with Randolph to
Roanoke. “Men and women rushed toward him, seized him by the hand with perfect familiarity,
and burst into tears of delight at his presence among them. His conduct to these humble
dependents was like that of a most affectionate father among his children.” Randolph insisted
that he took no precautions to protect himself from his own slaves. “I sleep with windows open
to the floor, my doors are never fastened, seldom shut,” he wrote. To him, they were his family.
He encouraged intermarriage of his own slaves and discouraged relationships with bondsmen
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from other plantations. In his own eyes, he was their benefactor and they were, for the most part,
loyal servants who offered him important connections to the gentry past.20
Of course, Randolph based many of his suppositions about slavery on his limited contact
with his personal servants. “My best friends are a few faithful slaves, who attend to my domestic
concerns and minister to my few wants without troubling me for orders,” he wrote. John White
and Jupiter, more commonly known as Juba, grew extremely close to their master. Since 1803,
John White, whose father Essex had also served the Randolph family, had attended Randolph at
Roanoke and Washington. The two servants accompanied their master everywhere, even
sleeping in the same room with Randolph at Roanoke. Juba and John White riding alongside
Randolph in the streets or standing behind him at dinner became a familiar sight in Washington.
He showed them favor and may have given them a sense of distinction. Randolph doted on them
publicly, even comparing John White’s intelligence favorably to that of his congressional
colleagues. But they would never be allowed to forget that he was their master. When John
White battled alcoholism, Randolph sent him to work in the tobacco fields, once left him in jail
for three months, and at least once ordered an overseer to whip him. By the accounts of many
people, Randolph was particularly close to Juba, but when one person asked him, Randolph
replied “Juba is good, very good servant—none better—but he will steal.” In 1843, ten years
after Randolph’s death, Henry Howe visited Roanoke and found Juba still watching over
Randolph’s cabin, which remained just as Randolph had left it. As Howe surveyed the simple
dwelling, he spotted portraits of John Randolph and Pocahontas. Then he saw a rarity—a
drawing of Juba, which Randolph kept there among his few possessions. “He was more than a
20
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father to me,” Juba told him. In Randolph’s political exile at Roanoke, slavery was one of the
few institutions that remained constant.21
***
In the spring of 1814, Randolph left Roanoke to tour the eastern Tidewater region where
he had spent his childhood. In March, he boarded a boat in Richmond and sailed the James River
until it met the Appomattox. As the boat approached the bluff above the river, “the noble sheet of
water in front of the house seemed to revive me” On land, the sight shocked him. He saw his
birthplace Cawsons, “once the seat of plenty and cheerfulness, associated with my earliest and
tenderest recollections, now muted and deserted.” As he traveled along the James, the sight of
“dismantled country-seats, ruinous churches, fields forsaken” astonished him. Randolph
mourned more than the physical deterioration of the Tidewater’s plantations. The three previous
decades of social, economic, and political changes had “uprooted” the gentry and altered “the
whole fabric” of his society. “The old gentry had disappeared,” replaced by “the rich vulgar.”
Randolph lamented the loss of his ancestors’ way of life and romanticized the “race of planters,
of English descent” of his memory:
Their inhabitants and establishments, for the most part spacious and costly, in some
instances displayed taste and elegance. They were the seats of hospitality. The possessors
were gentlemen,—better bred men were not to be found in the British dominion. Each
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planter might be said, almost without exaggeration, to have a harbor at his door. Here he
shipped his crop (tobacco), mostly on his own account to London, Bristol or Glasgow.
Those families had disappeared, moved west or been reduced to poverty. Rich capitalists from
undistinguished families now inhabited the Tidewater. Only “the most minute attention to their
affairs” concerned these men. As the gentry disappeared, Randolph believed that the “middle and
lower ranks of our people,” a class he typically despised, were “more social and hospitable” than
the rising moneyed class that ruled eastern Virginia.22
Randolph blamed democracy, westward movement, the failure of republicanism, and the
policies of Jefferson and Madison for the decline of Virginia. He particularly despised the use of
the gentry as “an electioneering bug bear” inspired by “democratical equality.” In the politics of
Jefferson’s Virginia, candidates cast the aristocracy as the enemy of republican society and
government, a remnant of the “poisoned society” of Great Britain. Looking back, Randolph
believed that the 1785 disestablishment of the Anglican Church in Virginia was a critical
moment in the gentry’s decline. In 1814, he stared at abandoned churches that now stood “in
portentous silence upon our guilty land.” The attacks on the Anglican, now Episcopal Church, by
deists such as Jefferson constituted an act of “sacrilegious violence” that “contributed to the
swell of general ruin.” In disgust, Randolph now watched freeholders and poor whites turn away
from the Anglican Church and embrace the growing Methodist and Baptist denominations.23
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For Randolph, the sons of Richard and Judith presented the best hope to save their family
from similar oblivion. Since his brother’s death, John Randolph had exercised enormous
influence over his nephews. Richard Randolph wanted his sons educated in England, far away
from the slave society of Virginia. John Randolph had arranged for St. George to receive an
education in London under the care of Minister James Monroe, who looked after him. The child
had been born deaf and mute, but he was also very capable. In defiance of Richard’s wishes and
over the objections of Judith, John Randolph sent Tudor Randolph to Harvard. Judith Randolph
clung to her children as the brightest part of her life. The scandal still weighed heavily on her,
alienating her from some of her closest family members for years. Her brother-in-law
exacerbated her loneliness and isolation when he forced Nancy Randolph to leave Bizarre in
1805. Afterward, the close relationship between John and Judith Randolph grew troubled. In
1810, after she finally freed the slaves of Bizarre, she became impoverished. After John
Randolph left Bizarre, Judith struggled to find peace and repair the relationships of her life. She
eventually fell under the influence of a local charismatic Presbyterian minister, John Holt Rice,
who ran a school near Farmville. She experienced a religious awakening that seemed to soothe
her painful life. When John Randolph first heard of her conversion to the Presbyterian faith, he
confronted her, screaming in his “piercing falsetto” that her alignment with the dissenters
disgraced the Randolph name. The lives of his nephews would honor the family’s storied past.
He taught St. George and Tudor Randolph to revere their family’s past and protect its land. The
Randolph’s family fortunes seemed doomed, however. On a spring day in 1813, John Randolph
and St. George watched as flames engulfed the plantation house at Bizarre, destroying papers,
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books, and other important family heirlooms. The following year, St. George Randolph turned
“entirely incoherent” as he experienced a mental breakdown. For John Randolph, “the very
strange and distressing occurrences” in his family were part of a convergence of personal, local,
national, and international tragedies that sprang from the unfaithful behavior and ideas of men.24
Randolph again blamed those unfaithful to the gentry for the decline of Virginia and its
planters. In national politics, Jefferson and Madison served as scapegoats; but in family matters,
Randolph blamed his stepfather, St. George Tucker. Since 1809, stepfather and son had grown
apart because Tucker disapproved of Randolph’s effort to entice his stepbrother, Beverly Tucker,
to abandon the law and become a planter. After Randolph visited Cawsons in 1814, he accused
his stepfather of squandering the Randolphs’ fortunes and blamed him for the loss of Matoax.
Furthermore, Tucker had encouraged his stepsons to reject the God of their mother and embrace
French-inspired rationalism. “The germ of piety was sown in my opening heart by a mother’s
hand—the sneer of skepticism, the open daring habitual profanity of yourself and your
companions,” Randolph wrote. He accused Tucker and the “men of splendid genius” of
introducing him to Deism and hostility to Christianity with “the infidel books which I heard
praised and read.” In regard to slavery, Randolph accused Tucker of gross hypocrisy. He accused
the supposedly antislavery Tucker of selling slaves and sending female slaves to Roanoke for
breeding, increasing his own human property. Randolph said he once refused to send any slaves
back to Tucker, where they would face sale. “I loved them too well to ask whether they were
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Tuckers or Randolphs.” After these accusations, he met Tucker only once more, near Richmond,
where he refused to shake his hand. The split also alienated him from most of his step-siblings.25
The Randolph family’s remaining hope for survival lay with Tudor Randolph, and John
Randolph took great pains to assure that he had the best education. On his way to Harvard
College in 1814, the boy was injured in a New York City. There, Anne Morris brought him to
her home, Morrisiana, where she cared for him. Morris was no stranger. She was the former
Nancy Randolph, the woman at the center of the scandal that had ruined Richard Randolph.
After John Randolph drove her from Bizarre, she spent several years in miserable poverty in
Richmond before she fled to New York City. There she finally escaped the shame and whispers
of the scandal. In 1809, she married Gouverneur Morris in New York City, despite their twentythree-year age difference. After giving birth to a son, she settled into a peaceful life at
Morrisiana. An unplanned reunion of Bizarre plantation’s former residents occurred when Judith
and John Randolph rushed to New York to care for Tudor. When he arrived at Morrisiana, John
Randolph embraced Anne Morris as an old friend; and as Tudor’s recovery became clear, the
reunion turned into a pleasant visit. Randolph discussed the war with Gouverneur Morris,
another harsh critic of President Madison. The following day, Randolph left Morrisiana on
cordial terms with everyone. In New York City, however, members of the elderly Morris’s
family expressed concern about Anne to John Randolph. They accused her of sexual
impropriety, and tried to cast doubt on the legitimacy of Gouverneur Morris’s son. Many in the
Morris family wanted the patriarch to spurn his bride and cut the son out of the wealth.26
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The gossip rekindled Randolph’s anger regarding the Bizarre scandal, which had ruined
Richard Randolph’s reputation. Randolph believed that the scandal represented a watershed
moment in his family’s decline. Indeed, Anne Morris served as a reminder of the fading power of
the planter class. In Virginia, she faced shame and scorn for her role in the scandal, but in New
York she escaped the lingering whispers of infanticide, adultery, and incest. Living in splendor at
Morrisiana, her life represented a reputation of the viciousness of Southern honor. Before
Randolph left New York City, he spread rumors that Nancy Randolph had murdered Richard
after he learned of her sexual liaison with a slave. John Randolph insisted that he drove her from
Bizarre when he first suspected she had murdered his brother. As if those charges were not
enough, Randolph also accused her of working as a prostitute in Richmond. On October 31, he
wrote a letter to Gouverneur Morris outlining the charges. Anne was a manipulative character,
Randolph argued, and he urged Morris to beware lest she murder him for his fortune. Hopefully,
Morris would disinherit the child and cut Nancy off from her financial security. Although
Randolph had refused to mention the scandal for decades, it now became clear that he had long
suspected Richard to be guilty of some impropriety. At this time, Randolph blamed the scandal
and, in part, his family’s downfall on a dishonorable woman, who dealt in deceit and lived
outside the system of honor. Gouverneur Morris kept the letter from his wife, and the charges
initially went unanswered.27
***
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The dismay over Northern attacks on slavery seemed ironic, for Randolph had cultivated
important friendships with antislavery Northerners in recent years. Since the debate over the war,
Randolph’s friendships with George Logan, Harmanus Bleecker, and Josiah Quincy had
outraged some Southerners. The friendship between Randolph and Quincy had grown especially
warm, for the two opposed many of the policies of the Jefferson and Madison administrations.
During the war debate, Quincy, the leader of the New England delegation in the House, often
deferred to Randolph when it came to opposition to the war. The men were bound together by
their mutual hatreds—of France, Napoleon, Madison, democracy, and especially the war with
Britain. Quincy accused Republicans of creating the breach with Britain to degrade New
England’s political influence. Indeed, he believed that Madison had declared war only after
Henry Clay threatened to use the Republican caucus to block Madison’s renomination. At the
end of 1812, Quincy left the House of Representatives for the Massachusetts legislature, where
he attempted to block aid to the war effort. In his opposition, however, he focused much of the
blame for the war on Southern slaveholders. In their correspondence, Randolph often denigrated
his fellow Virginians. When he once asked for newspapers from New England, he lamented that
“we have here a little school of intelligent freeholders upon whom such things are not thrown
away.” From Virginia, he supported and encouraged New England’s opposition to the war. “I
would not have you expect the relief from the sympathy of the Southern country, the people of
which are prepossessed by the demons of factions and discord with no favorable opinion of you,”
he wrote to Quincy. Both men wanted to end the war that threatened the civilized AngloAmerican world.28
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Few others in the South shared Randolph’s sympathy with New England, which earned
him the label of traitor. Jefferson believed that New England’s resistance represented an
“apostasy,” an attack on the emerging republican empire, and a cover for monarchical
sympathies. Randolph insisted that Jefferson, Madison, and the Republicans wanted to stifle
dissent and that they vilified the opposition to distract from the conflict’s disastrous results. “It is
only by obtaining entire control over the press, South and West of Virginia, (as well as in that
State) and persuading the country that you and I and some others were the cause of all their
difficulties by encouraging the British, that they have been able to support themselves,”
Randolph wrote to Quincy.29
New England’s solidarity appealed to Randolph. Unburdened by slavery and appreciative
of its British culture, the region protected its society, culture, and republican government. In
contract, Randolph believed, Jefferson and Madison had betrayed Virginia in order to empower
the federal government and degrade the British roots of Virginia society. Since the Revolution,
faithful Congregationalists of New England had protected and supported their church while
Jefferson and his supporters looked at the Anglican faith as “a church to pull down.” Randolph
believed that the men of New England never failed to honor the Puritans of their lore, while
Jefferson damned the Englishmen who established Virginia’s gentry.30
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Whether in Virginia or New England, however, slavery posed the most serious threat to
internal peace and sectional cohesion. In April 1813, Quincy aired New England’s grievances
against the South during an address honoring the anniversary of George Washington’s
inauguration. New England wanted peace, but Quincy realized that would only solve “present
ills.” To address Northern concerns, the federal government must undergo fundamental changes.
Above all else, the oppressive power of the slaveholders offended Quincy and fellow New
Englanders. The “ruling cabal” who pushed the nation into war enjoyed power only because of
the “slave ratio in the constitution” and the “emigrations, into the west,” Quincy insisted. The
three-fifths compromise would assure that slaveholding states dominated Congress when
Southerners settled Louisiana. Never mentioning the plight of the slaves, Quincy contended that
the numerical advantage in Congress allowed the measures that produced the war and threatened
New England’s political and commercial power. In newspapers, churches, and on the street
corners, New Englanders expressed similar sentiments. From the pulpit, preachers argued that
the disastrous war with England might be God’s judgment for the sins of the slaveholding South.
As Quincy’s opposition to the war intensified, Randolph assured him that “there is not a man in
the United States who agrees more entirely with you than myself.”31
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The poor performance of American troops on the battlefield further encouraged dissent in
New England. During the first year of the conflict, America waged a limited war in republican
fashion. The administration forbade any plundering during the Canadian campaign, waged
civilized combat, and tried to leave civilian populations untouched. But this limited-war effort
made the administration seem inept. In 1813, when American troops captured the Canadian
capital of York, soldiers looted homes and burned the legislative assembly building. Many in
New England feared retribution for the attack and resisted supplying more soldiers for the war.
In the fall of 1813, Martin Chittenden, the new Federalist Governor of Vermont, ordered the
state’s militia home. Yet, many Republican officials and military officers refused to comply with
the order. In Massachusetts, state senator Harrison Gray Otis offered a motion pledging support
for Vermont’s protection of “constitutional rights.” The public endorsed the motion as New
England moved toward outright resistance. The motion also pleased Randolph. “I have seen Mr.
Otis’ motion, and I assure you that no occurrence since the war has made so deep an impression
on me,” he wrote to Quincy. He rejoiced in New England’s embrace of states’ rights principles
but offered words of caution about talk of disunion:
Certain reports here, to which you cannot be a stranger, have caused much speculation
and some uneasiness here. Pray give me a little light respecting the serious intention of
the Opposition in Massachusetts. Rash counsels are not always, if ever, wise. I trust we
shall hold together.
Randolph certainly approved of disunion as a legitimate legal option. “It has always been my
opinion that the Union was the means of securing safety, liberty, and welfare of the confederacy,
and not in itself an end to which these should be sacrificed.” He warned Quincy that a politician,
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state, or society must move carefully toward disunion. A state should attempt secession only as a
last resort and only when “there is reasonable prospect of success.”32
The Republicans saw New England as traitorous, especially as merchants of the region
traded with Great Britain. In December 1813, the Madison administration passed a new embargo,
which banned all American exports. New England regarded the measure, with its severe
penalties and fines, as an act of retribution for its antiwar activity. The tense atmosphere in the
United States broke briefly when the nation learned the news of Napoleon’s fall. In early 1814,
Americans hoped that peace in Europe and the end of France’s Continental System would mean
the resumption of trade and the end of the war. Indeed, Napoleon’s fall briefly gave Randolph
hope for peace. “I fervently trust that the hour of our deliverance is at hand,” he wrote. But he
still saw the Anglo-American war as a civil war that “dimmed the ties of blood.” As was
common in civil wars, vengeance could prove swift. “I have it much at heart to give them a
complete drubbing before peace is made,” British admiral Alexander Cochrane wrote. Great
Britain soon sent soldiers to defend Canada and to attack both Chesapeake Bay and the Gulf
coast.33
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In late summer, twenty British warships appeared in Chesapeake Bay for an invasion.
Randolph rushed to Richmond, where he volunteered for military duty and served on a mounted
patrol around Richmond. The militia now had two responsibilities, to guard against invasion and
protect against an uprising. Stationed at Camp Holly in Henrico County, Randolph patrolled the
Virginia countryside, where he again noted that “[e]verything bears the mark of decay.” After
some plundering of the Virginia coast, British forces focused their attention on Washington, D.C.
On August 24, Madison, who believed that the enemy was headed for Baltimore, fled the capital
with his government, allowing the British army to march almost unimpeded into the city. In
retaliation for the looting of York, the British burned most of the government buildings. After
just a single destructive day, the Executive Mansion, the Capitol building and most of the other
government offices lay in ruins. In October, Randolph visited the city and surveyed the damage:
Washington is ruined. The walls of the Capitol and Palace are rapidly decomposing. The
massive columns in the Hall of Representatives are not larger than the ordinary poles of
which we build tobacco houses. The Navy yard is utterly torn up and destroyed. The
public offices, archives, & c., gone for ever.
As he walked the ruined grounds of the capitol building, the sight of his greatest triumphs and for
a dozen years his intellectual and emotional home, he wondered what lay ahead for him,
Virginia, and the nation. The British army moved on to attack Baltimore, but that city’s
defenders repelled them.34
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New England’s disgust at the war turned especially bitter when Madison requested a
conscription bill in the autumn of 1814. It would allow the federal government to avoid asking
state governments for more militia. In December 1814, five New England states sent
representatives to Hartford, Connecticut, for a convention to consider responses to the war.
Disunion was a possibility. The Convention’s final report addressed immediate problems
generated by the war, specifically advising state governments to nullify the federal conscription
bill. Concerning long-term sectional issues, the report advocated constitutional amendments to
repeal the three-fifths clause, prevent foreign citizens from serving in federal office, require a
two-thirds congressional vote to declare war or implement commercial restrictions, and ban
successive presidents from the same state. In addition, the Convention urged the federal
government to rid itself of the western territories and limit the admission of foreigners. In
essence, the Hartford Convention wanted a restoration of the Union to its English origins. The
failure to pass the measures, delegates warned, would result in the secession of New England. 35
With the exception of the repeal of the three-fifths clause, Randolph had advocated much
of the Hartford platform at various times in his career. Indeed, he wanted nothing more than to
restore the nation to its original Anglo-Saxon roots centered along the eastern seaboard. But
Randolph saw his political resurrection in the events at Hartford. In December 1814, he wrote a
public letter to New England on the growing secessionist movement, but his real target was the
“libels on the planters of Virginia” emerging from the region. Although he sympathized initially
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with Quincy and the war dissenters, he now objected to the seething hostility toward slavery and
labeled the Hartford proceedings as disloyal. Randolph attacked those who would diminish
Virginia’s power or prestige. While those in New England assumed that Virginians “would be
very glad to hear of the bombardment of Boston, so, I much fear, your jacobins would not be
very sorry to hear of a servile insurrection in Virginia.” While he wished that “neither country”
harbored such feelings, he recognized that New Englander’s hatred of slaveholders, if not
slavery, drove their dissent. “Let not her [New England’s] orators declaim against the enormity
of French principles, when she permits herself to arm and discipline our slaves, and to lead them
into the field against their masters, in the hope of exciting by the example a general insurrection,
and thus render Virginia another St. Domingo.” Southerners carried the dual burden of producing
the nation’s antislavery measures and caring for the slaves, he insisted. “Is this the country that
has abolished the slave trade? that has made that infamous, inhuman traffic a felony? that feeds
with the bread of life all who hunger after it, and even those who, but for her, would never have
known their perishing condition?” New England now looked at the three-fifths clause as “the
master-key which unlocks all its difficulties” and will end the “undue Virginia influence.” he
continued. If Virginia enjoyed a preponderance of power in the Union, then perhaps it deserved
it. “What member of the confederacy has sacrificed more on the altar of public good than
Virginia [?]” The remarkable letter revealed how easily Randolph could turn a public situation in
his favor. In his sweeping defense, he took credit for the abolition of the foreign slave trade,
ignoring both his attempt to defeat the bill and his threats of disunion during that debate. New
Englanders could scarcely believe Randolph’s hubris and prevarications. “If this gentleman not
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be deemed insane, it must be allowed,” wrote one observer, “that his letter is practical proof, that
sanity may, at times, perform the functions of madness.”36
When his former constituents urged him to stand for his old House seat in the next
election, it became clear that his letter had served its primary purpose. On January 7, 1815, he
answered the calls for his reelection in the Richmond Enquirer. Reveling in his political
vindication, he wondered about the “strange metamorphosis” of his former constituents. He
hoped that the ongoing peace negotiations in Europe would produce a settlement and urged the
people to prepare for the problems of peace. Dismantling the standing army should be the top
priority for Congress after the war, he insisted. If the standing army was maintained the people
could easily turn to a military despot who promised to solve the nation’s or a section’s social and
economic problems. He realized that Virginia remained in a precarious condition as soil erosion,
natural disaster, and the deprivations of the war caused economic suffering. “Not a village, not a
neighborhood, hardly a family escapes the infection.” Interestingly, Randolph singled out the
“shivering negro” as one of the war’s most unfortunate victims. “His master, no doubt some
‘Southern Nabob,’ some ‘Haughty Grandee of Virginia,’” the very idea of whose existence
disturbs the repose of over-tender consciences, is revelling in luxury which the necessary wants
of his wretched bondsmen are stinted to supply.” He agreed to run for Congress.37
In late 1814, Americans wanted the war to end before Great Britain devoted even more
resources to defeat the United States. In New Orleans, British forces seemed poised to overrun
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the city and sever the Union. In January, insurrection in New England seemed imminent as the
Massachusetts government refused to use the militia to defend Maine from the British. On
January 9, the Hartford Convention’s resolutions reached President Madison. In Europe, the
administration’s diplomats, John Quincy Adams, Henry Clay, and Randolph’s old friend Albert
Gallatin, found peace negotiations difficult in light of the nation’s dismal battlefield
performance. After a quarter of a century of warfare, the British government wanted peace.
Finally on December 24, 1814, the two nations signed the Treaty of Ghent, which left most of
the prewar problems technically unresolved. Before news of the treaty reached the United States,
General Andrew Jackson and his army dealt the British army a resounding defeat at New
Orleans. When news of the treaty arrived, Americans were celebrating the victory of Jackson and
his frontier warriors over the world’s greatest army.38
The auspicious ending of the war inspired a burst of patriotism and a celebration of
nationalist principles, in which Randolph refused to participate. Instead, he believed the nation
needed to deal with the “imbecility of the men at the head of our affairs.” In late March, with his
election victory over Eppes almost certain, Randolph argued again that Congress must disband
the army and prevent the development of “two great but very unequal classes,”—the citizens
who paid taxes and the army who lived off of them. Furthermore, Randolph promised to end the
reign of the war merchants and profiteers who took advantage of the public’s miseries. “I was
38
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not born into this order of things, and I will never consent, voluntarily, to become the vassal of a
privileged order of military and monied men,” he added. The victory transformed citizens’
behavior and their ideas about themselves. They interpreted the war’s end as a triumph of the
new world over the old, of an expansive America over its former colonial master. But Randolph
lamented “that the seeds of eternal discord are sown between the two great families of the AngloSaxon race.”39
In the midst of Randolph’s effort to reclaim his seat, his contemptuous attack on Anne
Morris returned to haunt him. Gouverneur Morris kept the contents of Randolph’s letter secret
from his wife for several months. When she heard the details, she leveled a scathing rebuke
designed to prevent Randolph’s election. In a letter sent to Virginia senator William Branch
Giles and First Lady Dolley Madison, among others, Morris indicted Randolph and the planter
society he now publicly cherished. She portrayed Randolph as a “chapter of self-contradictions”
and ridiculed his transformation from Jack Randolph, the friend of French Jacobinism, to the
Anglophile and genteel John Randolph of Roanoke. Contradictions and reversals “make up the
history of his life,” she insisted. While Randolph of Roanoke now memorialized the lost
civilization of planters, Morris condemned it with the charges of hypocrisy, self-indulgence, and
selfishness. Morris exposed Randolph as a hateful and violent man with a “murderous
disposition,” who once threw a knife at his brother Richard and nearly “consigned him to the
grave.” But, Randolph was at his most hypocritical on the matter of slavery:
There are many who remember, while your slaves were under mortgage for the British
debt, your philanthropic assertion that you would make them free and provide tutors for
them. With this project, you wearied all who would listen. When, by the sale of some of
39
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them, a part of the debt was discharged, and an agreement made to pay the rest by
installments, you changed your mind. This was not inexcusable, but when you set up for
your representation in Congress, and the plan to liberate your slaves was objected to in
your District, you published, to the astonishment of numbers, who had heard you descant
on your liberal intentions, that you never had any such idea. Thus your first step in public
life was marked with falsehood.
Morris hoped the attack would outrage planters in Randolph’s district, who would thus deny him
office. “His constituents (at least, those who once were) must be deranged if they ever reelect
this malignant madman,” stated an anonymous enclosure in Morris’s letter to Dolley Madison.
Morris tried to enlist William Branch Giles and John Wayles Eppes in her campaign against
Randolph but to no avail. Randolph believed the letter placed “her character beyond all
question.”40
The press declined to make the Morris letter a public matter, but Virginia newspapers
refused to support Randolph’s return to office. “There was a time [when] we admired him,”
Thomas Ritchie wrote in the Richmond Enquirer. But now, Randolph’s mental condition made
him a bad choice for public service. “Mr. R, lives in a world of his own creation—and knows
very little of the world without him,” Ritchie argued. “The violence of his passions have wrought
his ruin.” The Richmond Enquirer raised the issue of Randolph’s sympathy for England as an
example of his unpredictable and disloyal behavior, repeating rumors that he cheered the burning
of Washington. Almost as damaging were allegations that Randolph had recently condemned the
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American Revolution as a mistake. Critics reported a version of Randolph’s supposed remarks:
“The American Revolution had begun in Treason (or Rebellion) had been continued by Lareceny
[sic] (alluding to the confiscation of the Estates of Tories,) and had ended in sacrilege (in
allusion to the sale of the glebe lands of the old Episcopal Church?).” Indeed, during his recent
lamentations about the decline of the gentry, he often condemned the social changes wrought by
the American Revolution, particularly the growing impulse toward democracy and the decline of
the Anglican (now the Episcopal) Church. Ritchie and many other Republicans believed he
should never be allowed to escape his sullied past. “It is for the people to say, whether their
interests will be safe in the hands of such a representative,” Ritchie wrote. In the end, Morris and
Ritchie failed to sway enough voters, for Randolph defeated Eppes by 62 votes.41
***
The war, the crisis of the gentry, and family tragedies sent Randolph into an emotional
downturn despite his electoral vindication. In the past few years, Randolph had moved away
from the rational Deism that he had devoted himself to since his youth. In his public trials and
personal misfortunes, he began reevaluating his spiritual life. For several years, he had embraced
the Episcopal Church but only as a cultural reminder of Virginia’s past. When the nation began
the move toward war, he began obsessing about his own spiritual welfare. Since his time at
Columbia College he had believed that through politics republicanism would save mankind. In
the hopeful days of his youth, he expected the French Revolution to lead to the “amelioration of
mankind.” Instead, it spawned Napoleon, or as Randolph characterized him, “Satan himself.”
That Jefferson and Madison pursued policies that assisted Napoleon while seeking to destroy
England, the foundation of Virginia’s gentry, convinced Randolph that mankind might be
41
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doomed. Defeated and outcast, Randolph looked beyond politics for the pressing answers of faith
amid public crises and private tragedies.42
A sermon on the responsibilities of Christian planters by the Reverend John H. Rice
convinced Randolph to dedicate himself to improving his slaves’ well-being, especially their
spiritual conditions. Often, Randolph asked local white ministers to preach to the slaves at
Roanoke, and the sermons gave Randolph the opportunity to exercise his paternal authority over
his slaves. One of his favorite ministers, A. W. Clopton, recalled that after he delivered one such
sermon, Randolph took his place in the pulpit and addressed the field full of slaves:
He dwelt on the gratitude that was due to God for his kindness, and illustrated by his own
kindness to his servants. He spoke of the ingratitude shown to the Creator, and illustrated
by their ingratitude to him. “My ancestors,” said he, “have raised all of you, save one,
whom I bought from a hard master for sympathy’s sake. I have cherished and nourished
you like children; I have fed and clothed you better than the neighbors have fed and
clothed their servants. I have allowed you more privileges than others have been allowed.
Consequently any good heart would have shown gratitude even to me.
The self-flattering comment said more about his image of himself and his gentry ancestors than
the actual treatment of slaves. He believed that his care for the slaves made him the only person
that separated them from death and that he sacrificed his own wellbeing to provide for them. The
Northern antislavery interests could never understand the relationship, he believed, and they
would consign the slaves to doom if they actually achieved emancipation. In his religious fervor,
Randolph contended that he had reconciled himself to the place slavery had in his life. In
October 1815, when he returned from visiting Morrisiana, he expressed his acceptance of
42
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slavery: “For my part I shall return enamored of Virga and quite reconciled to Negroe Slavery.”
He was prepared to embraced its “comforts, as well as its curses.” In his search for spiritual
renewal, however, Randolph came to see himself as a true antislavery man and would “dedicate
the remnant of my life” to improving the “conditions among my poor slaves.” The company of
Rev. Rice encouraged him to criticize slavery, and pointed toward an assault on the institution in
public policy. “It is your partial friendship that shadows out in me an American Wilberforce,” he
told Rice.43
In December 1815, Randolph arrived for the first session of the Fourteenth Congress with
the fervor of an evangelist. Within days of his arrival in Washington, a young slave woman
jumped from a window at George Miller’s tavern. The abolitionist Jesse Torrey soon revealed
that the woman had attempted suicide because slave traders had broken up her family. Torrey
tried to use the incident to highlight the slave trade that operated in the shadow of the
government. Visitors to the nation’s capital often witnessed chained slaves marching through the
streets on their way from the border states to the Deep South. In 1816, Torrey led efforts to draw
attention to the horrors of this trade.44
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The story of the young slave woman disturbed Randolph. In March 1816, he asked that
the House committee responsible for governing the District of Columbia investigate abolishing
the city’s slave trade, which he deemed a “crying sin before God and man.” While he stressed
that “he would never weaken the form of the contract between the owner and his slave,” he
attacked the domestic slave trade. Anyone who walked through the streets of the city, he
declared, saw “an assemblage of prisons” where slaves dreaded “to be torn from their
connexions [sic],” and he condemned the government for harboring the practice. He recognized
that his stance contradicted his opposition to outlawing the foreign slave trade in 1807. That
stance had been driven by his desire to protect the states’ sovereignty, but the governance of
Washington was a federal issue. He regretted that his earlier vote had led others to label him “an
advocate of the most nefarious traffic that has ever stained the annals of the human race.” He
denounced the sight of slaves “incarcerated and chained down, and thence driven in fetters like
beasts, to be paid for like cattle.” As he had made clear after Gabriel’s Rebellion, Randolph saw
the slaves as humans, capable of understanding their own rights and interests, particularly slaves
whose families had long been in America. The domestic slave trader sold the “civilized informed
negro, habituated to cultivated life, from his master, his friends, his wife, his children, or his
parents.” The Washington slave trade violated humanity’s principles and embarrassed the
government, and Randolph asked the committee to find a way “to put a stop to it.”45
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The House met Randolph’s outrage with indifference. His estranged stepbrother and now
colleague, Henry St. George Tucker, hoping to avoid a nasty debate, suggested that a select
committee should deal with the subject. Randolph regretted that his brother “seemed disposed to
decline the task, and offered himself to take his share in the enterprise.” He thought it imperative
that Congress stop “hard-hearted masters” who destroyed slave families. He recounted a story he
had heard earlier about a slave who saved his money to buy the freedom of his wife and child.
With each allowance, the slave “paid it from time to time into the hands of the master.” When
the slave died before paying the total, the master sold the wife and child. “The transaction was an
affair of honor with the master,” Randolph concluded. He obviously believed that the slave, who
worked honestly for his freedom, was more honorable than the master. The congressmen were in
no mood for John Randolph or his sudden moralization about slavery, which one colleague
believed was another of his efforts “to make a noise and breed confusion.” Robert Wright of
Maryland argued that the current laws were sufficient to deal with the slave trade and compared
the condition of American slaves that of favorably to American sailors recently impressed by the
British. Despite Wright’s doubts, enough support existed for the House to appoint a select
committee with Randolph as a member. However, no action ever emerged from the committee.46
The question of slavery in postwar America seemed unimportant since the Southern
Republicans now enjoyed political dominance. The unfortunate timing of the Hartford
Convention politically diminished the New England Federalists, slavery’s most vocal enemies.
As cotton boomed in the West and slavery became more profitable and desirable, more
Southerners were justifying slavery. In Virginia, most whites blamed the free black population
for the escape of 5,000 slaves during the war and increased demands for their removal from the
46
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state. Early in 1816, the young Federalist and reformer Charles Fenton Mercer, a member in the
Virginia General Assembly, discovered in the records of the legislature the secret
correspondence between Jefferson and Monroe concerning the negotiations to colonize slaves
and freed blacks after Gabriel’s Rebellion. The correspondence inspired Mercer to revive the
idea of colonization, and he tried to build support in Virginia. Randolph himself considered these
questions and even sought the opinion of Britain’s great abolitionist, William Wilberforce.47
In April 1816, Mercer explained to a skeptical Randolph the idea of establishing a colony
in Africa for Virginia’s free black population. In April, Francis Scott Key urged Randolph to
attend a gathering of the colonization movement. At the meeting, Finley and Mercer lobbied men
such as Randolph, Rufus King, and Littleton Waller Tazewell for federal funding for effort. On
December 21, 1816, some of the most distinguished Washington men gathered at the Davis
Hotel to discuss the formation of the American Colonization Society. The meeting chairman,
Henry Clay, opened the proceedings. Randolph addressed the crowd, reminding the attendees
that the colonization effort aimed to export the free black population and would never interfere
with slavery. Referring to John Taylor’s work, he said that the “mixed and intermediate
population of free negroes was viewed by every slave holder as one of the greatest sources of the
insecurity and also unprofitableness, of slave property.” The free black population instilled a
“feeling of discontent” among slaves. Ignoring the problem only courted future danger. Those in
attendance agreed to reconvene and asked Randolph to compose a memorial to Congress,
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requesting official recognition of the colonization movement. The American Colonization
Society met a week later in the House chamber, electing Supreme Court Justice Bushrod
Washington, the nephew of George Washington, as its first president. The meeting drew a
number of the nation’s most distinguished slaveholders, including Andrew Jackson, John Taylor
of Caroline, and William Crawford. While Mercer hoped that the colonization effort might end
slavery, most Southerners saw it as a way to rid the region of the troublesome free-black
population.48
On January 17, 1817, Randolph presented his memorial to the House, seeking recognition
and funds for the American Colonization Society. The House sent the item to the Slave Trade
Committee, which rejected the plan as too costly and unworkable. Eventually, however, the
government secured a colony in Africa and poured more than $100,000 into the experiment of
Liberia. Federal support for the American Colonization Society violated Randolph’s beliefs
about federal power, but he realized the importance of the project. After this initial effort, he
remained guardedly optimistic that the project would remove Virginia’s free black population
and strengthen slavery. In time, however, he came to see it as both unworkable and distracting,
and he never again attended a meeting of the American Colonization Society.49
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***
Struggling with illness and his emotional and religious turmoil, Randolph decided not to
stand for reelection in 1817. Although his old political ally, James Monroe, had assumed the
presidency, Randolph believed the government was bent on a course of nationalism and he
wanted no part of it. “I feel alone in this world,” he wrote. In the following months, he suffered
from several serious illnesses, a part of his chronic lifelong ailment. During one near-death
episode, he thought he heard God whisper into his ear and tell him that all of his beliefs had been
incorrect and promise to bestow on him the “truths of Christianity.” He saw the incident as his
long-awaited sign from God, but it offered him little peace. Instead, he obsessed about his own
death, the decline of Virginia, and his family’s lingering tragedies. He lived in isolation at
Roanoke in a simple, sparsely furnished cabin, deep in the woods. Twenty yards away stood an
even more modest structure with only a sitting room and a bedroom, where Randolph lived
during the winter. In these dwellings, often under the influence of alcohol and laudanum,
Randolph spent the next several months in a lonely depression. “I have no longer a friend,” he
wrote. During this time of reflection, he gave several indications that he had truly turned against
slavery.50
When Judith Randolph died in 1816, responsibility for the mentally ill St. George
Randolph fell to John Randolph. Although St. George often functioned normally at Bizarre, he
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experienced bouts of rage and mental incoherency. Convinced that St. George would never
recover, Randolph tried to gain admission for him into the Pennsylvania Hospital in
Philadelphia, where Benjamin Rush had revolutionized the treatment of the mentally ill. In
several letters to Quaker Philadelphia merchant Thomas Cope, a member of the hospital’s board
of managers, Randolph offered revealing accounts of his changing attitudes about slavery. He
noted that one of the first signs of St. George Randolph’s “mental alienation” was “cruelty to the
slaves.” The emancipation of the family’s slaves angered St. George and might have inspired
him in an attempt to kill his mother. In his anger, St. George wanted to reverse the manumission.
“One of his ruling passions is to reduce these people again to Slavery,” his uncle reported. Of
course, Randolph failed to comment that he had incessantly pestered his nephews with laments
about the decline of the Virginia planter gentry. John Randolph pleaded the boy’s poverty in a
way that played on the Quaker’s antislavery sympathy: “His fortune has been much diminished
by an act of which will not prejudice him in eyes of the humane [and] good, the emancipation, by
his late father, of all his slaves, considerably above one hundred in number.”51
In his correspondence with Cope, Randolph lauded the Quakers and their stance on
slavery. “I was born a member of the old Church of England—I see no cause to leave it, but if I
did I should join the Society of Friends.” While he undoubtedly flattered Cope in the hopes of
securing St. George’s admittance to the hospital, Randolph singled out the Quaker’s stance on
“negro slavery” as the reason for his admiration. In a scathing attack against the foreign and
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domestic slave trade, he condemned the nation’s proslavery political leadership, particularly
Andrew Jackson, who had grown immensely popular after the Battle of New Orleans:
I see no difference between the African slave trade, barbarous as it is, [and] the home
trade except that the latter is more detestable. Human beings having a perfect knowledge
of their situation [and] all it’s [sic] horrors are sent (from this State [and] new England
inclusive) to the marshes of Louisiana, or the Sand Hills of Georgia [and] Abilene, where
they are treated not half as well as the four footed cattle—and yet we boast of our liberty
[and] toast our ‘heroes,’ who when you come to analyze them are mere indian butchers,
slave traders, [and] living in open adultery or fornication.
As with most slaveholders, Randolph reserved much of his ire for the overseers. Particularly
disgusting to him was “their power over the female slaves to a purpose most abominable.” The
message to Cope and his Philadelphia friends was simple: slaves would suffer if left to the likes
of overseers and the hypocrisies of politicians. Benign masters such as himself protected the
slaves.52
Randolph’s antislavery rhetoric went much further than usual in his next letter to Cope.
He continued his rant against slavery, but this time offered his most expansive condemnation of
the institution while defending past political proslavery decisions:
And now for the human butchers. If any thing could reconcile me to the consolidation of
the states it would be the placing of a power where it might be exercised of stifling the
slave trade domestic as well as foreign—it cries aloud to Heaven [and] “vengeance is
mine, saith the Lord” I voted against the bill that passed in 1807 (I think) to prohibit the
African or foreign slave Trade because it was an infringement by the federal Govt. of the
52
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rights of the citizens [and] Commonwealth of Virginia (not to carry on the slave trade. I
acknowledge no such right) but to travel with your servant in some ways: far enough to
sail from any atlantic port even of the state of Virginia to a Chesapeake port within the
same state. Now as an antifederalist [and], for such I have ever been, I hold the rights of
this Commonwealth to be as independent of the Congress [and] President as if the
Parliament [and] King, [and] would hold them in contempt of both authorities. The clause
to sell, ie[.] to dispose of the slaves according to the state laws wherein imported, was
foreseen to be a trick of the Georgian, [and] exposed as such at the time but by opposition
men [and] of course unavailingly.
The curious letter exudes both genuine rage against slavery and calculation. Randolph feigned
not remembering his vote against the abolition of the foreign slave trade in 1807, although he
had recounted his opposition and vote during the previous year’s congressional debate on the
Washington slave trade. As he wrote his antislavery letters to Cope, Randolph offered to help St.
George acquire some slaves for Bizarre. After Judith Randolph had freed the Bizarre slaves, her
brother-in-law had loaned several to her and sold her four, but she could never pay for them.
Now he wanted them back, claiming a desire to keep the slave families together. “If I can [find]
some negroes to work for you I will but those of mine which you have had so long I have now [a
need] for,” he insisted.53
Randolph’s passionate letters to Cope exhibited a sense of guilt at his private and public
relationship with slavery. In August 1818, he wrote to Rev. Meade that he had worried about
God and sin since before he had even arrived in Congress. “It is now just nineteen years since sin
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first came to sit heavy upon my soul.” The idea of irredeemable sin weighed heavily on
Randolph in the face of Virginia’s persistent decline. The condition of the state startled New
York politician John A. Dix as he traveled through Virginia. “You would be astonished at the
decay, which is visible between Washington and Monticello,” he wrote. The excessive
cultivation of tobacco had destroyed plantations and created hardships. “The land is apparently
exhausted, the system of agriculture miserable, every house old and hastening in decay.” Some
communities formed agricultural societies to reform practices and educate farmers, but many
realized their future lay in the West. Randolph welcomed the “great spirit of emigration” that
prevailed “among the poorer classes” as they searched for means of survival. He continued to
grieve, however, that the best families were “dispersed from St. Mary’s to St. Louis.” Gentlemen
who once rode in “fine coaches” left for the West with “saddlebags.” The gentry as he imagined
it no longer existed. Even his stepbrothers fled the family’s eastern past for opportunity in the
West—Beverly for Missouri and Henry St. George for western Virginia.54
In 1819, an economic panic aggravated the declining fortunes of Virginia. In its postwar
exuberance, Congress had established a Second Bank of the United States and a protective tariff,
both opposed by Randolph. Meanwhile, Europe adjusted to peace and its agricultural production
revived, which hurt the American economy. The Bank of the United States called in loans, and
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state banks turned on one another. The boom-and-bust cycle had arrived in America. Since the
end of the war, Randolph had condemned the nation’s seemingly new obsession with capital, and
the economic panic seemed to signal the consequences of the new ethos. In Virginia, property
depreciated and prices dropped. With economic disaster looming, his former constituents urged
Randolph to return to public life. He briefly considered running for the Virginia legislature, but
Randolph decided it was more important to return to Washington. “Very contrary to my
judgment, and yet more against my feelings, I am again a public man.55
As Randolph returned to public life, the circumstances seemed ripe for him to declare
publicly the antislavery sentiments that he had expressed to Thomas Cope. The continuing decay
of Virginia seemed to point to society’s sin of slavery. Randolph saw himself as a part of that sin.
In May 1819, before he returned to Congress, he wrote an updated last will and testament, which
hopefully would absolve him of his sin:
I give to my slaves their freedom, to which my conscience tells me they are justly
entitled. It has a long time been a matter of the deepest regret to me, that the
circumstances under which I inherited them, and the obstacles thrown in the way by the
laws of the land, have prevented my emancipating them in my lifetime. Which it is my
full intention to do so, in case I can accomplish it.

55

Murray Rothbard, The Panic of 1819: Reactions and Policies (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1962); Charles Sellers, The Market Revolution: Jacksonian America 1815-1846
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 135-8; Daniel Feller, The Jacksonian Promise,
1815-1840 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), 40-5; Wilentz, Rise of American
Democracy, 206-16; Clyde A. Haulman, Virginia and the Panic of 1819 (London: Pickering &
Chatto, 2008); JR to Francis Scott Key, May 8, 1819, Garland, John Randolph, 2:105.
268

If his brother had believed it his republican duty to free his slaves in the 1790s, John Randolph
now believed it his Christian duty to do the same. But the question remained whether his
antislavery sentiments would extend to the public sphere.56
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Chapter 7: Conclusion
In 1819, Virginia’s economy slumped and the nation soon slipped into full-scale
economic panic. The freeholders of Southside Virginia asked Randolph to return to Congress. In
their eyes, no one else had represented them as well as Randolph. In the uneventful April
campaign, the name of New York congressman James Tallmadge never surfaced, although
everyone in the South would soon be familiar with him. Randolph won the election and prepared
for the congressional session that would convene in December 1819. In the intermediate months,
the issue of slavery’s expansion was brewing in the North and threatened to create an
unprecedented crisis in Congress. In February 1819, Congress had debated an enabling bill to
allow the Missouri Territory to form a preliminary constitution in preparation for statehood.
James Tallmadge of New York, a follower of Dewitt Clinton, proposed an amendment that
forbade the introduction of slaves into Missouri and declared free the slave children already in
the territory when they reached the age of twenty-five. The House passed the bill, but the
Southern-dominated Senate killed it. As the Fifteenth Congress adjourned, many Southerners
believed the antislavery measure an aberration. During the summer of 1819, however,
Northerners rallied around the idea of a free Missouri and poured their sentiments into rallies,
pamphlets, and other public antislavery displays. Antislavery interests celebrated the Declaration
of Independence’s language of equality as a pillar of the American founding and the inspiration
for an antislavery nation. Hezekiah Niles published his series, “Mitigation of Slavery,” which
reiterated the long held revolutionary-era notion “that slavery must, at some future day, be
abolished in the United States.” As Southerners became aware of the numerous antislavery
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demonstrations in the Northern states, they realized that a serious threat to a proslavery Missouri
existed.1
In December, Congress met and began to discuss the question of Missouri statehood.
Many curious people who had never seen him came to observe the strange-looking John
Randolph. After a few days, however, the novelty of his appearance wore off, and then most of
Washington avoided him. “Here I find myself isole[sic], almost as entirely as at Roanoke.”
Randolph wrote. “I am become [sic] one of indifference to all around me.” In the House, the
question of Missouri came up almost immediately and created considerable tension between
members. “There are no two persons here that care a single straw for one another,” Randolph
observed. Immediately, John W. Taylor of New York advocated the appointment of a committee
to resolve the issue of slavery in Missouri, but it became apparent that neither side wanted to
compromise. On December 14, Congress admitted Alabama as a slave state. Although the Senate
was now evenly divided between free and slave states, the Illinois Senators usually voted with
the South. When Maine applied for admission to the Union as a free state, the prospect of two
more Senators from a free state made a tense debate about Missouri statehood inevitable. Many
expected Randolph to dominate such a debate. “I anticipate the pleasure of witnessing one of his
highest efforts,” wrote one observer. Unfortunately, congressional reporters Joseph Gales and
William Seaton refused to publish most of Randolph’s remarks during the session. Randolph had
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long complained about the “incompetent” Seaton and requested that Gales record his speeches.
However, they ignored him.2
Now, a year and a half after Randolph wrote the revealing antislavery letters to Thomas
Cope and composed his will freeing his slaves, he displayed no hint of antislavery sentiment. In
January 1820, Georgia congressman John Cuthbert offered a resolution for the standing
Committee on the Slave Trade to consider establishing a “registry of slaves” to strengthen
enforcement of the ban on the foreign slave trade. Randolph believed such a measure either
“foolish or mischievous” or an attempt to empower the federal government. In typical fashion, he
argued that “his zeal for the suppression of this detestable traffic was not surpassed by that of
any man in the nation.” In no way, he claimed, did his opposition to the resolution condone the
trade and he offered to “join heart and hand” with the strongest opponents of the foreign slave
trade and carry “the war into the enemy’s country, even into Africa, and endeavor to put it down
there, so they did not go beyond the definite land marks of the constitution.” In other words,
Randolph fought any increased enforcement of the ban on the foreign slave trade, thus refusing
to strengthen the most important antislavery statute on the books.3
In early 1820, Congress began debating the question of whether slavery would be
permitted in Missouri. The prospect of a free Missouri angered Virginians, who demanded their
representatives block any such measure. Many planters saw the Northern opposition to slavery in
Missouri as a way to stifle Virginia’s economy and close the West to slaveholders and slave
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traders. Many argued that if prevented from selling excess slaves, Virginia would see an increase
in its dreaded free-black population. Virginians refused “to be dammed up in a land of Slaves, by
the Eastern people,” wrote jurist Spencer Roane. Randolph’s fear of the growth of the free-black
population led him to present another memorial to the House on behalf of the American
Colonization Society. It requested an increase of support for the Society and the American
colony in Liberia. “The last census shows the number of free people of color of the United
States, and their rapid increase,” it stated. The American Colonization Society offered one
avenue of relief, but Virginia needed the West for its slaves.4
Virginians led the Southern effort to redefine Jeffersonian republicanism and to establish
slaveholding as a permanent Constitutional right. In their desperation, the members of the
Virginia delegation believed that they should cede no ground in the Missouri debate. Initially,
President Monroe encouraged tying together the questions of statehood for Maine and Missouri,
but he later encouraged Southerners to back away from that plan after it stoked popular outrage
in the North. Barbour and the Virginia congressional delegation refused to consider any
possibility other than the admittance of Missouri without restriction on slavery. On February 3,
however, Illinois Senator Jesse Thomas proposed banning slavery in the Louisiana Territory
above the 36° 30´ line, with an exception for Missouri. Virginians believed that the compromise
put them on the road to a constitutional crisis over slavery. “In this distressing crisis it becomes
us to be true to ourselves, and to the Constitution, and, if necessary, to die in the last ditch,”
Spencer Roane wrote to President Monroe. Talk of conflict and secession spread throughout the
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Virginia. In early February, Randolph declared his opposition to any restrictions on slavery in
Missouri during a long, emotional, and much-anticipated speech. He seemed to now embody
Southern emotions about the crisis. “God has given us the [sic] Missouri and the devil shall not
take it from us,” he said. The Boston Advertiser declared the comment and his remarks “the
ravings of a maniac.”5
In his speech, Randolph relied on his standard antislavery rhetoric to cloak his rabid and
complete opposition to any interference with slavery. In a response to Randolph, Northern
Republican William Plumer, Jr., repeated the Virginia slaveholder’s remarks about slavery: “A
gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Randolph) has told us, that all the misfortunes of his life (they
have, he says, been neither few nor inconsiderable)—are light in the balance, when compared
with the single misfortune of having been born the master of slaves.” After restating his
antislavery feelings, Randolph attacked anyone who dared question the right to hold slaves. “He
was wild, diffuse, and sometimes perfectly incoherent,” wrote one reporter. Secretary of State
John Quincy Adams slipped into the House chamber during one of Randolph’s speeches, which
astounded him. “His speech, as usual, had neither beginning, middle, nor end. Egotism, Virginia
Aristocracy, slave-scourging liberty, religion, literature, science, wit, fancy, generous feelings,
and malignant passions constitute a chaos in his mind, from which nothing orderly can flow,”
Adams wrote. Randolph leveled some of his most brutal assaults on the democratic spirit of the
North that seemed to impel the antislavery movement. When opponents of slavery used the
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language of the Declaration of Independence to defend the idea of equality, Randolph dismissed
the document as a “fanfaronade of metaphysical abstractions.” He pointed to a framed engraving
of the document hanging on the wall of the House chamber and insisted it should be removed.
Colleagues reported his uncontrollable temper and his repeated refusals to come to order.6
Randolph’s unseemly Missouri speeches shocked even supporters. Francis Walker
Gilmer believed he was “mad as ever” and “perfectly childish.” Gilmer agreed with Randolph’s
critics who argued that he was a spent force, unable to cope with the situation:
His figure more emaciated than ever, his countenance deep scars of thermidor had
entrenched—his fair and glossy locks which were like those of a girl neglected—dry—
angry—and the whole man disowned of his glory—the elected manner, the dignified
sentiments the brilliant eloquence by which he was distinguished beyond any one I ever
knew converted into doatage [sic] and mere oblivion. This was a sorry sight—and his
wild look—his frantic gestures—the occasional flashes of the sublimest [sic] eloquence
which shed a baleful fire upon the darkness around—still haunt my imagination and
oppress my heart!7
The tumultuous debates and Randolph’s inflamed proslavery rhetoric inspired Speaker
Henry Clay to fashion a compromise over Missouri. In early March, Congress passed three bills
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that admitted Maine to the Union, allowed Missourians to decide whether or not to allow slavery,
and banned the institution elsewhere north of the 36º 30´ line, the compromise that Thomas had
proposed a month earlier. Clay blocked a last-minute effort by Randolph to derail the
compromise. Randolph believed that “the slaveholding interest has been sacrificed by Southern
and Western men from the slaveholding states.” These men cultivated the goodwill and political
favor of Northern politicians. Randolph wanted neither their approval nor support. He publicly
expressed his dislike and even hatred for the North and its growing campiagn against. Indeed, he
even blamed Northerners for his own acceptance of slavery: “These Yankees have almost
reconciled me to negro slavery. They have produced a revulsion even on my mind, what then
must the effect be on those who had no scruples on the subject. I am persuaded that the cause of
humanity to these unfortunates has been put back a century, certainly a generation, by the
unprincipled conduct of ambitious men, availing themselves of a good as well as of a fanatical
spirit in the nation.” In his characteristic perversity, he delighted in the political troubles of the
Northern Republicans who voted for the compromise and who regularly supported the South.
Randolph labeled them “dough faces,” men who were scared of their own shadows and who
served the wishes of the Southern slaveholder. His remark, which became an epithet for a
generation of Northern supporters of slavery, evinced his disdain for their lack of principle.8
Virginians opposed the compromise and yet celebrated Missouri’s eventual admission
without slavery restriction. During the debate, Monroe sent overtures to Randolph to resume
their friendship, and even Jefferson expressed support of Randolph’s performance. Randolph
refused any suggestion of reconciliation and many of his colleagues soon returned to shunning
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him. When he returned to Roanoke, he again sank into depression and self-reflection. “I have
never been a happy man. I am not of a happy temperament; but I never knew until the decay of
my faculties and the dropping of those who once took apparent pleasure in my society, what it
was to be truly alone in the world.” He wanted to escape the country but the effects of the
economic depression made it impossible.9
In December 1820, he returned to Washington for the next congressional session amid a
new firestorm over Missouri. In the intervening months, Missouri proslavery forces had seized
control of that government and written a constitution that banned free blacks from entering the
state. Northerners threatened to undo the Compromise over what they saw as a denial of basic
constitutional rights. These new problems of state disturbed Randolph’s “daily and nightly
thoughts.” His perpetual illness plagued him, too and he feared he would die. Nathaniel Macon
urged Randolph to abandon Congress and return to Virginia. When he did return to the House,
after weeks of illness, the politics of the moment proved “a conundrum to me.” In response, he
avoided the Missouri debate since “there is no faith among men.”10
Randolph and the other Virginians again reacted harshly to Northern opposition. They
rejected any notion that free blacks were actually citizens. Congressman Philip Barbour argued
that only persons of European descent could enjoy citizenship. Virginia’s emerging racial
consciousness led the state’s congressional delegation to dismiss the principles of liberty.
Randolph portrayed the free black population as a burden to the white Southerners. “In our

9

JR to Brockenbrough, February 26, 1820, Garland, John Randolph, 2:135; JR to Richard Kidder
Randolph, August 14, 1820, Randolph papers, LC.
10
JR to Brockenbrough, November 26, 1820 and 1821 (undated), Garland, John Randolph, 2:
138-9, 143; JR to Dudley, December 26, 1820, Letters of a Young Relative, 231.
277

tenderness for the rights and privileges of the colored citizens, we have already brought into
jeopardy the rights and privileges of our fellow white citizens.”11
During the second Missouri debate, Randolph met regularly at the home of Secretary of
the Treasury William Crawford with a group of political leaders including South Carolina’s
William Lowndes and Maine Senator John Holmes, to discuss the crisis. Crawford and Randolph
led discussions about the South’s possible secession from the Union. “You are a peculiar people,
Holmes, prone to fanaticism,” Randolph said. In the growing Northern religious reform
movement against slavery, “the Constitution will only prove a barrier of straw.” In February,
when the House gathered to count the electoral votes for the presidential election, Northern
congressmen, who objected to the recent Missouri Constitution, tried to prevent the inclusion of
the state’s votes. Randolph responded with a speech of “severity & violence.” The Northern
insistence on the rights of free blacks in Missouri outraged Randolph, who openly talked of war.
“Let us buckle on our armour,” he said, “let us put aside all this flummery, these metaphysical
distinctions, these legal technicalities, these special pleadings, this dry minuteness, this
unprofitable drawing of distinctions without difference.” He assured his colleagues that “we will
assert, maintain, and vindicate our rights, or put to every hazard what you pretend to hold in
estimation.” Although he had never voted for the admission of any new state and habitually
scorned the acquisition and growth of the Western territories, Randolph now assured his
Northern colleagues that he would never stop “the growth of the rising Empire of the West.” In
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the end, Henry Clay offered a vague compromise that insisted that no Missouri law could deny
constitutional rights despite the clause in the state’s constitution.12
***
Randolph and others seemed to believe that the Missouri debate represented his “fall
from glory.” While he repeated his typical threats about selling Roanoke and leaving Virginia, he
seemed content with “humble mediocrity” in the absence of the Virginia gentry. He saw the old
order of the republic as doomed, much as the gentry had been. “Men are like nations. One founds
a family, the other an empire—both destined, sooner or later, to decay.” Nevertheless, the
Missouri debates revived him. For the first time since he fell from power during Jefferson’s
administration, he found himself in step with his Southern colleagues, many of whom took his
arguments seriously, even if they disowned his vituperations delivery. More importantly, by
winning admission of a slaveholding Missouri, the forces of slavery seemed in ascendancy. Yet
Randolph realized that the South must stay on guard, and that would best be accomplished by
always portraying the situation in its most dire terms. The South must always feel endangered
and oppressed. To be otherwise would amount to lowering its guard. Randolph finally visited
England in 1822, a trip he had long desired, but he assured his colleagues that he would return
before the 1824 election, which he saw as profoundly important in the struggle between North
and South.13
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As he prepared to sail, Randolph revisited his 1819 will, which had been only informal.
He gave a new version to his friend and attorney, William Leigh. It was basicallythe same as the
earlier document with a single important exception. “I give to my executor a sum not exceeding
eight thousand dollars, or so much thereof as may be necessary, to transport and settle said slaves
to and in some other State or Territory of the United States, giving to all above the age of forty
not less than ten acres of land each.” He followed the formula set by his brother, but without any
of the passion. It was his duty to free his slaves. In his mind, when he set foot in the land of
Wilberforce, he honestly saw himself, the architect of Southern defiance and defender of slave
power, as an antislavery man.14
In the following decade, until his death in 1833, Randolph dropped all pretensions to
antislavery sentiment and became the nation’s unrelenting advocate of slavery’s protection. In
Congress, he fought the expansion of the federal government, always with an eye toward
protecting slavery. In his vehemence his grew even more strange and entertaining. “He blazes
now and then like a small meteor, in Congress, and emits a little light very little more steady,”
wrote one observer. Privately, he continued to plan his slave’s freedom. During one brief period
on his return from his brief tenure as minister to Russia, his rage and anger inspired him to write
another will ordering all of his slaves sold upon his death. But on his death bed, he relented and
asked witnesses to swear that they would see that his slaves were freed. The action turned out to
be his most benevolent in a decade spent working to strengthen the institution.15
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